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Abstract
Crime Scene Behaviors of Rampage School Shooters: Developing Strategies for
Planning, Response, and Investigation of Multiple-Victim Shooting Incidents on School
Campuses. Michael Knox, 2018: Dissertation, Nova Southeastern University, College of
Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Justice and Human Services.
Descriptors: policing, mass shootings, rampage shootings, school violence.
Despite their almost aberrational rarity, rampage school shootings have gained national
attention to an extent that would make it seem that such events are a common occurrence.
Many schools—along with hospitals, businesses, and other institutions—have adopted
policies, implemented training, and conducted drills for responding to such incidents. In
some cases, concern over school rampage shootings has led to bad policy
implementations, particularly adoption of “zero tolerance” policies that punish the
slightest infractions in hopes of thwarting potential attackers, but, rather than achieving
their intended goal, result in massive false positive rates with few, if any, successes and a
potential for fostering violence rather than abating it.
For their part, law enforcement trainers and administrators have been caught in the
rampage school shooter turmoil to such an extent that, starting with the aftermath of the
1999 Columbine High School massacre, significant paradigm shifts in policing
methodology have taken effect. In order to promote more informed policy-making and
training decisions by law enforcement managers, this dissertation seeks to determine
through empirical study of the crime scene behaviors of rampage school shooters the
extent to which law enforcement planning and training can be informed by the study of
prior incidents.
Policy, training protocols, and institutional response plans have been shaped, in many
cases, by a world of perception rather than reason and sound empirical evidence. This
research seeks to bring clarity to the decision-making processes and provide sound
empirical evidence on which to base those decisions and develop strategies for on-site
protocols to help mitigate casualties, establish police response protocols, and develop
post-incident investigative models.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Background
On April 20, 1999, in an unincorporated portion of Jefferson County, Colorado,
high school students Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold, 17, perpetrated a 49-minute
massacre at Columbine High School killing 13 students and teachers and wounding 24
others before taking their own lives (Cullen, 2010; Erickson et al., 2001). The incident
affected American society so deeply that the name “Columbine” has become synonymous
with the phenomenon of school rampage shootings. “[T]he 1999 Columbine tragedy,”
wrote Fox and Savage (2009), “was the watershed event in terms of national
consciousness about school violence” (p. 1474). But whatever effect the massacre had on
American society, Columbine brought law enforcement to a crossroads: the aftermath of
the tragedy revealed the utter failure of police to respond appropriately, to rescue the
wounded, to stop the perpetrators, and to save lives. Instead, people watched in horror the
live news broadcasts showing dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of police staged outside
the school while victims lay dying inside, never to be rescued. Disgusted citizens and
victims’ family members chided police for their apparent inaction and lack of
coordination. Law enforcement officials stonewalled the press and refused to cooperate
with a governor’s inquiry, citing mounting lawsuits and “an on-going
investigation” (Cullen, 2010; Erickson et al., 2001).
Reports surfaced of the ineffectual response by law enforcement. Deputy Neil
Gardner, Columbine’s school resource officer, was called by staff to the parking lot, but
he had no idea what was happening. After Eric Harris fired multiple shots at him,
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Gardner returned fire, but missed. Harris and Klebold then ran inside the school, and,
consistent with protocol, Gardner did not pursue them. At the time, 11 of the 13 murdered
victims were still alive. It was later alleged that Gardner was not wearing his prescription
eyeglasses, though what effect that had on his ability to engage Harris in a gunfight
remains unclear (Cullen, 2010; Seibert, 2000).
Within two minutes, Harris exchanged fire with another deputy, and within a few
more minutes, dozens of law enforcement officers had arrived, but none would enter the
school until several SWAT teams arrived and eventually went in, long after the gunmen
had committed suicide. The strategy had been one of “containment” and “setting up a
perimeter” (Cullen, 2010, p. 56). In the wake of the shootings, law enforcement trainers
and administrators came to understand that “tactical loitering” was no longer an
acceptable policing strategy when facing an active shooter; such incidents would, from
Columbine forward, require a paradigm shift in policing policy, one that would mandate
that the first arriving officers take immediate action (Remsberg, 2013; see also Martinez,
2012; Police Executive Research Forum, 2014).
In 2002, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office settled a lawsuit brought by the
daughter of Dave Sanders, a Columbine High School teacher who allegedly bled to death
because deputies refused to allow paramedics to enter the scene and treat the dying man
for hours after the shooting was over, even after law enforcement commanders were
aware that both Harris and Klebold were dead. Refusing to dismiss the lawsuit, a federal
judge ruled that police officials had “demonstrated a deliberate indifference toward Dave
Sanders’ plight shocking the conscience of this federal court” (quoted in “Columbine
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teacher’s family settles lawsuit,” 2002).
Sadly, law enforcement officials had not learned the lessons from an incident a
decade prior: the massacre perpetrated by Marc Lépine at Canada’s École Polytechnique
de Montréal. On December 6, 1989, Lépine killed 14 people and wounded 14 others at
the college before taking his own life. Police arrived within 12 minutes of the first 911
call but waited another 14 minutes before entering, following their protocol of securing
the perimeter and waiting on specially armed and trained tactical officers. While it is
unclear how many lives might have been saved if police had entered sooner, Lépine was
still roaming the school’s halls while officers waited outside. Though he eventually killed
himself, a coroner’s report on the episode was highly critically of the police response
pointing out that Lépine still had 60 rounds of ammunition on him when he committed
suicide. Had he chosen to, he could have killed many more victims (Wilton, 2014).
Where Columbine set a new bar for law enforcement protocols, Sandy Hook
raised the argument that even the new standard was insufficient. On December 14, 2012,
20-year-old Adam Lanza went to Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,
Connecticut, and opened fire, killing 20 children and six adults before committing
suicide. Lanza shot his way through a floor-to-ceiling glass panel adjacent to a locked,
glass door before killing the principal and school psychologist and wounding two other
staff members. He went into the school office but did not notice several staff members
who were hiding. Lanza then went a short distance down the hall to classroom 8 where he
killed two teachers and all 15 children in the room. Moving to the next classroom—
number 10—he killed two more teachers and five children before killing himself. His
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rampage lasted fewer than 11 minutes (Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015;
Sedensky, 2013).
Where law enforcement had, following Columbine, learned to rapidly amass
multiple officers and enter a school or other venue quickly to proactively engage an
active shooter, Sandy Hook forced law enforcement trainers to face a new question: can
police spare even precious seconds waiting on backup when a shooter is actively killing
innocent people, particularly young schoolchildren? The first officer arrived at the school
two minutes and 41 seconds after being dispatched, but no officer entered the building
until nearly six minutes later (Montminy, Crowley, Manage, & Reed, 2013). The tragedy
has prompted law enforcement trainers and policy makers to advocate for solo-officer
entry: get there, get in, stop the shooter (Police Executive Research Forum, 2014;
Remsberg, 2013; Wylie, 2013). Clearly, when it comes to law enforcement response to
active shooter incidents—especially at schools—there exists a learning curve.
Unfortunately, police may not be as far around that curve as the repercussions
from the Columbine massacre would suggest that they should now be. On February 14,
2018, gunman Nikolas Cruz killed 17 people and wounded 15 others at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. In the aftermath of that tragedy, it
was learned that the school’s resource officer, an armed Broward County sheriff’s deputy,
waited outside the school for several minutes while gunfire was ongoing, never taking in
direct action to stop the shooter. Three more deputies arrived after the shooting, but still
none of them entered the school until several police officers from nearby Coral Springs
arrived, bypassed the deputies, and entered the school to start rescuing victims (Berman,
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2018; Elsesser, DiPentima, & Winston, 2018; Karimi & Lynch, 2018; Merelli, 2018;
Wamsley, 2018).
Problem Statement
Two rampage school shootings in little more than a decade have brought about
two major paradigm shifts in law enforcement thinking, perhaps because police are
particularly bothered by the idea of officers amassing outside a school while children are
being massacred inside. Before the massacre at Sandy Hook, American law enforcement
officials had been seemingly oblivious to the prospects of a shooter killing children at an
elementary school despite the 1996 Dunblane massacre in which 43-year-old Thomas
Hamilton shot and killed 16 children and one teacher inside a gymnasium at Dunblane
Primary School in Scotland (Wilkinson, 2013) and the 1989 murder of five first graders
by 24-year-old Patrick Purdy on an elementary school playground in Stockton, California
(Levin, 2014). Perhaps even police have difficulty accepting the possibility of such a
horrible tragedy.
Each year in the United States, there are an average of 18 incidents of mass
murder by firearm with an average of 85 victims killed plus many more wounded (Fox &
Levin, 1998; Yount & Poston, 2012). While shocking, these incidents account for less
than one percent of all homicides by firearm annually. The 35-year total from 1976
through 2010 equates to about two-and-a-half months worth of firearms homicides
overall. Duwe (2007) found only 116 public mass shootings between 1900 and 1999.
Dorn and Dorn (2013) calculated that any given K-12 school in the United States will
experience a violent, on-campus death once every 7,150 years. Killingbeck (2002)
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pointed out that the Columbine massacre was responsible for only two-hours worth of the
total U.S. homicides in 1999. Still, rampage shootings engender an inordinate level of
fear, concern, and political attention. Recent mass shooting incidents have reignited a
national debate on gun control, school security, and mental health.
For law enforcement, responding to a rampage shooting incident presents unique
challenges. Mass shooting incidents often take place quite quickly and may be completed
in a matter of minutes, providing police precious little time to respond and take action to
prevent casualties. Mass shootings also challenge many of the traditional tactical
deployment protocols employed by law enforcement agencies because, paradoxically,
traditional, sound tactics—designed to prevent deaths and injuries—result in increased
casualties because of the delayed response. To some law enforcement trainers, years of
emphasizing officer survival above all other considerations has caused police agencies to
fail at preventing casualties in a number of active shooter cases (Remsberg, 2013).
In response to Columbine, many law enforcement agencies implemented active
shooter training in which patrol officers were instructed to gather in small groups, enter
the scene, and make their way quickly toward the shooter. Still, recent shootings have
brought some in law enforcement to question the soundness of such a plan with regard to
mitigating loss of civilian life, especially in light of the recent Sandy Hook Elementary
School massacre. While the ongoing killing of innocent citizens must be dealt with
quickly, when the victims are young school children, expediency is paramount, even if it
risks the lives of responding officers. The dilemma of an officer facing a rampage shooter
actively firing on young children is literally one of life or death. Officers must decide
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whether to await the arrival of backup before entering or quickly enter and confront the
shooter; to wait means to risk the lives of others, and to enter means to risk the officer’s
own life. After Sandy Hook, many officers realized the answer to the question must be to
risk everything to stop the shooter or forever live with the guilt of having stood outside
while first graders were being slaughtered just feet away.
With such significant policy implications on the line, law enforcement managers
and trainers need empirical evidence to guide their decisions, including both a reality
check as to the magnitude of the problem and an effective outline of response and
investigative strategies for proper planning and training.
Dissertation Goal
Although law enforcement policymakers have twice shifted the active shooter
response paradigm following the attacks at Columbine and Sandy Hook, such changes
have been done in knee-jerk reaction to real-world incidents, based largely on the media
attention those incidents garnered. Little empirical research has been done for the purpose
of informing policy decisions.
This mixed-methods research sets out to answer important questions such as the
ones just posed. To date, little research has been conducted to assess the on-scene
behaviors of rampage shooters from the standpoint of developing strategies for
effectively mitigating the loss of life. The research explores patterns in the crime scene
behaviors of rampage shooters with particular attention paid to shooters’ responses to
environmental stimuli, the actions of others at the scene, and attempts at intervention by
bystanders and law enforcement. Insofar as patterns emerge within the data, the research
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goal has been to correlate those patterns into strategies and measures that can be
implemented by law enforcement agencies or security managers at educational venues for
the purposes of prevention, intervention, and investigation of rampage shootings.
Particular emphasis has been paid to low-cost, simple security solutions and other
mitigating measures that balance the need for protection against the unlikelihood of
occurrence.
As a natural extension of the research, an additional goal has been to develop
investigative and reconstructive models that can aid law enforcement officials in quickly
getting answers, particularly where the gunman may have left behind booby traps,
explosive devices, or other dangerous items at on-site or off-site locations. These
investigative and reconstructive models will hopefully also provide tools to law
enforcement officials to help them meet the extreme demands for information by
members of the news media, political entities, and the general public following a
rampage shooting incident.
Research Questions
The research questions to be addressed in this dissertation include:
RQ (1) Is there a relationship between physical security and preparedness
measures at potential target locations and target selection by rampage shooters?
RQ (2) Is there a relationship between physical security and preparedness
measures at target locations and the number of casualties in a rampage shooting event?
RQ (3) Is there a relationship between law enforcement response strategies to
rampage shooting events and the number of casualties?
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RQ (4) Are the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters sufficiently definable
such that specific response strategies are likely to be effective based on the presence of
patterns in the shooters’ behaviors?
RQ (5) Can specific response strategies be used to secure potential target
locations and train personnel to intervene and mitigate casualties based on the presence of
patterns in the shooters’ behaviors?
RQ (6) Are the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters sufficiently definable
to provide reliable investigative and reconstructive models within the context of social
control theory?
Relevance and Significance
A form of multiple homicide, mass murder is typically defined as the killing of
four or more people in one event at one location (Burgess, 2006; Fox & Levin, 1998;
Geberth, 1996) though some have argued the arbitrary nature of such a definition and
have sought to establish a more appropriate one that takes into account the number of
injured as well as the number killed (Dietz, 1986). Accounting for the number wounded
provides a better framework because such a definition considers the intervening variables
that may tend to prohibit the offender’s intent from becoming reality: poorly-aimed shots
may fail to inflict a life-threatening injury; medical intervention may save a life that was
otherwise destined to be lost; intervention by law enforcement, security forces, or a
bystander may stop an intended massacre.
Mass murder’s sister in the sinister world of multiple homicide is the spree
killing, an event in which an offender kills multiple victims at different locations but over
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a relatively short timespan during which the offender experiences no cooling-off period
(Burgess, 2006). Both mass murder and spree murder can occur in different forms. One
family member may kill multiple other family members before committing suicide. A
disgruntled employee may seek revenge on former coworkers. A street gang member may
indiscriminately fire at rival gang members inflicting multiple casualties not only on
intended targets but on unfortunate bystanders. A troubled student may inflict carnage at
school during a rampage.
Of the various forms of multiple murder, the rampage shooter presents a uniquely
confounding problem for law enforcement: without a finite, predefined set of targets, the
shooter is likely to continue the rampage until some intervention takes place. Unlike
familial, coworker, and gang shootings, rampage shooters typically seek to inflict as
many casualties as possible rather than simply targeting specific individuals. The
rampage shooter may not even know any of the intended victims. Unlike the serial killer,
whose motives are usually sexual and private, the rampage shooter is likely motivated by
publicity (Dietz, 1986).
As Fox and Levin (1998) have argued, very little attention has been given to the
phenomenon of multiple homicide in criminology literature, and where such attention has
been given, serial homicide has dominated as a topic of study leaving mass and spree
killings to wander in a lonely dearth of research. From the point of view of the
criminologist, a paucity of research on the topic of mass murder is representative of the
extremely low rate with which such events occur. To the police administrator, however,
research provides the underpinnings for good policy, and to the police trainers, research
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provides the foundation for an effective training program.
Schools seem to present particularly attractive target locations for rampage
shooters. However, even in the wake of such epic tragedies as the shootings at
Columbine, Jonesboro, Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook, and Douglas High School, school
officials, security specialists, and law enforcement officials have had difficulty coming to
a consensus regarding what to do to prevent such massacres, and the political climate
does little to improve the situation. Rampage shootings, especially the killing of 20
elementary school children and six faculty members at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, Connecticut, have only served as fodder for political agenda. Some officials
push for arming teachers while others promote gun control. Some want greater mental
health resources while others seek greater penalties for weapons violators. Some promote
school security while others view such measures as a step toward turning schools into
prisons.
Security specialists have developed action plans for active shooting incidents
including ALICE, The 4 A’s, and Window of Life (“Is run, hide, fight right?,” 2013). While
these plans present some useful ideas for active shooter response, they offer conflicting
theories on how to instruct employees at a potential target location to act when faced with
a rampage shooter, and none of these plans have any underpinnings in strong research of
empirical data. Law enforcement and security personnel are, then, forced to choose an
existing plan, adapt a new plan from existing plans, or create a wholly new plan with
little supporting substantive data.
Patterns in the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters are likely to yield
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measurable probabilities of the effectiveness of certain response plans. If, for example,
the data show that a plurality of rampage shooters terminate their massacres upon
realizing that police are closing in, security measures may be developed to generate
signals that convince a shooter that police are, in fact, near even when they are not. The
research was undertaken to determine what, if any, actions taken on the part of potential
victims can mitigate the probability of being targeted by the shooter; whether it is better
to run, hide, or fight; whether physical security measures that tend to stop rampage
shooters or mitigate casualties can be identified; if there are countermeasures that can be
deployed at a target location that have a reasonable probability of stopping—or at least
slowing—the shooter; if the physical design of a potential target location can help prevent
loss of life during a shooting rampage; and, whether there are measures that can be
implemented to make a potential target location unattractive to a rampage shooter and
thus avert the tragedy altogether.
Barriers and Issues
Perhaps the greatest barrier to effectively conducting this research was the lack of
any centralized sources of information about the crime scene behaviors of individual
shooters. Obtaining information necessarily occurred in a piecemeal fashion, and data
collection was a tedious, painstaking process. Data collection in rampage shooting
incidents is further complicated by the fact that many rampage shooters either commit
suicide or are killed in confrontations with police and, hence, take with them many of the
answers about what they did and why they did it. Data collection, too, was heavily reliant
on news accounts, which are plagued by inaccuracies and are biased by the degree to
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which particular incidents garner media attention. Bockler, Seeger, Sitzer, and Heitmeyer
(2013) pointed out that the reliability of data obtained from news reports is open to
challenge, but they concluded that, in the absence of any centralized, reliable database,
news reports provided a reasonable source of data.
Definitional issues also plague this type of research as there is no real consensus
among criminologists and other experts regarding the defining parameters for rampage
shooting incidents. If the minimum number of victims killed or wounded is arbitrarily
assigned, that value may exclude cases in which a shooting was averted. A shooter may
fire at multiple victims but not hit any of them. A shooter may be interrupted before
anyone is shot. It is also difficult based on definitional parameters to separate shootings
that involve specifically-targeted victims from ones that are randomly selected.
Theoretical Framework
School rampage shootings are difficult to define in terms of traditional
criminological theories. Muschert (2007) points out that “[s]chool shooting incidents
need to be understood as resulting from a constellation of contributing causes, none of
which is sufficient in itself to explain a shooting” (p. 68; see also Bockler, Seeger, Sitzer,
& Heitmeyer). Social control theory has been argued as an explanatory, if not causative,
theoretical framework for the phenomenon of rampage shootings (Levin & Fox, 1996;
Pittaro, 2007; see also VanGeem, 2009). To the extent that researchers and policy makers
better understand the on-scene behaviors of school rampage shooters, they can make
informed policy decisions to (1) influence the planning and behaviors of future shooters
by imposing additional influencing factors such as better security measures; (2) develop a

!14
more complete profile of potential offenders; (3) increase the likelihood that planned
massacres will fail to generate the level of accomplishment intended by would-be
perpetrators, and (4) develop an improved framework for law enforcement to intervene in
such incidents and bring about an effective resolution. While the primary goal of the
research was to develop law enforcement planning, response, and investigative strategies,
such strategies are an important component to the social control mechanisms that can be
implemented by schools as a means of preventing or otherwise mitigating the devastation
of a school rampage shooting.
Use of this Research
The utility of this research is to aid policymakers and stakeholders in law
enforcement and school security functions to better address training, planning, and
preparation for the potential threat of rampage shooters on school campuses. An intended
consequence of this research would be that law enforcement trainers and administrators
would have increased access to guidance with respect to dealing with rampage shooters
on school campuses despite the fact that few law enforcement agencies will ever
experience such an event firsthand. However, it is the rarity of such events that makes
this research particularly important. Even the smallest of law enforcement agencies
cannot rule out the possibility that such a massacre may strike their jurisdictions, and
rampage shootings are events that cannot be dealt with on the fly. Informed policy
decisions will likely serve to aid affected law enforcement agencies by allowing for an
effective response that mitigates casualties, streamlines investigation, and minimizes bad
publicity and exposure to litigation.
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Limitations and Delimitations
The most significant limitation to this research is sampling, which is complicated
by the fact that the population of rampage shooters is not easily defined, the population is
quite small relative to comparison populations, and unbiased random sample selection is
difficult at best. There is no central data set that can be used to define the population of
school rampage shooters, though a handful of data sets do exist to provide a significant
sample of the population, if not the entire population. However, even those data sets are
plagued by the sporadic nature of reports of school rampage shooter incidents, and the
tendency is for the volume of data about specific incidents to be directly correlated to the
notoriety of the incident. With regard to mass murder cases, data are generally available,
but with regard to mass shootings with few casualties, incidents have a much smaller
profile on the data radar. Because this research evaluated response protocols and security
measures that have proven to be effective, the casualty-notoriety correlation is likely to
have contributed to sampling bias: the incidents most likely to provide indications of
successful response protocols are least likely to show up in the data.
This research was delimited by constraining most variables under study to
boolean values. Rather than evaluate a variable based on multiple possible outcomes, the
variable was separated such that each outcome was reported as a separate, independent
variable. Dependence, then, was evaluated relative to other variables. Because pattern
searching is accomplished algorithmically, it was unnecessary to assume dependence
between variables: dependence became apparent when patterns were identified.

!16
Definition of Terms
For the purposes of this research, the terms “mass shooting,” “rampage shooting,”
and “active shooter” are effectively synonymous, though with some distinctions. A “mass
shooting” is defined as a shooting incident in which multiple victims suffer gunshot
wounds, though, other than an arbitrarily-defined value, there seems to be no specific
threshold minimum number of victims by which to establish inclusion criteria. However,
one key criterion would be that more than one victim was specifically targeted, which
would exclude a number of gang-violence shootings in which multiple people may be
caught in the crossfire between rival gang members. Likewise, another criterion would be
that the victims are not participants in the violence, again eliminating many gangviolence episodes in which rival gang members shoot it out, often resulting in multiple
casualties.
The term “rampage shooting” can be more narrowly defined because motivation
is the key factor. Rampage shooters are self-serving individuals whose attacks are not
aimed at furthering some broader political goal, a criterion that excludes acts of terrorism.
Rampage shooters do not limit their attacks to one or a few specifically-targeted
individuals, so acts of domestic and workplace violence are generally excluded, unless
those acts are coupled with a broader targeting of random or symbolic individuals.
Rampage shooters are generally motivated by a desire to enact revenge against a
particular person or group of people, and they often kill individuals who symbolize their
intended victims in what are typically well-planned episodes rather than knee-jerk,
emotional outbursts (Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, & Jimerson, 2010; Fox & Levin,
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1998; Levin, 2014).
Blair and Schweitt (2014) defined the term “active shooter” to “describe a
situation in which shooting is in progress and an aspect of the crime may affect the
protocols used in responding to and reacting at the scene of the incident” (p. 4). Such a
term is most appropriately used by law enforcement because, at the time such an incident
is reported, neither casualty counts nor offender motivation are known. What is known is
that an ongoing shooting is taking place, thus indicating that response time is of the
essence and appropriate protocols should be implemented without delay.
Bockler, Seeger, Sitzer, and Heitmeyer (2013) considered criteria for defining
“school rampage shootings” and similarly excluded acts of terrorism, gang violence, and
acts of domestic violence. The researchers further constrained the definition to include
only cases that (1) occurred on a school campus, (2) took place during school hours, (3)
involved victims chosen by the shooter deliberately, randomly, or symbolically.
Summary
No matter the political or social landscape, active shooter events show no sign of
declining in either frequency or death toll. Although such events are rare, they pose some
of the greatest challenges for law enforcement because there is little time to react, to
develop a plan, or to deploy resources once an attack is underway. For law enforcement,
active shooter incidents result in an expansion of an already-difficult training problem:
that training scenarios too often focus on events that rarely happen in real-world policing,
thus displacing time that could be spent training for much more common occurrences
(“Study reveals important truths,” 2005). But when it comes to active shooter events, not
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training means not being prepared, and one need look no further than Columbine to
understand the implications of not being ready to face that once-in-a-career event.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Background
Mass shootings continue to drive impassioned public discussion on gun control,
mental illness, and harsher penalties for offenders who commit crimes with firearms. Oftheard in media and public forums are claims by politicians, lay people, and pundits that
the problems of firearms violence and rampage shootings are worsening. However,
neither the empirical literature nor the current data support such a conclusion.
Certainly, the empirical data point to a lessening problem of homicidal violence,
not an increasing one. After reaching a low of 4.6 murders and non-negligent
manslaughters per 100,000 people in 1962, the U.S. homicide rate skyrocketed to a peak
of 10.2 per 100,000 in 1980, but after a brief dip followed by another peak at 9.8 per
100,000 in 1991, the rate plummeted to a low of 4.5 per 100,00 in 20131 (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 2013, 2014, 2015). (See Figure 2.1). Similarly, nonfatal violent crimes
involving firearms fell from a rate of 7.3 per 1,000 in 1993 to 1.8 per 1,000 in 2011
(Planty & Truman, 2013).

1

The murder and non-negligent manslaughter rate remained at 4.5 per 100,000 in 2014.

!20

Figure 2.1. Rates of murder and non-negligent manslaughter in the United States from
1950 through 2010 (Cooper & Smith, 2011).

Data on homicides, suicides, and firearms deaths of youths ages 15 to 19 reflect similar
patterns. Homicides in this age group jumped from levels of around 10 per 100,000 in the
early 1980s to a peak of over 20 per 100,000 in 1993 and then declined to levels below
10 per 100,000 by 2004. The trend is still declining: the rate fell to 6.7 per 100,000 in
2013 (Child Trends, 2015b).
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Figure 2.2. Rates of homicide, suicide, and firearms-related deaths of youths ages 15-19
in the United States from 1970 to 2013 (Child Trends, 2015b).
To be sure, homicides at school are rare. For children ages 5 to 18, school-related
murders—including those occurring on campus as well as off campus on the way to or
from school or at school events—accounted for no more than 1.8% of homicides for that
age group with a mean of 1.3% from the 1992-1993 school year through the 2008-2009
school year (Planty & Truman, 2013; see also O’Toole, 1999; Reddy et al., 2001).
Studying criminal incidents on college and school campuses for the five-year period from
2000 through 2004, Noonan and Vavra (2007) reported a total of 37 murder and nonnegligent manslaughter incidents out of 193,080 reported violent crimes. Scholars have
estimated that the odds of a student in a U.S. school becoming the victim of homicide at
school are between one in one million and one in two million (Reddy et al., 2001).
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School-associated homicides from the 1992-1993 school year through the 2009-2010
school year declined in the late 1990s, and, but for a brief increase during the 2006-2007
school year, have remained steady since (Centers for Disease Control, 2014).
Furthermore, much like homicides of juveniles outside of school, homicides at school
“tend to be gang related, drug related, or otherwise linked to criminal activity or
interpersonal disputes where the school is simply a site of opportunity for the
attack” (Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, & Jimerson, 2010, p. 29). Multiple homicides at
school are an exceedingly rare subset of an already rare population: of 109 school-related
homicide events studied by the Centers for Disease Control (2008), only eight involved
more than one victim. However, despite decreases in school-related single-victim
homicides and school-related homicides overall, multiple victim homicide rates at school
remained steady from 1992 to 2006 (Centers for Disease Control, 2008).
Compiling data from the National School Safety Center and the National Center
for Education Statistics, Dorn, Satterly, Dorn and Dorn (2013) calculated that, on
average, any one of the 130,600 K-12 schools in the United States would experience a
violent, school-related death no more than once every 7,150 years.
According to data from the National School Safety Center, an independent, nonprofit organization that was founded by presidential mandate in 1984, firearms are
overwhelmingly the weapon of choice in school-associated violent deaths (Stephens,
2010).
Despite dramatic declines in homicide rates and gun violence overall, few in the
public appreciate the reduction (Pew Research Center, 2013). Some scholars have blamed
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the divide between homicide statistics and public perception on the extent to which media
coverage influences what people believe (see Fox & DeLateur, 2014). However, the Pew
Research Center (2013) found that crime-related news coverage declined from 29% of
local newscast content in 2005 to 17% in 2012.
Just as public perception of violent crime has not correlated with actual homicide
rates, neither the public nor scholars have come to an understanding of actual rates of
mass shootings. While some scholars have reported marked increases in mass shootings
and active shooter events (Blair & Martaindale, 2013; Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols,
2014; Blair & Schweit, 2014; Cohen, Azrael, & Miller, 2014; Krouse & Richardson,
2015), others have argued that there has been little upward trend (Cooper & Smith, 2011;
Fox, 2015; Fox & DeLateur, 2014; Fox & Levin, 2015; Lott & Riley, 2014a).
Using a statistical process control method, Cohen, Azrael, and Miller (2014),
studying mass shootings occurring in public places, found that the average time between
events dropped—quite suddenly—after the September 6, 2011 massacre at an
International House of Pancakes restaurant in Carson City, Nevada. In that incident, 32year-old Eduardo Sencion opened fired on uniformed National Guard troops, killing three
of them. Sencion also killed a civilian woman and wounded seven other people before
killing himself (Whitcomb & Gorman, 2011). According to Cohen et al., the average time
between public mass shootings following that episode dropped from an average of 200
days between shootings to an average of 64 days between shootings, a level that the
researchers claimed remains to the year of publication. However, the researchers relied
heavily on the data set used by Blair and Schweit (2014) for their study published by the
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been criticized by Fox and Levin (2015) and
Overberg, Upton, and Hoyer (2013) due to errors in the data set such as including
shootings that did not meet the criteria, excluding a number of shootings in the early part
of the data set, and including in the data set an incident reported in the UCR as a
multiple-victim homicide that was actually a cold-case arrest from an incident that took
place decades earlier.
Further criticism of the findings by Cohen et al. stems from the fact that statistical
process control methods were developed for use in analyzing repetitive processes, such as
those occurring in manufacturing, rather than with more grossly stochastic processes such
as mass shooting events. The sudden, unexplained drop in the average number of days
between shootings should have queued the researchers to suspect a methodological error
or problem with the validity of the underlying data given the fact that criminological
phenomena rarely fluctuate so drastically and so suddenly without explanation. Neither
Blair and Schweit nor Cohen et al. undertook any analysis of the endogeneity of their
data. Because there is no central resource for data on mass shootings, research on the
topic is fraught with sampling bias issues, which, when applied to the study of event
frequency, are likely to produce significant uncertainty given the rarity of mass shooting
events in the first place. In compiling their data set, Blair and Schweit relied heavily on
keyword searches of news media archives. While such methodology may be appropriate
for finding cases for study of other parameters, it is likely to produce a data set that has
more correlation to the evolving habits of news media outlets than it does to the temporal
characteristics of mass shooting events. Media reporting is not a controlled process, so
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applying statistical process control methods, as Cohen et al. did, to a data set developed
predominately based on media reports is likely to tell the researchers more about the
frequency of news coverage than mass shootings.
Duwe (2007), studying 1,186 mass murder incidents from 1900 through 1999
identified 116 mass public shootings (i.e., mass murder incidents involving firearms that
took place in essentially public locations) and found that 52% took place during the last
two decades of the 20th Century.
Further complicating the study of trends and issues in mass shootings is the fact
that their association with gun control polarizes the topic and connects it to political
agenda. Cohen et al., for example, did their research for Mother Jones, an Internet news
outlet with a history of promoting gun control, and Blair and Schweit’s research was done
for the FBI at a time when the administration was pushing heavily toward imposing
greater restrictions on firearms ownership.
While debate rages over recent trends in school shootings, one thing is clear:
massacres and shootings at schools are not a 21st Century phenomenon (Drysdale,
Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010; Langman, 2015d). On July 26, 1764, four Native American
warriors shot and killed the headmaster at a school in Pennsylvania before killing nine
schoolchildren with tomahawks (Dixon, 1954/2005). On April 10, 1891, the New York
Times reported that an elderly man named James Foster, armed with a shotgun, opened
fire on a group of young boys playing in front of St. Mary’s Parochial School in
Newburgh, New York. “None of the children were killed,” the Times reported, “but
several were well filled with lead” (quoted by Lorenzi, 2012; see also Holmes & Holmes,
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2012, p. 139). On May 18, 1927, Andrew Philip Kehoe killed 43 people, including 38
children, by setting off dynamite at the Bath Consolidated School in Bath Township,
Michigan, an event that most scholars believe left the largest death toll of any school
massacre in U.S. history (Bernstein, 2009). On September 15, 1959, Paul Oregon
detonated an explosives-filled suitcase inside Poe Elementary School in Houston, Texas
killing himself, two seven-year-old boys, a custodian, a teacher, and his own son, sevenyear-old Dusty Paul. Nineteen others were wounded (“Poe school coverage,” 2001).
School massacres are not a uniquely American phenomenon either (Bockler,
Seeger, Sitzer, & Heitmeyer, 2013; Fessenden, 2000). Perhaps the deadliest school
massacre in recent world history was the terrorist attack at a school in Beslan, Russia in
September 2004. While parents, students, and teachers gathered at the school to celebrate
the opening day of the new school year, at least 32 armed offenders took more than 1,000
hostages in a siege that lasted three days. In the end, more than 330 people lay dead
(“Beslan school attack,” 2015). On May 9, 1974, three Palestinian terrorists disguised as
Israeli soldiers took more than 115 hostages at a school in Ma’alot-Tarisha near Israel’s
border with Lebanon, killing 22 and wounding 68 (Fishkoff, 2015). There have been
school rampage shootings in other countries as well. On March 13, 1996, Thomas
Hamilton, a 43-year-old former Scout leader, entered the gymnasium at the primary
school in Dunblane, Scotland, and opened fire on kindergarten students, killing sixteen
children and their teacher (Wilkinson, 2013). On April 26, 2002, 19-year-old expelled
student Robert Steinhäuser shot and killed two students, a police officer, and 13 teachers
at a school in Erfurt, Germany, and wounded one other person before killing himself (“18
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dead in German school shooting,” 2002; Erlanger, 2002). On November 20, 2006, 18year-old former student Sebastian Bosse shot a teacher, a janitor, and seven students at
Geschwister Scholl-Schule in Emsdetten, Germany and injured 28 others with smoke
bombs (Jüttner, 2006). On April 7, 2011, 23-year-old former student Wellington de
Oliveira killed 12 students and wounded 12 others before committing suicide at Escola
Municipal Tasso da Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (“Fleeing for their lives,” 2007).
In fact, in the past three decades, multiple-victim school shootings have occurred
in Canada, Brazil, Australia, Germany, Finland, and France, among other countries
(Gupta, 2015). A sample (Langman, 2015d) of multiple-victim school shootings over the
past three decades includes several international cases:
1. December 6, 1989, École Polytechnique, Montreal, Quebec, Canada: 14
killed, 14 wounded.
2. August 24, 1992, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada: 4 killed,
1 wounded.
3. October 20, 1994, Brockton High School, Toronto, Ontario, Canada: 2
wounded.
4. April 28, 1999, W. R. Myers High School, Taber, Alberta, Canada: 1 killed, 1
wounded.
5. August 3, 1999, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia: 1 killed,
1 wounded.
6. October 21, 2002, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia: 2 killed, 5
wounded.
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7. January 27, 2003, Escola Estadual Coronel Benedito Ortiz, Sao Paolo, Brazil:
1 killed, 8 wounded.
8. September 13, 2006, Dawson College, Montreal, Quebec, Canada: 1 killed,
19 wounded.
9. November 7, 2007, Jokela High School, Finland: 8 killed, 12 wounded.
10. September 23, 2008, Seinajoki University, Kauhajoki, Finland: 10 killed, 1
wounded.
11. March 11, 2009, Albertville-Realschule, Winnenden, Germany: 15 killed, 9
wounded.
Just as violence in U.S. schools increased in the 1990s, so, too, did it increase in
schools worldwide (Agnich, 2011). Though school shootings have occurred in other
countries, the United States has had by far the highest number of them (Gupta, 2015),
but, when national populations are taken into account, the United States does not have
either the highest mass shooting fatality rate or total victims rate; in fact, according to
data analysis by Politifact, from 2000 through 2014, Switzerland, Norway, and Finland
have higher fatality rates and total victim rates, though it is contextually important to
recognize that the very small populations of those countries in comparison to the United
States, and the rarity with which rampage shootings occur, skew the statistics because a
very small number of incidents results in high casualty rates (Herring & Jacobson, 2015).
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Figure 2.3. Table showing data used by Politifact in its analysis of comparative mass
shooting fatality and total victim rates (Herring & Jacobson, 2015).
Bockler, Seeger, Sitzer, and Heitmeyer (2013) found, in sample spanning from the
1920s until 2011, 76 school rampage shootings in the United States and 44 in the rest of
the world (occurring in 23 countries); hence, 63% of school rampage shootings
worldwide have taken place in the United States as compared to only 37% in all other
countries combined. The researchers noted that, unlike such shootings in the United
States, incidents globally did not appear regularly until the late 1990s.
School rampage attacks do not require an offender with firearms (Bockler, Seeger,
Sitzer, & Heitmeyer, 2013). On November 4, 2015, four students at the University of
California Merced were stabbed by 18-year-old Faisal Mohammad, who was
subsequently killed by campus police. Though Islamic terrorists applauded Mohammed
for his actions, law enforcement officials determined that the computer science and
engineering freshman had acted alone after recently having been booted from a study
group. A manifesto found on his body revealed his intent to stab a specific student and
then overpower a police officer and steal the officer’s firearm (“Four stabbed at UC
Merced,” 2015; “Four students stabbed,” 2015; “Sheriff: California university stabber,”
2015). On April 9, 2014, 16-year-old Alex Hribal, a sophomore at Franklin Regional
High School in Murrysville, Pennsylvania, wounded 20 students and a security guard in a
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rampage knife attack. At least four of the victims were critically injured. The attack ended
when the vice principal tackled Hribal (Hardway, 2015; McClam, 2014; Signorini &
Andren, 2015).
Rampage attacks at schools using weapons other than firearms have taken place in
countries where firearms are strictly controlled. China—a country that expressly bans
possession of firearms by citizens—has experienced a number of deadly knife attacks at
schools, perhaps as many as 28 such attacks resulting in 58 deaths and over 300 injuries
since 1995. One attack at a kindergarten in China left seven toddlers and two adults dead
and 11 children wounded. The attack “was China’s fifth such school rampage in less than
two months” (Olesen, 2011). The problem has been so pervasive in Chinese society that
government officials have taken measures such as adding security guards at schools,
training school personnel to respond to knife attackers, and requiring residents who
purchase knives over 15 centimeters in length to register using their national
identification cards (Canaves, 2010; FlorCruz, 2010; “Who (or what) is killing China’s
children?,” 2011; see also Hilal, Densley, Li, & Ma, 2014).
Japan, a country with strict firearms laws, has also experienced rampage knife
attacks. On July 26, 2016, 26-year-old Satoshi Uematsu killed 19 disabled people and
wounded 24 others plus two employees at a special needs facility in Sagamihara, a town
about three miles from Tokyo. In a letter written months prior to the attack, Uematsu, a
former employee of the facility, wrote that “all disabled people should cease to
exist” (“Japan knife attacker,” 2016; see also Wang & Yamaguchi, 2016; Yamaguchi
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d). For the Japanese people, the attack echoed their sense of
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vulnerability previously felt in 2001 when 37-year-old Marmoru Takuma used a knife to
kill eight children and wound at least 15 people at an elementary school in Ikeda, a small
town about ten miles from Osaka (Sims, 2001; Struck, 2001).
Indeed, firearms are used in only a fraction of crimes on school campuses.
Studying criminal incidents on college and school campuses for the five-year period from
2000 through 2004, Noonan and Vavra (2007) reported that 3,461 crimes involved
firearms while 98,394 involved personal weapons (hands, fists, etc.); 10,970 involved
knives or other edged weapons; and, 2,005 involved blunt objects used as weapons. Of
the 37 murders and non-negligent manslaughter incidents reported by the researchers,
only 13 involved firearms. Similarly, O’Neill, Fox, Depue, and Englander (2008)
reported 76 homicides on college campuses between 2001 and 2005, 52.2% of which
involved firearms.
In comparison to single-victim homicides, multiple homicide events are so
incredibly rare2—perhaps even aberrational—that few researchers have devoted attention
to the subject (Fox & Levin, 1998; Hempel, Meloy, & Richards, 1999). There exists a
scattering of empirical literature on the topic of rampage shootings, most of which has
focused on occurrence trends, behavioral risk assessment, and threat assessment with
respect to potential rampage shooters rather than on target-level prevention and response.
According to Fox and Levin (1998), “most of the research on multiple killing has
remained anecdotal and heavily qualitative in approach . . . reflecting an abundance of

2

Mass murders represent less than one percent of all violent crimes in the United States (Hempel,

Meloy, & Richards, 1999).
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speculation and a paucity of hard data” (pp. 409-410). According to Fox and Levin
(1998), mass murder has received the least attention in the already-thin body of research
on multiple homicide in part because mass murderers often commit suicide or are killed
during their rampages, leaving only sparse data behind as to their motives and
methodology. Likewise, mass murder is not as sensational as serial murder and does not
garner the same level of ongoing fear within the community as does a serial killer on the
loose. In comparison to serial murder investigations, mass murder investigations are not
terribly challenging (Fox & Levin, 1998; Fox & Levin, 2003).
While mass murder claims about twice as many recorded victims as serial murder
annually, there is a much greater likelihood of serial killings being lost from the data than
mass murder cases. In many instances, homicides are simply not identified as serial in
nature either because investigators failed to recognize indicators that multiple homicides
were perpetrated by a single offender or because homicides committed by a single
offender across different jurisdictions are not linked for similarity (Fox & Levin, 1998).
Serial murderers have a vested interest in concealing their crimes and remaining
undetected while mass murderers rarely concern themselves with escape and often relish
in the publicity they expect their crimes to receive.
Observers of media attention and public concern over mass murder events would
hardly appreciate the lack of research on such killings. Much like fatal airline accidents,
the consequential nature of these events is disproportional to their frequency of
occurrence. While dozens of people die in motor vehicle accidents daily, fatal airline
crashes involving U.S. domestic carriers have become so rare as to not even occur

!33
annually, 3 yet when such a tragedy happens, the news coverage will typically preempt
regular programming, and significant investigative resources are expended in determining
the cause. The typical traffic fatality, on the other hand, will often merit little more than a
brief mention in local news media and be investigated by no more than a small handful of
local police officers. Such is true of multiple homicides: the consequences of a mass
murder involving a dozen victims are far more reaching than the nearly forty “routine”
murders (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014) that take place each day. A single
episode involving the murders of 20 children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newton, Connecticut, for example, touched off a massive public debate over
the merits of gun control and the status of American society. The journalistic paradox of
newsworthiness in rarity played out once more: man had bitten dog.
In fact, Fox and Levin (2015) explained that rampage shootings in a movie theater
in Colorado and at Sandy Hook Elementary School became “the top news story of
2012 . . . eclipsing a hotly-contested presidential race and a massive storm along the East
Coast” (p. 8) despite the fact that both the presidential election and hurricane Sandy
affected hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—more people than did all of the
rampage shootings in 2012 combined. The intense media coverage of a few sensational
mass murder events leads to the public perception that rampage shootings are on the rise.

3 As

of this writing, the last fatal airline crash involving a major domestic carrier occurred in

November 2001 when American Airlines flight 587 crashed shortly after take-off from New York’s
Laguardia Airport, killing 265 people. Since that crash, there have been several fatal crashes involving
commuter airlines with significantly smaller death tolls, but even those cases have occurred at a less-thanannual frequency (Sanchez, 2013; Wilkey, 2013).
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“Contrary to the relatively flat trend line in mass murder,” Fox and Levin explained,
“media reports leave a different—and much more terrifying—impression” (p. 10).
Similarly, Killingbeck (2001) found that the 1999 Columbine High School
massacre took second place in news coverage during that year, being bested only by the
military conflict in Kosovo, despite the fact that the 16 fatal casualties at Columbine
represented less than two hours worth of the 15,522 homicides that occurred that year.
Killingbeck argued that media coverage, both in terms of quantity and substance,
contributed to the construction of a “moral panic” regarding school violence. As O’Toole
(1999) explained, “the sudden, senseless deaths of teenagers and teachers in the middle of
a school day, for no comprehensible reason, is far more shocking and gets far more
attention than the less extreme acts of violence that happen in schools every week” (p. 2).
Duwe (2005), noting commentators’ and scholars’ claims of an increase in mass
murder during the 1960s, found that, although mass murder did not become
phenomenologically more significant during the 1960s, media coverage of it did. “The
overemphasis placed on the most sensational and least representative mass killings,”
wrote Duwe, “has significant implications for the social construction of mass murder” (p.
60). Furthermore, researching the period from the 1960s through the 1980s, Duwe argued
that through its work on multiple homicide during the 1980s, the FBI promoted increased
media attention and exaggerated the prevalence of multiple murder.
Indeed, news media is a profit-driven business, and since as far back as the 1830s,
media outlets have found that crime reporting sells (Duwe, 2000). “In an effort to make
crime news more entertaining, and thus more appealing to consumers,” Duwe explained,
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“the news media overrepresent violent, interpersonal crimes because they are dramatic,
tragic, and rare in occurrence” (p. 365). Studying over 30,000 news articles from 117
different newspaper outlets covering 495 mass murder episodes over a 21-year period,
Duwe found that “[d]eath toll, stranger victims, and public locations” were associated
with increased media coverage, and that incidents involving firearms use, “assault
weapons,” and “workplace massacres” were overrepresented in media coverage (p. 390).
Gray (2014), pointing out that one has a greater likelihood of being struck by lightning
than being murdered on a college campus, points to media hysteria as problematic in
terms of forming public opinion with regard to the dangers associated with rampage
shooters.
In the wake of rampage shootings, a number of groups ranging from news outlets
to gun control groups to law enforcement to universities sought to research the issue.
“[R]ather than adding clarity,” wrote Fox and Levin (2015), “these initiatives, by virtue
of their varying definitions, time frames and data sources, created even greater
confusion” (p. 8). Some advocacy groups have sought to show that mass shooting
episodes are becoming more frequent and that they are commonly associated with the use
of so-called ‘assault weapons’ and ‘high-capacity magazines’ (Cohen, Azrael, & Miller,
2014; Everytown for Gun Safety, 2015; Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2013).
Thus, one encounters one of the greatest challenges in the study of rampage
shootings: determining what data get included in the study. The answer seems to rest
largely on context and research goals. For example, a study on the motivational aspects of
rampage shooters would do well to define incidents by typology. Familial mass
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murderers, for example, are likely motivated by different factors than killers who commit
public massacres of random individuals.
Some scholars have argued the need for empirical research on averted school
shootings, a topic that has gotten significantly less attention in the literature than
perpetrated incidents, but even those studies have focused almost exclusively on threat
assessment, sociological prevention strategies, and student-staff relationships to avert
incidents before they begin (Daniels et al., 2010; Moore, Petrie, Braga, & McLaughlin,
2003; O’Toole, 2000). Almost nothing exists in the empirical literature dealing directly
with physical security measures, incident-level preparedness, and law enforcement
protocols aimed at preventing incidents and mitigating casualties.
There is evidence that high-profile rampage shooting incidents can spawn copycat
events (Carcach, Mouzos, and Grabosky; 2002; Fox & Levin, 2003; Towers, GomezLievano, Khan, Mubayi, & Castillo-Chavez, 2015; see also Moore, 2003). Some
researchers have found evidence of a contagion effect resulting from publicity given to
rampage shooting events. Carcach, Mouzos, and Grabosky, for example, found that,
following the 1996 Port Arthur massacre in Australia in which 28-year-old Martin Bryant
killed 35 people and wounded 23 others during a shooting spree at a popular tourist site
in Tasmania (Grimson, 2015), firearms homicides in Australia increased for five days
before returning to normal levels. Studying mass killings and school shooting incidents in
the United States, Towers, Gomez-Lievano, Khan, Mubayi, and Castillo-Chavez found a
statistically-significant increase in shooting events during the 13 days following a
publicized shooting. Duwe (2007) has argued that very few rampage shooters are
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influenced by previous shooters and found only five U.S. mass murder cases out of 909
studied that showed clear evidence of contagion effect, including Robert Smith, whose
1966 massacre at a beauty college in Mesa, Arizona was influenced by the notorious
mass murderers Richard Speck and Charles Whitman, and the 2007 Virginia Tech
slaughter, which was influenced by the 1999 Columbine bloodbath. However, Duwe was
quick to point out that there may be other shooters who were influenced by previous
massacres but simply did not leave behind evidence of such influence.
If a contagion effect exists, it lends evidence of two important issues for this
research: (1) the patterns of behaviors are likely repetitive because the accomplishments
of one shooter or set of shooters influence the planning and thought processes of
subsequent ‘copy cat’ shooters; and, (2) mitigating the number of casualties during a
rampage shooting episode may reduce the attractiveness of that episode to future rampage
shooters and lessen the contagion effect.
The consequences of rampage shootings give importance to the research. The
emotional response engendered in the public pushes policymakers toward knee-jerk
reactions. “Although these incidents are extremely rare,” wrote Reddy et al., “they are so
vexing and their impact is so great that the fear they engender can often drive radical
policy change, in some cases leading to the implementation of bad policy” (p. 159). The
Newtown massacre represented just 0.17% of the 14,827 homicides in the United States
in 2012 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013), yet no single criminal incident that year
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resulted in farther-reaching policy implications than did that one tragic event.4
Newtown served to establish just how utterly unprepared policymakers were for
such a tragedy. As gun control legislation embroiled Congress in a futile debate,
legislators at the state level found themselves suffering severe political backlash for
supporting gun control measures (Bevis, 2013; Healy, 2013) that, despite what was
arguably the greatest political traction the gun control lobby had gained in two decades,
resulted in exactly opposite the lobby’s intended goal: gun sales soared (Jouvenal, 2012;
Pisani, 2012), the National Rifle Association increased its membership (Fox, 2013; Wing,
2013), and absolutely nothing got done in Congress with respect to curtailing the
prevalence of firearms in American culture (O’Keefe & Rucker, 2013; Weisman, 2013).
Indeed, most researchers examining the matter outside the context of politicallydriven agenda have concluded that there is very little evidence that gun control measures
are likely to have a significant impact on mass shootings. Duwe, Kovandzic, and Moody
(2002), for example, found “weak evidence” that right-to-carry laws had any impact on
the number of public mass shootings. Kovandzic, Shaffer, and Kleck (2005) found that
despite a number of studies that have concluded a positive correlation between gun
ownership levels and gun violence, endogeneity bias, when taken into consideration,
nullifies or even reverses the perceived correlation. Kleck (2009) argued that mass public

4

The racially-charged shooting death of Black teenager Trayvon Martin by Hispanic (and

described by some as White) George Zimmerman also occurred in the same year. Although it resulted in
significant public discourse, and even some state-level legislative action regarding racism and murder in
America, it did not propel the nation into the level of policy debate initiated following the Newtown
murders.
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shootings provided the ‘worst possible basis’ for proposed gun control measures such as
background checks at gun shows and bans on ‘assault weapons’ because such measures
are largely irrelevant in the context of multiple-victim shooting incidents. Duwe (2007)
found that ‘assault weapons’ were used in only 9% of the 116 public mass shootings
between 1900 and 1999 that he studied. Fox and DeLateur (2014) have similarly argued
that increased background checks, bans on ‘assault weapons,’ and limits on magazine
capacity would do little, if anything, to curb the prevalence of rampage shootings in the
U.S. Still, in the wake of high-profile mass shooting events, the media and advocacy
groups have continued to push gun control as the cornerstone topic for discussion
(McConville & Lawless, 2012; LaFrance, 2015).
One of the prime difficulties in studying rampage shootings is that there exists
little clarity in the empirical literature, for a variety of reasons. First, there exists no single
data set from which cases of rampage shootings can be reliably extracted; while many
such events appear in UCR data, others do not, forcing reliance on secondary sources
such as news coverage to track down the numbers—news coverage, which, by virtue of
the spectacular nature of such events and increasing public attention they receive (Fox &
Levin, 2015), is likely more robust today than in decades past. Second, defining what
events should and should not be included in research on rampage shootings has proven
elusive, and researchers tend to include and exclude cases based on criteria that may be
more arbitrary than empirically-supported. Third, the study of rampage shootings is,
unfortunately, tied to broader political issues such as gun control and the mental health
system that tend to instill a greater tendency for researchers to succumb to contextual and
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confirmation bias.
For example, a recent FBI study (Blair & Schweit, 2014) claimed that the average
annual number of mass shooting incidents between 2000 and 2013 rose from an average
of 6.4 incidents per year during the first seven years studied to an average of 16.4
incidents per year during the last seven years studied, an increase that, on its face, appears
suspect. Indeed, Fox and Levin (2015), Lott and Riley (2014), and a study by USA Today
(Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013) have directly challenged the FBI report’s findings. 5
Lott and Riley concluded that the FBI study had neglected to include a number of mass
shooting incidents that occurred during the first half of the study period that, if included,
significantly reduced the upward trend apparent in the data. Moreover, Fox and Levin,
relying on data from the Supplementary Homicide Reports, have concluded that over the
past three decades, there has been no upward or downward trend in the number of mass
murder incidents and found only a slight upward trajectory with regard to the number of
deaths from such rampages in recent years, an increase that the researchers attributed to
several recent incidents with larger than average body counts. The USA Today study,
which looked at mass murders (including those that did not involve firearms) from 2006
through 2011, found that the FBI data were highly inaccurate with such reporting flaws as
multiple, individual homicides being reported as a single, mass murder; mass murder
incidents being conversely reported as multiple, single homicides; data from Florida and
tribal jurisdictions, as well as some data from Nebraska and Washington, D.C., not

5
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included in the FBI data set; and, a case from New Jersey in which a mass murder
appeared in the data, but upon verification, it was discovered that the incident actually
involved arrests made for an incident that occurred more than three decades earlier.
Dietz (1986) compared various forms of multiple homicide and found common
features that suggest methodological similarities in terms of psychological and
criminological research. Dietz also explained that the rarity of multiple homicide events
forces researchers to adopt methods that are outside of their normal habits. Hence, we
face the complexity of rampage shooting research.
Defining “Rampage Shooter”
While the lines of distinction are not laterally discontinuous, multiple homicides
are classified into three forms based on spatial and temporal span over which the killings
take place: (1) serial murder, which takes place over an extended period of time and
involves an emotional cooling-off period for the offender;6 (2) spree murder, which takes
place generally at different locations over a short period of time; and, (3) mass murder,
which takes place in one episode over a limited geographic area (Fox & Levin, 1998).
The definitions of these terms, unfortunately, remain ambiguous.
Fox and Levin (1998) arbitrarily limit the definition of multiple homicide to only
those cases in which four or more victims are killed “simultaneously or sequentially, by
one or a few individuals attempting to satisfy personal desires such as power, profit,
revenge, sex, loyalty, or control” (pp. 407-408). Levin and Madfis (2009) define mass

6 A “cooling

off period” is typically a period of unspecified duration during which the offender

returns to a state of normal way of life (Burgess, 2006).
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murder as “the antisocial and non-state-sponsored killing of multiple victims during a
single episode at one or more closely related locations” (p. 1227). The researchers further
limited their study to “cases in which multiple human targets were killed or injured on
school property by a student or recent former student of the targeted school, where three
or more victims were killed or injured” (p. 1229).
Dietz (1986), studying the psychological characteristics of multiple-victim killers,
defined mass murder as “offenses in which multiple victims are intentionally killed by a
single offender in a single incident” (p. 479). Dietz elected to ignore distance as a factor
in classifying multiple homicides as mass murder but chose, apparently arbitrarily, to set
a maximum time interval of 24 hours between killings. Pointing out that setting the
minimum death threshold at three would exclude 95% of violent crimes and setting the
threshold at five would exclude 99%, Dietz defined mass murder as “the willful injuring
of five or more persons of whom three or more are killed by a single offender in a single
event” (p. 480).
Hempel, Meloy, and Richards (1999) and Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and
Gray (2001) defined mass murder as an event in which a single perpetrator intentionally
killed three or more other people during a single event.
Mullen (2004) provides clarity with categories of mass murders related to
victimology and offender motivation: (1) victim-specific, wherein the offender kills
certain individuals for a variety of motivations; (2) instrumental, wherein the offender
kills victims in the furtherance of some particular personal agenda; and, (3) massacres,
wherein the offender kills victims chosen mostly—if not completely—at random (though
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the offender may select people who fit a particular racial, ethnic, or gender group, or meet
some other criteria). These categories are not mutually exclusive: in fact, Meloy, Hempel,
Mohandie, Shiva, & Gray (2001) term offenders whose motivations or victim selection
changed during the course of an event as bifurcated killers.
While acts of terrorism have often involved mass casualty events, it is
inappropriate to define a multiple homicide event as an act of terrorism despite the
tendency of such acts to instill great fear and societal consequence. Multiple homicides
are a self-serving form of murder intended to benefit the killer or killers rather than to
serve a broader, politically-oriented motive in the way that terrorism does. However, the
distinction between expressed political desires and actual political motive distinguishes
acts of mass murder from acts of terrorism. Simply because a person with Islamic ties, for
example, engages in an act of mass murder does not define that act as terrorism. Key to
understanding the difference is a thorough analysis of the offender’s background. When a
single individual carries out such a massacre, one need be suspicious of classifying the
event as an act of terrorism.
Acts of terrorism, when included in data on mass murder, may tend to skew the
results and generally should be excluded. Fox and Levin (1998), for example, excluded
the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building from their research “because its
enormity and special character would grossly distort the statistical research” (p. 432). 7
In a National Academy of Sciences report, Moore (2003) defined “lethal school
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violence” as any event that involves: (1) “lethal violence,” (2) “that took place in
schools,” (3) “was committed by students of the school,” and (4) “resulted in multiple
victimizations” (p. 287, emphasis deleted). 8 Similarly, Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta,
and Roth (2004) defined “rampage school shootings” as events that (1) “take place on a
school-related public stage before an audience”; (2) “involve multiple victims, some of
whom are shot simply for their symbolic significance or at random”; and, (3) “involve
one or more shooters who are students or former students of the school” (p. 50).9 Bockler,
Seeger, Stizer, and Heitmeyer (2013) used similar criteria.
The first component of the definition is, of course, necessary to any definition of a
rampage school shooting as it sets the venue as being at school or at some school-related
event. The specification that there be an audience is vague and ill-defined. Nonetheless,
the specification that there be an audience would seem appropriate in the context of
establishing that the shooting takes place in the presence of multiple people, whether or
not some or all of those people become victims of the attack. The second point is more
poignant in its definition: multiple victims are shot with some of them shot not because
they are specifically targeted by the shooter but because they represent some symbolic
target or because they are simply chosen at random. The third point again raises some
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include at least one case in which no one died” (p. 287).
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It should be noted that Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta, and Roth were all involved in the

National Academy of Sciences research published by Moore. According to Moore, case and literature
reviews led the researchers to begin “referring to some of the . . . cases as ‘school rampage shootings’” (p.
288).
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question as it necessitates that the shooter be a student or former student of that school.
Such a definition would exclude, for example, cases in which a prospective student,
turned down for admission to a particular school, came to inflict carnage in retaliation; a
student from a rival school decided to carry out a massacre because of a perceived slight
or the fact that he or she had been bullied by students at that school; or, a school staff
member, bullied by students, goes on a rampage.10 With regard to research aimed at
responding to such events as they unfold, limiting the definition based on offender
background or status seems inappropriate; therefore, the broader population of rampage
shooters who have carried out their massacres on school grounds or in other areas where
school-related events were ongoing should be included in such research.
Langman (2009c) provided a similar definition of “rampage school shootings”: an
attack that (1) is carried out by a student or former student of the school; (2) is done
publicly with no intent to conceal the shooter’s identity or actions; and, (3) involves at
least some randomly-selected or symbolic victims rather than strictly targeted victims.
Langman argued that studying targeted and rampage shooters collectively “muddies the
waters, making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about what type of person
perpetrates a rampage school shooting” (p. 2). Langman’s definition, however, is less
applicable to the current research based on its focus on shooter psychology rather than on
police response.
One encumbrance in prior research on rampage shootings has been the arbitrary
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specification of a minimum body count. Despite intent to inflict maximum casualties,
shooters are not fully in control of how many victims live or die (Bjelopera, Bagalman,
Caldwell, Finkela, & McCallion, 2013). Shooters may miss intended targets. Gunshot
wounds may be nonfatal. Medical intervention may spare the lives of some who would
otherwise have died.
As Madfis (2012) explained, prior research has almost entirely ignored cases in
which either the planned or attempted massacre was thwarted or when multiple victims
were shot but an insufficient number of them died to meet definitional thresholds for
inclusion in the research. Such exclusions, while benefiting the practicality of the
research, serve only to limit data and, especially in cases of averted rampages, may serve
to bias the outcome of the research. There exists scant research focusing on averted
rampage shootings; those studies that do exist have focused largely on risk and threat
assessment rather than on site-specific, time-of-incident measures (Daniels et al., 2007;
Daniels et al., 2010; White-Hamon, 2000). Madfis also argued that there could potentially
be numerous averted school rampages that were handled at the school or local level and
never received national attention, thus excluding those cases from any potential research
based on national data.
Muschert (2007) examined school shootings and developed several typologies to
distinguish shootings for research purposes: (1) rampage shootings, which are
characterized by random or symbolic targets and are perpetrated by a student or employee
or former student or former employee of the school; (2) mass murders, which are carried
out by a person with no affiliation with the school against symbolic targets (i.e., students
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or members of the institution) for symbolic purposes; (3) terrorist attacks, which are
designed to serve some political agenda; (4) targeted shootings, in which a shooter targets
a specific individual or specific individuals to exact revenge for some real or perceived
slight; and, (5) government shootings, which are those carried out by police or other
government agents.
Heide, Eyles, and Spencer (1999) reviewed school shootings with random victims
during the 1990s utilizing five criteria: (1) multiple shots were fired; (2) the offender(s)
were enrolled as students in the school where the incident took place; (3) at least one
victim was killed or injured; (4) the victims were associated with the school; and, (5) at
least some of the victims were randomly selected. These criteria, however, allowed the
inclusion of at least one incident at a high school in Richmond, Virginia, that, according
to reports, was likely a spontaneous shooting resulting from a dispute between juveniles
rather than a planned, coordinated attack (Baker & Hsu, 1998; “Shooting at high school
in Virginia”, 1998).
Shooters and Their Victims
Despite media attempts to portray rampage shooters as middle-aged White males,
developing a profile based on common features of rampage shooters is a complicated,
elusive task (Langman, 2009b; Langman, 2015b; see also O’Toole, 1999). “The most
common error in discussing school shooters,” wrote Langman (2015b), “is the
assumption that they are a homogeneous group of people—that they can be lumped
together and discussed as if they were essentially the same. This assumption simply
doesn’t hold up to scrutiny” (p. 1; see also Fessenden, 2000). Langman (2015c) has
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compiled a list of school shooters—currently totaling 37—who were not White males,
including Seung-Hui Cho, an Asian male who, as Langman explained, perpetrated the
most deadly school rampage shooting in U.S. history, the 2007 massacre at Virginia Tech.
Still the myth that school rampage shooters are almost exclusively White males persists.11
White males are nonetheless over-represented as mass murder offenders because
they are male rather than because they are White. Rampage shooters are overwhelmingly
male (Langman, 2009b; Fox & Levin, 1998). Over 94% of mass murderers have been
male and nearly 64% have been White, higher percentages than single murder or any
other type of multiple homicide. As a consequence, victim characteristics are likewise
skewed (Fox & Levin, 1998; see also Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013). A study by the
New York City Police Department (Kelly, n.d.) found that only 4% of active shooter
incidents were perpetrated by females. Just under half the U.S. population are male, and
over 70% are White (United States Census Bureau, 2016). Hence, males are significantly
overrepresented as mass murderers, but Whites are actually slightly underrepresented. It
is important to note, however, that, while mass murderers are overwhelmingly male, so
11
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samples where selection bias has skewed the sample. For example, McGee and DeBernardo (1999) studied
15 cases involving 17 “classroom avenger” shooters and developed a profile reflecting that 100% of them
were White males in stark contrast to more comprehensive data sets (Fox & Levin, 1998; Langman,
2015c). Other literature (Melter, 2012) has described “the typical U. S. mass murderer” as a White male,
stating the statistic that “63% of offenders are [W]hite” (p. 39). In a paper discussing racial disparities in
media reporting on mass shootings, Mingus and Zopf (2010), referencing studies of mass school shootings
between 1974 and 2008, wrote that “[t]he majority of the shooters were [W]hite with few notable
exceptions” (p. 60). The authors did not mention that Whites represent over 70% of the U. S. population
(United States Census Bureau, 2016) and, thus, should make up the majority race of mass shooters.
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are murderers overall. In fact, data compiled by Fox and Levin (1998) for the two
decades from 1976 through 1995 showed that 94.4% of mass murder (four or more
victims in a single event) offenders, 93.2% of triple murder offenders, 94.3% of double
murder offenders, and 87.3% of single murder offenders were male. Studying 29 mass
shooting incidents occurring between 1999 and 2012, New Jersey Regional Operations
Intelligence Center (2012) reported that only one (3.4%) of the incidents was perpetrated
by a female. Males, however, represent slightly less than half the U. S. population
(United States Census Bureau, 2016).
Rampage school shooters are, however, not exclusively male: female shooters
include Laurie Dann, who opened fired on children at Hubbard Woods School in
Winnetka, Illinois, in 1988 killing one and wounding five (McCoppin & Berger, 2013);
Amy Bishop, who in 2010 shot and killed three coworkers, wounded three others, and
attempted to shoot a seventh during a biology faculty meeting at the University of
Alabama Huntsville (Keefe, 2013; Lawson, 2014); 12 and, Brenda Spencer, who in 1976
opened fire on a San Diego elementary school killing the principal and a custodian and
wounding a police officer and eight students (Langman, 2010b; “School shooter Brenda
Spencer denied parole”, 2009; “Sniping suspect had a grim goal”, 1979). Recently,
authorities in Colorado arrested 16-year-old Sienna Johnson along with another female
after discovering that the girls were plotting a rampage shooting at suburban Denver
Mountain Vista High School. Police obtained Johnson’s journal in which she detailed her
12
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however, questions arose after the UAH rampage shooting, and an inquest into the 1986 shooting led to
Bishop being indicted for the murder of her brother (Keefe, 2013).
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plans, though Johnson was not found to actually possess any of the weapons or
explosives needed to carry out her plans (Associated Press, 2016; “Denver teen charged
as adult,” 2016; Padilla & Powell, 2016; Roberts, 2016). On February 23, 2016, a 14year-old girl randomly attacked and wounded nine classmates with a knife at a high
school in the Toronto suburb of Pickering, and a news report indicated that she had made
social media postings in the days prior intimating her planned attack (Johnston & Fox,
2016). Whether she would have used a firearm had she had access to one remains unclear.
Rampage shooters overwhelmingly act alone. The New York City Police
Department has reported that 98% of active shooter incidents studied involved a lone
offender (Kelly, n.d.). Despite this statistic, perhaps the most defining school rampage
shooting incident in U.S. history was the 1999 massacre at Columbine High School,
which was carried out by two students, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold (Cullen, 2010;
Erickson, et al., 2001; Langman, 2008).
Notable in the research, however, is the fact that, while middle-age shooters have
carried out rampages in a variety of venues, adolescent rampage shooters
overwhelmingly carry out their massacres at school or school-related events (see Meloy,
Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and Gray, 2001).
Psychological disorders. No study of rampage shooters should overlook the
integral role that psychological disorders play in these episodes of violence. These
offenders are not normal people who snapped under pressure; they are people suffering
from “a long history of frustration, humiliation, and failure” and “a diminishing ability to
cope” who see themselves as victims and who, in their deeply disturbed minds, see
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violence as a means of gaining power and taking control of their suffering (Fox & Levin,
2003, p. 52; see also Fessenden, 2000; Fox, Levin, & Quinet, 2012; Langman, 2009c).
Unlike others suffering from extreme levels of depression and low self-image who may
be intropunitively violent, rampage shooters blame others for their failures and thus act
out extrapunitively (Fox & Levin, 2003). School rampage shooters are no different.
“School shooters are disturbed individuals,” Langman (2009c) explained. “These are not
ordinary kids who were bullied into retaliation” (p. 15). Planning and premeditation are
apparent in almost every case (Band & Harpold, 1999). Mental illness plays a role in
some shootings, but Duwe (2007), studying 1,186 mass murderers, conservatively
estimated that about 13% had a diagnosed history of mental illness and another 15%
exhibited symptoms of mental illness without any formal diagnosis.
Studying a non-random sample of 30 mass murderers, Hempel, Meloy, and
Richards (1999) found that the offenders killed between three and 22 people and
wounded between zero and 30. In 57% of the events, all or most of the victims were
known to the offender.13 Fifty-three percent of the offenders committed suicide, 36%
were captured, and 10% were killed. Though the age range spanned over 40 years, the
average offender was found to be a male in his 40s with no racial or ethnic group being
disproportionately represented.
Mass murderers are often erroneously viewed as individuals who “just snapped”
or “went berserk” and suddenly went on a rampage (Pollack, Modzeleski, & Rooney,

13 A study

of mass murders occurring since 2006 carried out by USA Today also found that 57% of

mass murder victims knew their killer (Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013).
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2008). In fact, such sudden episodic violence is rare, though many rampage killers exhibit
few, if any, indicators of their plans prior to execution. To get a clearer view of just who a
rampage killer is, one must be more meticulous in researching and analyzing an
offender’s past behavioral and mental health history. “[B]y focusing on atypical cases of
episodic violence in which bizarre and irrational behavior is profoundly implicated,”
wrote Fox and Levin (1998), “provides at best a partial understanding of the etiology and
character of mass homicide” (p. 431; see also Fessenden, 2000; Fox & DeLateur, 2014).
Indeed, the common image of mass murderers being “crazy people” is misplaced.
When attempting to identify potential mass murderers, one should be reminded of Fox’s
admonition that mass killers are “extraordinarily ordinary” (cited in Duwe, 2005, p. 68).
While rampage shooters often suffer mental illness—even if undiagnosed—the targeted
nature of such offenses is rarely associated with psychosis (Fox & Levin, 2003).
Victim selection. Mass murderers kill acquaintances and family members much
more often than strangers; in fact, about 80% of mass murder victims are family members
or are otherwise known to their killers (Fox & Levin, 1998). “The indiscriminate
slaughter of strangers by a ‘crazed’ killer,” the researchers wrote, “is the exception to the
rule” (p. 438). Fox and Levin (2003) argued that, while homicide offenders often kill
family members, mass murderers are significantly more likely to kill family members
than strangers.
Mass murders occur as a result of escalation of a serious argument in only about
23% of cases, despite the fact that single-victim homicides occur following a heated
dispute in over 53% of cases (Fox & Levin, 1998). Mass murderers typically choose their
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victims “because of what they have done or what they represent” (p. 438). Mass killers
usually have “clear-cut” motives (pp. 437-438). “[A] critical condition for frustration to
result in extrapunitive aggression,” wrote Fox and Levin, “is that the individual perceives
that others are to blame for his personal problems. . . . [T]he mass killer comes to see
himself never as the culprit but always as the victim behind his disappointments” (p.
439).
Root causes. Although causal factors of mass murder remain elusive in the
literature, the crime seems to be rooted in psychological maladies rather than biological
ones. “It remains to be seen,” wrote Fox and Levin (1998), “whether and to what limited
extent biological catalysts are implicated in incidents of mass murder—a crime that tends
to be methodical rather than episodic” (p. 441).
Familial mass murderers usually have either altruistic or revengeful motives: they
either seek to spare their family members some perceived fate or suffering, or they kill
family members out of spite, usually for perceived slights (Levin & Madfis, 2009).
Hence, strictly familial mass murder episodes are generally distinct from rampage
shootings in terms of both offender motivation and victimology. That said, rampage
shooters have, in a number of cases, killed family members either during an episode or,
more commonly, prior to one. Charles Whitman killed his mother and his wife prior to
ascending the clock tower at the University of Texas at Austin to begin his deadly
rampage (Lavergne, 1997); Kip Kinkel killed his parents the day before he carried out his
massacre at Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon (Langman, 2009a); and, Adam
Lanza killed his mother prior to slaughtering 20 children and six adults at Sandy Hook
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Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut (Sedensky, 2013).
While adult mass murderers almost exclusively act alone, juvenile mass
murderers are more likely to have an accomplice. Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and
Gray (2001) found that, in a sample of 34 adolescent mass murderers, one-quarter acted
in tandem with another male in stark contrast to the adult mass murderers who
overwhelmingly carry out their massacres alone (Fox & Levin, 2003).
Levin and Madfis (2009) looked at cumulative strain as a causal factor in mass
shootings at schools and developed a sequential model to explain the buildup to violence
involving five stages: (1) chronic strain, (2) uncontrolled strain, (3) acute strain, (4) the
planning stage, and (5) the massacre. This model, while explanatory in criminological
terms, does not address the nature of the massacre but, rather, the childhood and
adolescent strains that push one toward rampage violence. The primary constraint in
applying this model to real-world cases a priori, however, is that a great many juveniles
suffer the same cumulative strain as school rampage shooters without becoming violent.
Again, the false positive rate is exceedingly high.
Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and Gray (2001) asserted that mass murders
were “generally acts of predatory (instrumental) violence”—rather than affective
(reactive)—that is “planned, purposeful, unemotional, shows an absence of autonomic
arousal, and is not preceded by a real or perceived imminent threat” (p. 726). Such
predatory violence is particularly apparent among “classroom avengers” (p. 726; McGee
& DeBernardo, 1999).
Characteristics. Studying a sample of six school shooters, Band and Harpold
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(1999) found a number of common characteristics (p. 14):
1. The offenders expressed narcissistic views but also had low self-esteem.
2. They had a real or perceived lack of familial support.
3. They had difficulty with their parents, though no evidence of actual abuse
existed.
4. They perceived themselves as different from others and suffered self-loathing
as a result.
5. They desired recognition and, in absence of positive recognition, sought
negative recognition.
6. They had a history of displays of anger and minor violence at school.
7. They had a history of mental health treatment.
8. They were influenced by satanic or cult beliefs or philosophies.
9. They listened to violence-promoting music.
10. They were loners who performed as average students and often had an
unkempt appearance.
11. They tended to dislike popular students and bullies.
12. They had an interest in previous killings.
13. They expressed a desire to kill others.
14. They sought power over others through killing because they felt powerless.
15. They exhibited no remorse after killing.
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Typology. Langman (2009a), studying a non-random sample of 10 rampage
school shooters who carried out massacres between 1997 and 2007, 14 identified three
typologies: (1) traumatized; (2) psychotic; and, (3) psychopathic. The traumatized
shooters, which included Evan Ramsey, Mitchell Johnson, and Jeffrey Weise, all had a
history of physical or sexual abuse and “had at least one parent with substance abuse
problems, and each had at least one parent with a criminal history.” The psychotic
shooters, which included Michael Carneal, Andrew Wurst, Kip Kinkel, Dylan Klebold,
and Seung Hui Cho, all “came from intact families with no histories of abuse, parental
substance abuse, or parental incarceration” and had “exhibited symptoms of either
schizophrenia or schizotypal personality disorder, including paranoid delusions, delusions
of grandeur, and auditory hallucinations.” The psychopathic shooters, which included
Andrew Golden and Eric Harris, all had “intact families with no histories of abuse or
significant family dysfunction” and “demonstrated narcissism, a lack of empathy, a lack
of conscience, and sadistic behavior” (p. 81).
Lankford (2012a) studied a sample of 81 terrorist suicide attackers and rampage
shooters who committed suicide during their attacks and found that both groups shared
similar background characteristics, including “social marginalization, family problems,
work or school problems, and precipitating crisis events” (p. 255). These findings directly
challenge the conventional wisdom that suicide terrorists are “rational political actors” as
compared with suicidal rampage shooters who are believed to be “mentally disturbed
loners,” leading Lankford to conclude that, if many of the rampage school shooters in the
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United States had grown up in, for example, Gaza or the West Bank, they would likely
have become suicide bombers (Lankford, 2012b, para. 2). Lankford’s findings suggest
that the scourge of rampage shootings in the United States vis-à-vis the almost complete
absence of suicide bombers here owes to cultural differences between American culture
and cultures in other regions of the world where suicide bombings are common but
rampage shootings are not. Larkin (2009) also likened the Columbine rampage to a
politically-motivated massacre, and illustrated how it had spawned other similar events.
Dietz (1986) classified mass murderers into three typologies: family annihilators,
who typically suffer from depression, paranoia, and substance abuse and kill multiple
family members, often in an emotional outburst; pseudo-commandos, who are often
preoccupied with weapons, death, and killing and will commit their massacres after
substantial contemplation and planning; and set-and-run killers, who typically carry out
their murders through some remote means, such as setting a fire, leaving an explosive
device to be triggered later, or tampering with products to indiscriminately poison
unsuspecting consumers. Dietz’s distinctions are critical to the study of the crime scene
behaviors of mass murderers and lend themselves to establishing a classification for
school rampage shootings. While a study on mass murder overall may rightly be designed
to include data on all incidents that meet specified criteria regarding casualties,
timeframe, and location, the distinction between the motivations of family annihilators
and pseudo-commandos necessitates, at least from a crime scene behaviors standpoint,
studying the typologies separately. Indeed, as Fox and Levin (1998) explained, rampage
killers who massacre large numbers of strangers in a public place represent only a
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minority fraction of mass murderers.
Fox and Levin (1998) listed five motivations for multiple murder: (1) power, (2)
revenge, (3) loyalty, (4) terror, and (5) profit. Power is often the motivation for
“pseudocommando” killers—ones who dress in military-style clothing, are often
obsessed with weapons and symbols of power, and who tend to slaughter victims
indiscriminately. Revenge killers are usually motivated by some precipitating event such
as the loss of a job or being rejected in attempts at a relationship, though they may not
directly kill the object of their rage, choosing instead to kill others connected with that
person, such as a husband murdering his children in an act of revenge against his wife.
Loyalty killers are usually family members—often patriarchal—who kill loved ones out
of a desire to spare their victims some perceived suffering. Profit killers murder witnesses
to crimes or people whose deaths are likely to allow for the offenders’ monetary gain.
Terror killers use mass murder as a means of making some political statement.
Weapons. In their study of 27 mass murder events perpetrated by adolescents,
Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and Gray (2001) found that only four of the events did
not involve firearms; in 16 cases, firearms were the only weapons used. A USA Today
study of mass murders occurring since 2006 found that 77% of the incidents involved
firearms. Of the incidents involving firearms, 72.9% involved handguns, 18.5% involved
rifles, and 8.6% involved shotguns; 58.2% of the firearms were semiautomatic and 1.3%
were fully automatic (Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013).
While rampage shooters, by definition, rely on firearms as their weapons-ofchoice, there is significant disparity among the types and numbers of firearms and rounds
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of ammunition carried. In their study, Hempel, Meloy, and Richards (1999) found that the
average mass murderer brought three weapons to carry out an attack, though they pointed
out that “some brought an arsenal” (p. 220). The researchers noted a “warrior mentality”
theme among the subjects in their non-random sample. Warrior types often carry weapons
of little utility in a rampage, such as knives, swords, and throwing stars that serve more to
feed the offender’s fantasy and warrior self-image than to facilitate a rampage.
Outcome. Some disparity exists in the data regarding outcome of the offender.
According to data compiled by USA Today, about one-third of mass murder offenders
since 2006 were either killed or committed suicide (Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013).
Duwe (2007), studying 1,186 mass murderers between 1900 and 1999, found that 22%
were killed, either by suicide or by other people, at the scenes of their massacres, and
38% were taken into custody; data were ambiguous as to outcome for the remaining 40%.
However, in a report by the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (2012),
the authors studied 29 mass shooting events that occurred between 1999 and 2012 and
found that 20 of the incidents (69%) ended with the offender either committing suicide or
being killed by police. Where successful interventions occur, the circumstances have
varied: for example, in five case studies presented by Mullen (2004), one offender
intended to commit suicide but could not bring himself to do so, and efforts to get the
police to kill him failed; another offender hesitated after turning his gun on himself and
was tackled by a police officer; another offender was cornered and disarmed by citizens;
another offender expected to be killed by police, but, when that did not happen, he failed
at a suicide attempt before being taken into custody; and, another offender was tackled by
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one of his victims when his firearm malfunctioned.
Where interventions occur, it is difficult to assess the degree to which those
efforts spared victims. Even when offenders take their lives, investigators and experts are
left only with limited proxy data from which to discern the degree to which outside
influences promoted an offender’s suicide. An offender may have stopped killing because
he was cornered, or because he ran out of ammunition, experienced a firearm failure, or
was simply satisfied that he had completed his mission.
Violent video games. One background factor that dominates the profiles of
rampage school shooters is a history of frequent playing of violent video games. Clearly,
playing violent video games cannot be viewed as causal with regard to violent rampages:
millions of consumers of violent video games never turn to violent rampages as an outlet
for their stresses and frustrations; in fact, as Langman (2009c) explained, those few who
do can be viewed as aberrational rather than normal (see also Ferguson, 2008; Ferguson,
Coulson, & Barnett, 2011; Fox & DeLateur, 2014). Violent video games, however, are a
common thread among rampage school shooters, and such media seem to serve as a sort
of pornography for those obsessed with death and killing. “They do not just play violent
video games,” Langman explained. “They become obsessed with them” (p. 8).
Media depictions of violence, Langman (2009c) explained, may also serve to feed
the rampage shooter’s violent fantasy and may even provide “guidelines or scripts for
killers to follow” (p. 8). By legitimizing violence and giving status to those who
perpetrate it, Langman argues, violent media feed the would-be killer’s desire for power
and make violence appear to be a legitimate means of achieving it. Still, there exists no
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real consensus in the empirical literature as to extent to which playing violent video
games affects the behavior or decisions of school rampage shooters.
Warning signs and indicators. Band and Harpold (1999) provided the following
list of “general warning signs or personal background indicators” for school shooting
offenders (p. 12):
1. a history of violence;
2. a close family member who has committed a violent act;
3. a history of alcohol or drug abuse;
4. a precipitating event, such as a failed romance or the perception of a failed
romance;
5. the availability of a weapon or the means to commit violence;
6. a recent attempt to commit suicide or an act of violence;
7. a lack of coping skills or strategies to handle personal life crises with no
controls to prevent anger or positive ways to release it; and,
8. no apparent emotional support system.

Characteristics of the Events
In their study of a non-random sample of 30 mass murder events, Hempel, Meloy,
and Richards (1999) found that 37% took place at the offenders’ workplaces, 20% on
public streets, 13% at schools, and 13% at the offenders’ homes with the rest occurring at
other public locations. The median length of time for the events was 20 minutes. Ninety
percent took place on a weekday, and 93% took place between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and
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6:00 p.m. A study by the New York City Police Department found that 29% of active
shooter incidents studied took place at school (Kelly, n.d.).
Prevalence of Rampage Shooting Incidents
Mass murder incidents in the United States occur about once every two weeks.
Fox and Levin (2003) found that during the period from 1976 through 1999, there were
599 mass murder episodes in the United States by 826 offenders claiming 2,800 victims,
an average of over 100 victims annually.15 A recent USA Today study of mass murders
occurring since 2006 found that 1,331 victims had been killed in 271 incidents, 205 of
which involved firearms (Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013).
Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and Gray (2001) concluded that their nonrandom sample of 34 offenders involved in 27 events represented “most of the universe
of adolescent mass murderers . . . in North America in the past half century” (p. 720).
While the sample spanned from 1958 to 1999, nearly 52% of the cases occurred between
1995 and 1999.
A study by USA Today of mass murders (including ones not involving firearms)
occurring since 2006 found that massacres occurring in public places accounted for about
one in six mass murder episodes; 52% of cases involved familial mass murders, 12%
arose out of burglaries or robberies, and 21% were classified as other or unknown
circumstances (Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013). Several researchers have found that
mass murders have not shown a significant upward or downward trajectory over as long a
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period as the past three decades (Fox & Levin, 2005; Overberg, Upton, & Hoyer, 2013).
Fox and Levin (2003) found that, while violent crime tends to be more prevalent
in urban locales, mass murder occurs more frequently in small towns and rural settings.
Furthermore, while murder rates are higher in the South, mass murder rates are not.
Homicides on Campus
Fox, Levin, and Quinet (2005) posited an interesting juxtaposition: while rates of
juvenile and school campus violence were decreasing in the 1990s, the phenomenon of
rampage school shootings was making its first real appearance in American culture, and
an appearance it indeed made. Particularly on middle and high school campuses, the
number of reported rampage shootings on campus surged in the 1990s. Similarly, the
number of rampage shootings on college campuses increased during the 2000s (Fox &
Savage, 2009).
Schools, especially high schools and colleges, are particularly at risk for rampage
shooting events for a number of reasons: (1) students fall within the age range during
which violence is most prevalent; (2) students are exposed to considerable social and
academic stressors; and, (3) campuses are more open, particularly at the college level
where students are able to come and go at will (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009).
On college and university campuses, an average of 10 homicides were perpetrated
annually between 2001 and 2005, the majority of which involved acquaintances or were
drug-related. Firearms were used in only 52% of those murders (Fox & Savage, 2009).
Researchers have noted an interesting phenomenon with regard to school rampage
shootings: they occur almost exclusively in suburban and rural schools (Moore, Petrie,
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Braga, & McLaughlin, 2003; Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta, & Roth, 2004). Rampage
shooters on school campuses have shown distinctly different offender characteristics than
shooters in other geographic locations, particularly with regard to age and motivation
(Fox & Savage, 2009). With respect to rampage shooting incidents on college and
university campuses, Fox and Savage (2009) found that graduate students were
disproportionately represented as offenders: of the 14 incidents the researchers studied,
eight were committed by current or former graduate or professional students as compared
to only three that were perpetrated by undergraduate students and three by outsiders.
Fox and Savage (2009) examined rampage shootings on college campuses
following the 2007 Virgina Tech massacre. In particular, they examined whether task
force recommendations put forth in the wake of such tragedies would have a beneficial
effect on campus security. Fox and Savage found that, while some recommendations
were valid and appropriate, others may be detrimental to the college campus
environment. Fox and Savage identified as problematic the implicit assumption that
security and prevention strategies effective at the secondary school level would likewise
be effective on college campuses. They identified “differences in assailant motivation and
setting” as factors that must be considered when adapting prevention and response
measures (p. 1465).
Harding, Fox, and Mehta (2002) researched methodological issues regarding the
study of school rampage shootings given the rarity of their occurrence. The researchers
argued that a significant problem in studying mass shootings at schools is “defining the
relevant universe of cases that can realistically be called rampage school shootings” (p.
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177, emphasis in original). They examined epistemic uncertainty associated with small
sample sizes, inability to clearly define the population under study, and inability to obtain
useful comparison samples. In many cases, the number of potential independent variables
exceeds the number of data points resulting in underdetermined systems making it
difficult to assess the complex web of causation.
Heide, Eyles, and Spencer (1999) looked at school shootings from the beginning
of the 1990/91 school year through the end of the 1997/98 school year and proposed a
typology of school shootings “that aims to put the phenomena of school shootings in a
scientific framework where it can be objectively investigated” (p. 174). Petee and Padgett
(1999) looked at “the context of mass murder occurring in both public and private
settings in the United States between 1975 and 1999” (p. 211). Nykodym, Patrick, and
Mendoza (2011) examined response options for universities and the effect of multiple
independent variables, including factors associated with economic downturn experienced
over the last several years.
Prevention and Response
Perhaps H. L. Menken (n.d.) best summed the issue: “For every complex problem
there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.” Indeed, as O’Toole (1999) explained:
“In a knee-jerk reaction, communities may resort to inflexible, one-size-fits-all policies
on preventing or reacting to violence” (p. 2). Still, poor policy decisions in the aftermath
of rampage shootings continue.
Preventing rampage shootings from occurring in the first place is certainly
preferable to responding to such an incident when it does take place. A study by the New
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York City Police Department (Kelly, n.d.) found 31 cases in which school shooting plots
had been foiled prior to being carried out. Still, prevention is only one layer of protection,
and clearly many shootings have not been prevented.
Fox and Savage (2009) have suggested that “an atmosphere of fear” has led some
colleges and universities to adopt measures that “go beyond what is reasonable” and “do
more harm than good” (p. 1466). Unfortunately, there are no simple answers as to what
measures are appropriate for school and law enforcement officials to take to prevent
rampage shootings and other violence.
Prevention of a rampage shooting requires officials to gain intelligence of the
impending plot and intervene before the shooting starts. Unfortunately, there are no
failsafe measures that can prevent every rampage shooting. Risk assessment tools are
difficult to employ. The aberrantly small population of school rampage shooters means
that such tools are likely to produce an alarmingly high rate of false positive indicators.
And, the accuracy of risk assessment tools is barely greater than mere chance. Threat
assessment protocols, on the other hand, target specific threats rather than individual
characteristics to assess the legitimacy of a potential threat and provide specific
information from which investigators and school officials may act. “The question is not
whether the student might be at increased risk for engaging in some form of aggressive
behavior during adolescence,” wrote Reddy et al. (2001), “but rather whether he or she
currently poses a substantial risk of harm to another identified or identifiable person(s) at
school” (p. 160).
Risk assessment. Risk state may be defined as an individual’s propensity to
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become involved in violence at a given time, based on particular changes in biological,
psychological, and social variables in his or her life (Skeem & Mulvey, 2002). Central to
this construct is a recognition that risk factors vary in the extent to which they are
changeable, ranging from highly static variables (e.g., gender, race, history of violence)
to highly dynamic ones (e.g., substance use, weapon availability) (Heilbrun, 1997; see
also Kazdin, Kraemer, Kessler, Kupfer, & Offord, 1997; Kraemer et al., 1997). Static risk
factors describe an individual’s risk status, whereas a combination of static and dynamic
factors describes an individual’s risk state (Douglas & Skeem, 2005, pp. 349-350).
Most risk assessment tools have been developed with the assumption that they
will be applied to make single-point predictions of violence (i.e., release decisions),
although some risk assessment models attempt to integrate the concepts of reassessment
and dynamic risk (Andrews & Bonta, 1994; Douglas, Webster, Hart, Eaves, & Ogloff,
2001; Grann et al., 2005; Grann, Belfrage, & Tengstrom, 2000; Webster, Douglas, Eaves,
& Hart, 1997).
While retrospective profiling is often used in the investigation of violent crimes,
prospective profiling to identify the risk an individual may pose with respect to targeted
violence at a school provides little promise of being effective. Prospective profiling
techniques lack the sensitivity and specificity to provide any scientific reliability to the
process of identifying a very small group of potential rampage shooters out of a
population of tens of millions of students. Fox has described the problem of detecting
actual killers from among the thousands of non-killers who fit the profile as being “a very
large haystack and very few needles” (quoted in Duwe, 2005; see also Bjelopera,

!68
Bagalman, Caldwell, Finkela, & McCallion, 2013; Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009;
Kleinfield, Buettner, Chen, & Stewart, 2015).
Questions also exist as to the accuracy of current rampage school shooter profiles.
The FBI, for example, developed a profile based on only six school shootings while other
researchers found over 40 school shooting cases during the last two decades of the 20th
Century (Band & Harpold, 1999; Reddy et al., 2001). The school shooter profile
developed by the FBI, relying on a sample of only six shooters, mistakenly determined
that all were white males (Band & Harpold, 1999); however, three of the six shooters
were actually not white males: one was African American, one was Hispanic, and one
was a Native American (Reddy et al., 2001). In fact, Langman (2015c) has published a
list of 37 school shooters who were not white males. Pollack, Modzeleski, and Rooney
(2008) wrote that there is “no useful or accurate ‘profile’ of students who engaged in
targeted school violence” (p. 3).
Langman (2005) explained the problem of attempting to profile potential rampage
shooters:
There is no typical demographic profile of a school shooter. Some come from
intact families and some from broken homes. Some are excellent students, and
some are poor students. Some are bullies, and some are not. Some are victims of
bullying, and some are not. Some use drugs, and some do not. Most are male, but
some are female. Thus, profiling is not a productive course to pursue in
identifying potential school shooters. (p. 1)
Threat assessment. Certainly, the prospect of a lone gunman opening fire on a
school campus, randomly killing strangers, was not at the forefront of Americans’
collective consciousness in 1966—even if it should have been. During the first quarter of
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that year, 25-year-old Charles Whitman, after killing his wife and his mother, went to the
University of Texas at Austin and ascended the clock tower, armed with three rifles, a
shotgun, and three handguns. After killing three people inside the tower, Whitman spent
the next 96 minutes sniping at victims on the ground, killing 11 and wounding 32 before
being killed by police (Lavergne, 1997). Beside having written about his violent
thoughts, Whitman told multiple acquaintances that he wanted to shoot people from the
tower, and he even confessed to a psychiatrist, who noted that Whitman was “oozing with
hostility,” that he was “thinking about going up on the tower with a deer rifle and start
shooting people” (Heatly, 1966, pp. 1-2; see also Burgess, 2006).
Twenty-five-year-old Canadian Kimveer Gill shot 19 people at Dawson College
in Montreal in 2006. Prior to his rampage, Gill had posted disturbing, death-laced
messages of violence and despair on various websites. He even posted 51 photographs of
himself posing with firearms and wearing a black trench coat reminiscent of those worn
by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold during their infamous rampage at Columbine High
School in Littleton, Colorado (Alfano, 2006; Langman, 2009c).
Threat assessment is not centered on profiling offender characteristics but, rather,
concerned with specific, overt behaviors that may indicate a person’s intent to engage in
violence. “Any student can make a threat,” explained Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, and
Jimerson (2010), “but relatively few have a persisting violent intent that leads them to
engage in the planning and preparation necessary to carry out an attack” (p. 31). Threat
assessment is not used to predict violence; it is used to detect impending violence before
it takes place. Whereas risk assessment is actuarial, threat assessment is investigative.
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O’Toole (1999) explained that there is an inequality among threat makers: they
are not they same, but despite the unlikelihood that a threat maker will actually become
violent, all threats must be taken seriously and investigated properly. Key to threat
assessment is understanding the difference between verbalizing a threat and actually
posing a threat. “Any student can make a threat,” explained Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski,
and Jimerson (2010), “but relatively few have a persisting violent intent that leads them
to engage in the planning and preparation necessary to carry out an attack” (p. 31; see
also Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009; Reddy et al., 2001). Langman (2005)
explained that “the more detailed the plan and the more accessible the means, the greater
the risk” (p. 2).
A number of researchers have provided threat assessment warning indicators
(Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, and Jimerson, 2010; Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, &
Gray, 2001; Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2011; Meloy, Hoffmann, Roshdi, &
Guldimann, 2014; Reddy et al., 2001; Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski,
2004). Borum et al. provided a list of eleven investigative questions for assessing threats
of targeted violence in schools (p. 32):
1. What are the student’s motives and goals?
2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?
3. Has the student shown inappropriate interest in school attacks or attackers;
weapons; or, incidents of mass violence?
4. Has the student engaged in any attack-related behaviors?
5. Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence?
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6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, or despair?
7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible
adult?
8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable, desirable, or exclusive way to
solve problems?
9. Is the student’s conversation consistent with his or her actions?
10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?
11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?
O’Toole (1999) proposed a threat hierarchy in which threats are classified at
levels of either “low,” “moderate,” or “high” threat. Threat content, O’Toole explained,
should be evaluated based on the specificity and plausibility of the threat; the emotional
content of the threat; and, the existence of precipitating stressors in the threat maker’s
life. Verlinden, Hersen, and Thomas (2000) expanded the classifications to include “very
high” threat as an additional category.
Hempel, Meloy, and Richards (1999), studying a non-random sample of 30 mass
murder offenders, found that only 20% of them had directly threatened their victims,
which implies that reliance on such threats as the sole indicator of future violence would
yield a false negative rate of 80% (see also Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009). Still,
taken into context, threats made either directly to a potential victim or to a third party can
be reliable predictors of an impending rampage shooting. Studying 30 adult and 34
adolescent mass murderers, Meloy, Hempel, Gray, Mohandie, Shiva, and Richards (2004)
found that 66% of adult and 58% of adolescent mass murderers made verbal or written
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threats, most often to third parties. Some of the threats were specific, some were
generalized, and some were mixed. Likewise, however, Meloy et al. found a potential
false negative rate of 42% for adolescent and 80% for adult mass murderers because no
threat was communicated directly to targeted individuals.
One particular challenge in identifying potential rampage shooters is the inherent
lack of emotion that most mass murderers exhibit. In their study of 34 adolescent mass
murderers, Meloy, Hempel, Mohandie, Shiva, and Gray (2001) described the typical
offender as “emotionless” and explained that, if any emotion is exhibited at all, it is likely
to be an expression of happiness or pleasure (p. 726). 16 “The importance of this finding,”
they wrote, “is that it suggests that the adolescent mass murderer is opportunistic rather
than impulsive, and will not show any sudden or highly emotional warning signs” (p.
727). In contrast to the oft-seen profile of the single victim homicide offender whose
violence is affective, impulsive, and unplanned, the mass murderer will often appear to be
quite calm and collected, a product of the intense planning and preparation that often
precedes a massacre.
Fox and Savage (2009) argued that, while threat assessment protocols have a
place in violence prevention strategies, the rarity of rampage shootings complicates
prediction of occurrence and threatens to yield an “exceedingly high” number of false
positives. “[W]hereas threat assessment can be highly effective,” wrote Fox and Levin,
“it should not be the only method of violence prevention utilized by an institution” (p.
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1471). Some people make threats they have no intention of carrying out, while others
who have strong intentions to perpetrate violence may never make a threat (Langman,
2009c). Threat assessment protocols, therefore, are unlikely to be failsafe (see Kleinfield,
Buettner, Chen, & Stewart, 2015).
Fox and DeLateur (2014) explained that the warning signs of an impending
rampage shooting are not easily seen in foresight, and they argued that it is mythical to
believe that paying greater attention to those warning signs will allow for the
identification of would-be mass killers before they carry out their massacres. “If
anything,” wrote Fox and DeLateur, “these indicators are yellow flags that only turn red
once the blood has spilled and are identified in the aftermath of tragedy with crystal-clear
hindsight” (p. 133). Langman (2009b) echoed that sentiment. Pointing out that concerns
voiced by Eric Harris’s English teacher at Columbine High School about a paper he wrote
were not acted on by school officials or Harris’s parents, Langman explained that, in
hindsight, the indicators may seem clear, but in foresight they are often ignored because
innocuous explanations exist. Prior to carrying out his 2007 massacre at Virgina Tech,
Seung-Hui Cho wrote an essay that “caused enough concern that he was referred for an
evaluation,” but still no official action was taken to prevent the rampage (Langman,
2012b, p. 4).
Despite strong and specific threat indicators months before Charles Whitman
carried out his massacre, no action was taken to stop him. A subsequent report by a
governor’s commission focused on a brain tumor discovered during Whitman’s autopsy,
and even made recommendations that news media “review their own role and attitude in
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obtaining and disseminating information concerning acts of violence,” but made no
recommendation regarding threat assessment or the fact that Whitman had communicated
his plan to a school psychiatrist (Blumberg et al., 1966, p. 15). In the 21st Century, unlike
in 1966, threat assessment protocols have been codified, and school officials have a much
greater level of awareness of the warning signs (Cornell, 2009; Fein, Vossekuil, Pollack,
Borum, Modzeleski, & Reddy, 2002). However, as Harwood (2007) explained, there are
no national standards for threat assessment teams, though both the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the United States Secret Service have published reports providing
guidance to school and law enforcement officials.
The specificity of the threat is a key component to appropriate assessment.
Michael Carneal, for example, wrote a story about a rampage shooting in which the killer
was named Michael and the victims in the story were named for actual students. He also
told fellow students that “something big” was going to happen, specifically referencing
the day that the shooting actually took place. Nobody took him seriously (Langman,
2009b).
Scholars have also argued the need for defragmented documentation in school
settings. In the case of Michael Carneal, multiple teachers witnessed disturbing events
involving the would-be killer, but, in isolation, none of the events were serious enough to
warrant the type of intervention that was needed. In absence of a central reporting system,
no single person had a complete picture of the boy’s troubling pattern of behavior. For
threat assessment protocols to work, the observations of multiple faculty members must
come to a single processing point so that the full depth and breadth of the student’s
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behavior can be assessed (Langman, 2009b; Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta, & Roth
2004).
Successful interventions do occur, and sometimes plots are foiled within days or
even hours of the shooting rampage taking place. On October 28, 2015, police and FBI
agents in Michigan arrested Ryan Stevens, 18, Lamar Dukes, 15, and Cody Brewer, 15,
after school officials became aware of threats made on social media website Instagram
that a plot had been hatched to shoot people at Linden High School and nearby Linden
Middle School in Argentine Township, Michigan. According to police, when the trio, who
had access to firearms, were arrested, the plot was only two days from being carried out
(“Three teens arrested,” 2015; Vinograd, 2015; Worland, 2015).
Reviewing news accounts of 28 averted school shootings, Daniels et al. (2007)
found that the most common reason for preventing the shooting rampage was that other
students told school personnel or police about a potential incident (n = 16, 57.1%). Eight
of those cases involved friends alerting officials after the would-be perpetrators revealed
their plans. Two cases involved students recruited to be part of the plot alerting
authorities. Similarly, seven of the 28 plots were discovered by attentive administrators
who received intelligence on the plots either by hearing chatter among students or by
observing suspicious behavior on the part of a would-be perpetrator. Four more incidents
were uncovered by staff members who overheard rumors. Five plots were discovered by
police based on tips, and two more were uncovered following an arrest of the would-be
perpetrator on unrelated charges.
Using semi-structured interviews, Davis et al. (2010) found that school climate
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can affect the willingness of students to alert school officials of potential future violence,
and they recommended that school officials work diligently to foster positive
relationships with students and “break the code of silence” that exists between students
and school personnel (p. 91).
Increasingly, social media have played key roles in the detection of potential
rampage shooting plots. Cohen-Almagor (2014) found evidence of premeditation in the
social media postings of several rampage shooters and argued for the development of
monitoring protocols for Internet sites to detect potential killers prior to loss of life. She
found, for example, that 16-year-old Jeff Weise, who killed nine people and wounded five
during a 2005 massacre at Red Lake Senior High School in Minnesota, had posted certain
key indicators on a social media site on which he listed his occupation as “doormat” and
his interests as “military, high schools, death and dying.” He also described himself as
having “16 years of accumulated rage suppressed by nothing more than brief glimpses of
hope, which have all but faded to black. I can feel urges within slipping through the
cracks, the leash I can no longer hold” (p. 2). A number of rampage shooters, including
Kimveer Gill, who killed one person and wounded 20 others at Dawson College in
Montreal, Canada, and Seung-Hui Cho, who killed 32 and wounded 17 at Virginia Tech
in 2007, had posted photos of themselves on social media sites posing with weapons and
wearing tactical attire (see Langman, 2012b).
Threat assessment protocols have been shown to be effective at reducing violence
and student disciplinary problems. Studying the effects of the adoption of the Virginia
Student Threat Assessment Guidelines at 23 high schools, Cornell, Gregory, and Fan
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(2011) found that, in comparison to a control group of 26 schools, institutions that
implemented the guidelines experienced a 52% reduction in long-term suspensions and a
79% reduction in bullying infractions during the year following implementation as
compared to the prior year.
Security measures. “In the short term, access control and close surveillance may
calm the fears of an anxious public,” wrote Fox and DeLateur (2015). “In the long run, it
is equally important to avoid transforming our public spaces into fortresses.” Likewise,
Fox and Savage (2009) suggested that “tight security measures . . . appropriate for middle
and high schools” where attendance is compulsory, when implemented on college or
university campuses, “could create an environment so distasteful to student prospects as
to encourage them to look for options elsewhere” (p. 1474). Bridges (1999), however,
argues that security measures need not be prison-like.
In response to the perceived epidemic of rampage shootings, a number of security
measures have been put in place at schools around the country. Security badges, for
example, are used to distinguish those who belong versus those who do not, but such a
measure assumes, incorrectly, that the greatest danger of violence is posed by strangers
rather than students or others known to the school. Likewise, surveillance cameras, while
important for monitoring campus and responding to emergencies, will do little to
dissuade the would-be shooter because such individuals have no concern for carrying out
their rampages concealed from public view; quite the contrary, with rampage shooters,
the more attention their massacres receive, the more satisfied they are. Metal detectors as
well have limits in that, while they may serve to prevent targeted violence episodes that
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require the shooter to reach an intended victim undetected, rampage shooters are likely to
begin shooting before reaching the metal detectors and, especially if unchallenged by
armed security, will simply shoot their way past a checkpoint (Langman, 2009b). Fox and
DeLateur (2015) pointed out that, in the case of Mitchell Johnson’s and Andrew Golden’s
1998 rampage at their high school in Jonesboro, Arkansas, the offenders simply pulled a
fire alarm and waited for their victims to amass outside before opening fire, thereby
defeating any physical security measures that were in place.
One aspect that critics of physical security measures often overlook is the fact that
no single measure is sufficient to prevent violence, but an approach that involves
multiple, redundant layers of security can reduce the likelihood of violence. Lieutenant
Colonel Dave Grossman, who has become known for his study of the psychology of
killing, asserts that the first step in preventing deaths from school rampage shootings is to
overcome denial: too often, parents, school officials, and even police officers deny that
violence can occur in schools. Likening the prevention of violence to the prevention of
fire, Grossman gives the fire prevention experts an “A+” grade for having prevented fire
deaths in U.S. schools for over a half century. Schools, as Grossman points out, are filled
with fire prevention measures: fire-retardant materials, sprinklers, fire hoses, fire
extinguishers, fire hydrants, fire alarms, designated no-parking fire zones, lighted fireexit signs, battery-powered emergency lights, and mandatory fire drills—redundant,
layered fire prevention measures. But, as Grossman explains, security measures for the
prevention of violence in schools have not followed suit, largely due to the paradoxical
denial mentality in which talk of taking steps to prevent violent deaths in schools is often
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met with resistance, while talk of removing fire prevention measures from schools would
likely be met with equal—if not greater—resistance.
In Grossman’s view, there exists conflict in public perception between the need
for fire safety measures and the need for violence prevention measures. Fire safety
measures are typically welcomed by parents and school officials, while violence
prevention measures are often criticized. Grossman equates such seemingly-contradictory
attitudes as being due to denial in which people’s fear of violence causes them to deny it
rather than face it and take measures to prevent it. “Are these fire guys paranoid?”
Grossman has asked. “No! . . . Because this fire guy has redundant, overlapping layers of
protection, not a single kid has been killed by school fire in the last 50 years! But you try
to prepare for violence—the thing much more likely to kill our kids in schools—and
people think you’re paranoid. . . . They’re in denial” (Wylie, 2010).
Indeed, according to the National Fire Protection Association (2013), no fire in a
U.S. K-12 school has claimed 10 or more lives 17 since the tragic 1958 fire at Our Lady of
the Angels Catholic school in Chicago killed 92 children and three nuns and injured
dozens more. A 13-year-old later confessed to starting the fire in the school’s basement,
though he later recanted his confession and was found not guilty of starting the fire. The
official cause of the fire remains undetermined (Babcock, 1959; “Boy admits fire fatal to
95,” 1962; Groves, 2008).
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Punitive measures and zero tolerance. Zero tolerance policies aimed at
punishing every breech of school policy connected with a potential for violence became
the norm following Columbine and a number of other high-profile school rampage
shootings in the 1990s. Despite being tied to federal educational legislation and having
been adopted by nearly 75% of schools, there is a dearth of evidence of their efficacy
(Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, & Jimerson, 2010).
Langman (2009c) asserted that, in practice, zero tolerance policies often result in
“inappropriate responses to innocuous situations” because of a “failure to distinguish
actual threats from non-threats” (p. 186). Punishment, moreover, as Langman explained,
can have a detrimental effect in violence prevention in that it may serve to increase rage
while doing nothing to mitigate the underlying issues driving the individual toward
violence. Expelling or suspending a student from school can also lead to increased
unsupervised periods and a compounding of a troubled student’s already prevalent
feelings of isolation. “A student threatening mass murder is a student in crisis,” explained
Langman. “Simply getting such youths out of school by suspension or expulsion does
nothing to resolve the crisis” (p. 187; see also Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009).
“[B]y and large, the response to school rampage as a social problem,” wrote
Madfis (2012), “has been to predict it with risk assessments, punish anything resembling
it (such as weapons violations and threatening comments) with harsh zero tolerance
policies and transfers to the justice system, deter it with police officers and cameras, and
make it more difficult to accomplish through target hardening procedures like locked
doors and metal detectors” (p. 57). “[M]ore ameliorative forms of school violence
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prevention” have been largely ignored by policymakers and school administrators in large
measure, Madfis explained, due to the fear engendered by the few highly-publicized
anecdotal examples of rampage shootings that, based on media reports, create the illusion
that such incidents are rampant. The net effect of such approaches tends to be a focus on
preventing extraordinarily rare events while neglecting more ordinary and common forms
of school violence.
School response protocols. Schools have an obligation to protect students,
faculty, and staff from foreseeable dangers, including the threat of violence. Not only
does violence on campus expose educational institutions to liability, it potentially has a
negative effect on enrollment, student performance, and institutional prestige. As such,
school officials must be prepared, to whatever extent preparation for such a rare event is
reasonable. “There is a significant difference between awareness and readiness,” wrote
Greenburg (2007). “Simply providing information to increase awareness of a problem
and potential solutions does not ensure preparedness or appropriate response in a
crisis” (p. S58).
A number of programs have been developed to establish a framework for training
faculty, staff, and students how to respond in the event of a campus attack. Such
programs, while varying significantly in certain aspects, have common features. Each
program, for example, includes evacuation as a potential response, though some
programs prioritize other responses such as campus lockdown procedures over
evacuation. Fighting back is even a response included, controversially, in some programs
(“Is ‘run, hide, fight’ right?,” 2013; see also Healthcare and Public Health Sector
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Coordinating Council, 2015).
ALICE, an acronym for “alert, lockdown, inform, counter, evacuate,” is an active
shooter countermeasures program developed and marketed by the Ohio-based ALICE
Training Institute. The company describes ALICE as a non-sequential “list of options that
can be used to stay safe in the highly unlikely event of a violent intruder” (ALICE
Training Institute, n.d.). ALICE is one among several commercially-marketed training
programs for preparing for an active shooter event. Window of Life, developed by
Georgia-based non-profit Safe Havens International is “an approach that can help people
better understand how to make notifications and take protective actions” by following a
four-step response: (1) “protect yourself,” (2) “protect others,” (3) “protect the place,”
and (4) “notify public safety” (Dorn, 2014). “Run, hide, fight” is another commerciallyavailable training program for active shooter incident preparation that encourages victims
of an active shooter to first try to escape, then try to hide, and, if still under attack, attack
the shooter (“Is ‘run, hide, fight’ right?,” 2013; “Run, hide, or fight,” 2015). Critics of
these plans have argued that sequential steps negate the nuances each scenario is likely to
bring: run, hide, fight, for example, could prompt potential victims to leave a place of
safety and, perhaps inadvertently, move to a position of danger because they choose to
flee rather than remain in a locked-down room. Others question the idea of remaining
locked in a room where one might be waiting to go to slaughter. But as Albrecht (2014)
explained, “Run when it’s safe to run. Hide where it’s safe to hide. Fight if you or others
around you have no other options” (p. 3). Some police and school security experts
advocate as a last resort a “swarming” approach in which a large group of potential
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victims overwhelm a shooter, first by throwing books or other items at the shooter before
physically assaulting the perpetrator (Dorn & Satterly, 2012).
“[O]ur society often embraces—and even demands—extreme responses to
extreme and aberrational behavior,” wrote Fox (2007). “Such actions, in hindsight, aren’t
always prudent.” Security measures at schools are all too often implemented by school
administrators rather than by school security experts. Such measures may be more “feel
good” than effective. In one survey of school security experts, more than half of the
experts (62.5%) surveyed believed that unmonitored security cameras were the most
significant security measure on which dollars were wasted.18 The experts also pointed to
a number of common security breaches—mostly human failures—that contribute to
significant breeches of security at schools: gaps in student supervision, people propping
open doors, staff members not wearing visible identification badges, visitors being
allowed entry without proper screening, and improper or ineffective emergency
procedures and security plans. When surveyed, the experts pointed to unsupervised
visitor access as the most common school security breech, followed by presumptuous
staff, improper access control, failing to secure doors, and lack of training. Many of the
experts believed that, rather than spending dollars on security technology, schools should
spend it on training staff and faculty members (“Security experts,” 2013).
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Many competing considerations necessarily affect the proper development of
response plans for implementation on school campuses. No two schools are alike:
buildings, neighborhoods, resources, and student and staff characteristics vary—in some
cases widely. The age and motivation of the likely offender must be considered when
developing a response plan (Fox & Savage, 2009). Good contingency plans should also
consider that an offender may alter routes of egress from school buildings. Seung-Hui
Cho, for example, chained exit doors. Jiverly Wong blocked a door with his vehicle.
Charles Whitman barricaded the door to his sniper’s nest. Shooters may also tamper with
phone lines or take other measures to hamper communications (Langman, 2015a).
Planning for such contingencies should be part of a more global all-hazards strategy as
well because fire, natural disaster, and other hazards could likewise block exits or hamper
communications.
Fox and Savage (2009) explained that differences in campus layout (sprawling
universities versus single-building schools) complicate matters with respect to developing
response plans: the one-size-fits-all model simply does not work.
Lockdown plans, while widely used, may not be effective in all cases. Fox and
Savage (2009) argued that, due to the relatively short time frames of most active shooter
events, lockdown procedures might not be implemented quickly enough to prevent a
massacre, and the sprawling nature of university campuses makes lockdowns impractical,
if not unnecessary. Lockdowns might even increase the danger posed by a rampage
shooter. “Although a gunman loose on campus grounds may not be able to enter
classrooms and other buildings,” wrote Fox and Savage, “so too would potential victims
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be left stranded without refuge if stalked by the shooter” (pp. 1469-1470).
Still, lockdowns are currently a component of most plans advocated by security
experts, and they could result in significant mitigation of casualties. In the Sandy Hook
Elementary School massacre, for example, Adam Lanza had only to breech a tempered
glass window to enter the school before killing 20 children in two classrooms. In the first
classroom, which was occupied by 15 children and two teachers, Lanza killed every
single occupant in the room. In the second classroom, Lanza killed only five children and
two teachers while nine children escaped. Lanza then committed suicide. Police had
already arrived at the school, though no officers entered the school before Lanza ended
his rampage by shooting himself (Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015). Had the
second (or even the first) classroom been locked and secured such that Lanza could not
enter, many lives might have been saved. “The room does not have to be Fort Knox,”
wrote Grossman (2000). “It just has to slow down an intruder/shooter long enough for the
police to arrive and respond.”
One key concept discussed in the literature is that early recognition is important
for successfully locking down classrooms or buildings to prevent access by a shooter, as
well as to otherwise proactively intervene in a potentially dangerous situation (“Is ‘run,
hide, fight’ right?,” 2013). On December 8, 2009, Jason Hamilton, a student at Northern
Virginia Community College, carried a .30-06 Springfield caliber bolt-action rifle onto
the school’s Woodbridge campus and opened fire in his mathematics classroom.
Hamilton’s math professor, who noticed the gunman approaching, told her students to
evacuate before taking cover behind her desk. Hamilton fired two shots at the professor
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without wounding anyone, but after the rifle malfunctioned, he put it down and waited
outside the classroom for police to arrive. Hamilton was arrested and eventually pled
guilty to charges including the attempted murder of his professor (Barakat, 2011;
Northern Virginia Community College, 2010; Urbina, 2009). Hamilton carried the rifle to
class in a hockey bag, and as a lieutenant from the college’s police department explained,
a student carrying a hockey bag to a math class was out of the ordinary and provided,
albeit subtly, a warning sign that something was amiss (“Is ‘run, hide, fight’ right?,”
2013).
Early recognition initiates response protocols, and the sequence of those protocols
can affect the outcome provided that school officials are able to take appropriate
measures quickly. Dorn (2014) points out that, while notifying police is a critical step in
effectuating a response to an active shooter, it should not be the top priority; precious
seconds may be lost to dialing 911 rather than taking protective measures that might
provide better mitigation of injuries. Dorn’s Window of Life concept prioritizes one’s
response: protect yourself, protect others, protect the place, notify public safety.
Technology can also play a role: at least one company has developed a mobile device
application that lets teachers and other staff members quickly notify police of an active
shooter incident (Bush, 2013).
Likewise, mass notification systems are faced with the same limitation, as well as
the risk that such notifications, if used too often, will be ignored by students and staff,
thus adding to the delay (Fox & Savage, 2009).
Controversially, some response programs include a fight/counter/defend
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component in which school officials—and sometimes even students—are taught to
actively engage perpetrators, but not all experts agree as to the wisdom of such a plan
(Dorn, 2010; Dorn & Satterly, 2012). Pointing to shooting cases such as the 1997 attack
by Luke Woodham at Pearl High School in Mississippi (Hewitt, 1997; Sack, 1997a;
Toppo, 2014) and the 2010 case involving Bruco Eastwood at Deer Creek Middle School
in Colorado (Riccardi, 2010), Dorn and Satterly (2012) have argued that, in some cases,
actively engaging a perpetrator may reduce casualties. Indeed, other shooting rampages
have ended when a bystander actively engaged the shooter. In 1999, Seth Trickey was
apprehended by science teacher Ronnie Holuby after wounding four students at Fort
Gibson Middle School in Oklahoma (Ruble, 1999). In 1998, 14-year-old Andrew Wurst,
after shooting and killing shot and killed science teacher John Gillette at an eighth-grade
dance at a banquet hall called Nick’s Place in Edinboro, Pennsylvania, and was
subsequently apprehended at gunpoint by the venue’s owner (DeJong, Epstein, and Hart,
2003). In 1998, 15-year-old Kip Kinkel, who murdered his parents prior to killing one
student and wounding 23 others at Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon, was
tackled by several classmates and was taken into custody (“Teen jailed after Oregon high
school shooting spree,” 1998). And, on April 27, 2015, a student firing gunshots inside
the cafeteria at North Thurston High School in Lacey, Washington, was taken into
custody after being tackled by teacher Brady Olson before anyone was shot (“School
shooter apprehended,” 2015).
Still, confusion persists as to when to engage. Following the Newtown massacre,
security experts found that teachers and others were misapplying the principles of their
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training opting, when quizzed as to their response choices, to attack the gunman rather
than attempt to escape or secure their classrooms to prevent the shooter from gaining
access to the students (“Is ‘run, hide, fight’ right?,” 2013). Ironically, the facts of the
Newtown massacre provide anecdotal evidence of the futility of an unarmed response to
an active shooter. The school’s principal, Dawn Hochsprung, and psychologist, Mary
Sherlach, were killed when they confronted the gunman, Adam Lanza, in a hallway as
Lanza entered the school (Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015), which leads to the
obvious concern that staff and faculty cannot effectively save students’ lives when they
cannot even save their own.
Dorn (2010) has argued that other hazards such as tornadoes and earthquakes may
pose a much greater likelihood of threat than active shooters in many parts of the country,
and spending time teaching students and teachers how to physically fight an offender may
not be the most efficient use of training time, which may be better spent focusing more
broadly on an all-hazards approach. Similarly, drawing on the authors’ collective
experiences in assessing school readiness, a report for the Maine Department of
Education (2014) reflects concern that “schools that focus intently on preparing for active
shooter incidents may actually be less prepared for active shooter incidents” as well as
other emergencies than are schools that take a broader, all-hazards approach to
emergency preparedness (p. 10). “Focusing intently on active shooter events,” the authors
wrote, “can be compared to a person who likes to sail in the ocean focusing on how they
would survive a shark attack while not taking the time to learn how to swim” (p. 11).
Indeed, the rarity of school rampage shootings belies the common notion of the ubiquity
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of the problem.
Popularity of particular prevention and response measures is not necessarily an
indicator of their effectiveness. As Fox and Savage (2009) argued, “some common
strategies are not necessarily productive and may even potentially have negative
consequences” (p. 1466). Fox (2008) has even suggested that focusing too much on
response measures can create a climate of fear that may actually contribute to the risk of a
rampage shooting by fueling the fantasies of potential copycats (see also Fox & Savage,
2009). “[T]here are a few students,” Fox wrote, “for whom the notion of wreaking havoc
on their schoolmates may seem like an exhilarating idea.” While Fox’s position may well
be more scholarly opinion than empirically-derived conclusion, his sentiment is quite
logical: there is a limit beyond which security measures are likely to be
counterproductive and detrimental to the educational environment.
One key concept necessary for proper development of response measures is that
differing populations may require different approaches. Where Run Hide Fight might
work well on high school and college campuses, the plan assumes that individuals
implementing it are able to act autonomously. When that is not true, such as in an
elementary school or special needs facility, the plan may not work (“Is ‘run, hide, fight’
right?,” 2013).
Schools—particularly those serving grades K through 12—may face special
considerations in planning for crisis response due to having a population of special needs
students, and such considerations can impact the response plan for active shooter
incidents. Where evacuation is the primary response, the time required to mobilize
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special needs students may expose them to too much risk of encountering the perpetrator
or otherwise being caught in the kill zone. It may be necessary to maintain a separate
roster of special needs students to quickly determine where they are and what level of
assistance they require 19 (Cannaday, Wright, Cox, Cave, & Cundiff, 2007).
While some experts argue that including students in active shooter drills could
contribute to emotional distress and make students unjustifiably anxious about active
shooter events, others argue that including children contributes to the success of active
shooter drills. Following a live active shooter drill at a middle school in Winter Haven,
Florida, controversy swirled because faculty, students, and parents were kept in the dark
about the realistic drill until after it took place, prompting one editorialist to compare the
drill to conducting fire drills with real fire (“Active shooter drill,” 2014). Bridges (1999)
specifically cautions against using surprise drills in which staff or students are not given
previous warning that the drill is going to take place. Fox and Savage (2009) suggested
that the “limited risk” of active shooter events makes it “unwise, potentially traumatizing,
and simply counterproductive” to include students in drills associated with active shooter
plans. They also suggested that training students on active shooter response may produce
the unintended consequence of making students and parents believe that an actual active
shooter incident is much more likely than it really is.
On the other hand, Wylie (2013) chronicled an active shooter drill at Pompano
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Beach High School carried out by the Broward County (Florida) Sheriff’s Office and
argued that not including children in the drills is essentially a denial of the full breadth of
“stranger danger” about which children are routinely taught. The Pompano Beach drill
was especially realistic: blanks were fired to produce realistic gunfire sounds, students
were adorned with imitation injuries courtesy of make-up artists, imitation explosive
devices were staged and disabled by members of the bomb squad, and the police
helicopter was used to drop SWAT team members onto the roof of the school.
Unfortunately, the law enforcement and school officials involved in planning the drill
apparently did not recognize the immense benefit of recruiting a research team to follow
up with the students to investigate the degree to which participation in the drill affected
students. Hence, no solid empirical research exists on which to base the decision to
include or exclude students from active shooter drills.
Given the rarity of active shooter events, it is reasonable to question the propriety
of expending precious institutional resources preparing for an event that is unlikely to
happen. As such, some experts advocate an “all-hazards” approach in which training and
preparation for active shooter events is implicitly part of a more global strategy for
dealing with a plethora of potentially hazardous situations such as tornadoes,
earthquakes, hazardous materials spills, and fires (Dorn & Satterly, 2012; Dorn, 2010; “Is
‘run, hide, fight’ right?,” 2013; O’Neill, Fox, Depue, & Englander, 2008).
Response to an actual incident will likely involve multiple agencies, including
police, fire-rescue personnel, and school officials. It is important to delineate each
agency’s responsibilities in an emergency so that implementation is effective and
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efficient: command structures, areas of responsibility, and lines of communication need to
be established beforehand, and stakeholders should outline responsibilities in a
memorandum of understanding (Band & Harpold, 1999).
Law enforcement officials have been advising school administrators to prepare a
“crisis response box” to quickly and efficiently provide emergency responders with
pertinent information to aid in response planning and management. Such a box might
contain such items as aerial photos of the campus and its surroundings; maps of the
campus, to include traffic patterns, access points, and secured areas; blueprints or
building floor plans that provide detailed information about the layout of facilities on
campus; a current and complete roster of students and staff, to include their scheduled
locations and identifying photos; clearly-labeled keys to allow access to all buildings and
rooms on campus with a legend to allow responders to quickly identify which key
accesses a specific building or room; documentation providing specific fire and intrusion
alarm deactivation procedures; a map providing the locations of all fire extinguishers,
hoses, valves, and sprinklers, along with detailed shutoff procedures; water, gas, and
electricity layouts, access locations, and shut off procedures; cable television, satellite,
and Internet deactivation procedures; on- and off-campus contact procedures for key
administrators, incident command staff, maintenance staff, security personnel, and
medical staff; the locations of designated command post and staging areas; and, a list of
students with special needs. In addition, school officials should be able to quickly provide
an up-to-date attendance roster to make it possible to efficiently account for all students
(Cannaday, Wright, Cox, Cave, & Cundiff, 2007; Lockyer & Eastin, n.d.).
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Law enforcement response. While rampage shooting events are extremely rare,
law enforcement officials must still train for them in order to respond effectively.
Training for rare events is nothing new for police, who regularly train for deadly force
encounters, something that the vast majority of police officers will never experience
(Fairburn & Grossman, 2000).
From the law enforcement perspective, key duties at the scene of a rampage
shooting include: (1) stop the shooter; (2) rescue wounded victims; (3) prevent further
violence; (4) remove students and staff from the crime scene; (5) secure the crime scene
and protect physical evidence; and, (6) investigate the incident thoroughly. Law
enforcement plans must be developed cooperatively with school officials to determine
such courses of action as reunification of students with their families and protocols for
returning control of sections of the school to school officials once investigative efforts in
those areas have been completed. Because the law enforcement burden following a
rampage shooting is great, police officials would do well to avoid accepting
responsibility for roles that are tangential to law enforcement duties. Grief counseling,
release of students from school, parental notification, and other such duties rightly belong
in the hands of school administrators, with the possible exception of next-of-kin
notification for deceased victims, which may rightly fall under the purview of law
enforcement, if for no other reason than to assure that no parent is incorrectly told that his
or her child has been killed. Even the dissemination of public information by law
enforcement should be limited to those matters related to the key duties of responding
police. In keeping with established incident command protocols, clearly defining areas of
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responsibility for police, medical, and school officials serves to mitigate the potential for
miscommunication or implementation of conflicting response protocols (Cannaday,
Wright, Cox, Cave, & Cundiff, 2007).
Increasingly, particularly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, law enforcement
officials are employing intelligence-led policing models to make better use of available
social and technological resources for the purpose of gaining insight into criminal
enterprises and conspiracies. While these techniques have proven helpful in some cases,
their utility in averting rampage shootings is limited, in large measure because the small
population of incidents disables the use of geographic predictions, and the solitary nature
of the crimes inhibits the ability of law enforcement to infiltrate potential plots
beforehand (Bjelopera, Bagalman, Caldwell, Finkela, & McCallion, 2013).
One issue of controversy is the need to assign police officers to schools for
security purposes. While some experts and scholars argue that having a police officer on
campus provides a critical reduction in law enforcement response time to an active
shooter incident, others argue that school resource officers do not prevent mass shootings
and are likely to be targeted by shooters because of their prominent visibility. Fox and
DeLateur (2015), for example, have argued that the massacre at Columbine High School
was not prevented despite there being a school resource officer on duty at the time;
however, they did not point out that the officer was not on campus when the shooting
started, and, after exchanging gunfire with the perpetrators outside the school, the officer
followed what was then standard police protocol for such incidents: he waited outside
and summoned additional officers, in particular tactical officers who did not enter the
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school until hours later (Cullen, 2010). Law enforcement response tactics were
significantly altered following the Columbine tragedy because, from that experience, law
enforcement managers and trainers became aware of just how deficient the police
response had been (Harwood, 2007; Martinez, 2012; Remsberg, 2013).
Police response to a rampage shooting is contingent upon the training and
resources available to responding officers. In a report making recommendations for
Massachusetts institutions of higher education, O’Neill, Fox, Depue, and Englander
(2008) pointed out that only one-third of campus police officers carry firearms, and the
authors recommended that all school police be armed and appropriately trained.
Police response time has been a topic of concern in a number of studies that have
looked at multiple-victim shooting incidents at schools (Drysdale, Modzeleski, &
Simons, 2010; Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012). Langman (2015a) pointed out that active
shooter incidents do not always end quickly: many do, but many do not. Studying the onscene behaviors of 48 school shooters, Langman determined that 81% of incidents ended
with the offender either committing suicide, being killed by police, surrendering, or being
apprehended on site. Fifteen percent fled the scene but were quickly apprehended, and
only 4% were on the run for an extended period of time. Langman also found that 44% of
the shooters took their own lives. Only one shooter in the sample—Charles Whitman—
was killed by police, but as Langman pointed out, evidence found after the attack
indicated that Whitman intended to die during his attack, and his death may well have
been a ‘suicide by cop’ scenario. In Langman’s sample, 23% of perpetrators surrendered
to police, 15% were apprehended by citizens, 13% surrendered to citizens, and 8% were
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apprehended by police. Studying 34 adolescent and 30 adult mass murderers, Meloy,
Hempel, Gray, Mohandie, Shiva, and Richards (2004) found that 66% of the adult but
only 14% of adolescent perpetrators committed suicide or were killed by police.
Similarly, a report by the Pennsylvania State Police (n.d.), evaluating rampage shooting
incidents occurring in the U.S. between 2002 and 2012, showed that 45% of active
shooters were apprehended, 43% committed suicide, 8% were killed by law enforcement,
and 4% escaped.
A report by the Police Executive Research Forum (2014) took the issue further
looking at offender outcome as a function of police response. Studying 84 active shooter
incidents from 2000 to 2010, the researchers separated offender outcome based on
whether or not police arrived prior to the rampage ending and found that 51% of the
incidents ended after police arrived while 49% ended prior to police arrival. In cases in
which the shooting ceased prior to police arrival, 51% of the attackers committed suicide,
10% fled the scene, 7% were shot by victims or bystanders, and 32% were subdued. In
cases in which the shooting ceased after police arrived, 30% committed suicide, 14%
surrendered, 40% were shot by police, and 16% were subdued.
Langman (2015a) explained that, while the rate of police-resolved incidents was
nearly equal to the rate of civilian-resolved incidents—31% and 28%, respectively—
many of the perpetrator suicides occurred only after police had arrived at the scene, and
in some cases police had exchanged gunfire with the perpetrator. Accounting for these
cases, Langman concluded that police were involved in resolving 56% of the active
shooter incidents. A significant number of shooters engaged police with gunfire: 23%
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fired at police; 8% wounded or killed a police officer. In 19% of the attacks, police fired
at the perpetrators.
Prior to Columbine, police officers across America had been trained to isolate a
shooter and call for tactical team response. Columbine proved to be the watershed event
that led law enforcement trainers and administrators to adopt a new paradigm: rapidly
assemble a small force of first-responding officers, enter the scene, and stop the
perpetrator. While the new paradigm was a substantial improvement over the prior one
with regard to mitigating casualties, the massacre at Sandy Hook awakened law
enforcement officials once again to the need for a rapid police response, and many
trainers began to advocate for solo-officer entry in which the first arriving police officer
should enter the scene and get to the shooter as quickly as possible, despite the risk: 75%
of solo-officer entries during an active shooting resulted in a confrontation between
police and the perpetrator, and one-third of solo officers entering an ongoing shooting
scene were shot by the perpetrator (Police Executive Research Forum, 2014).
Active shooter incidents are often tied to other crimes. A number of shooters
killed family members or others prior to carrying out their rampage massacres. Some
shooters went on sprees, fleeing their original rampage scenes only to commit more
murders at other locations. Seung-Hui Cho killed two people in a dormitory, left campus,
and returned several hours later to launch what became the deadliest school shooting in
U.S. history. Hence, it is important for police to view any campus shooting in which the
perpetrator is still outstanding as a potentially ongoing incident. Even in cases where the
perpetrator’s disposition is known, there may be additional crime scenes about which
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police have not been notified (Langman, 2015a).
In his sample, Langman (2015a) found that five (10%) of the shooters held
hostages, although most of them did so only briefly. Two of those shooters were
overpowered by hostages, and the other three released all of their hostages with no
further violence. Another shooter used a bystander as a human shield. Additionally, five
shooters (10%) had explosives either at the scene, left in a vehicle, or at their homes.
Hence, first responders should be prepared to deal not only with the armed perpetrator
but also with explosive devices that may have to be deactivated or destroyed.
It is important that law enforcement and school officials learn to differentiate
between types of shooting events and react accordingly (Greenburg, 2007). For example,
on November 10, 2015, when a student at a high school in Lecanto, Florida shot himself
in front of a teacher and more than 20 fellow students during an English class at the
school, officials responded with a total lockdown of the school, and police employed
active shooter response protocols that included bringing an armored vehicle to the
campus (Salinger, 2015; Solomon, 2015; Zogbaum, 2015). Such a response is
disproportional to the isolated nature of the event. Indeed, suicides occur frequently at all
sorts of locales, yet the response in this case was heavily dictated by the fact that it
occurred on a school campus amidst a heightened national fear of school rampage
shootings. Officials apparently were concerned that another shooter might be on campus,
but such an occurrence would be entirely unprecedented: rampage shootings involving
multiple perpetrators are an extremely rare subset of an already rare population, and an
incident in which a shooter commits suicide without threatening or shooting anyone else
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in conjunction with a rampage shooting simply does not exist in the literature on mass
shootings. “We went into active shooter mode right when we knew what was going on,” a
police spokeswoman said in reference to how police handled the incident. “We definitely
train for this” (Solomon, 2015, emphasis added). Despite knowing “what was going on,”
police “went into active shooter mode.” Clearly, when it comes to official response, the
mere idea that a shot has been fired in a school engenders the fear of an active shooter,
even though most school shootings are not associated with rampage shooters.
Harwood (2007), referencing spree killings such as the 2007 Virginia Tech
massacre in which the shooter, Seung-Hui Cho, killed two people in a dormitory building
two-and-a-half hours before gunning down thirty more in the building that housed the
university’s engineering program, argued the distinction between an isolated incident and
a continuing active shooter threat may pose a difficult practical matter.
Technology may play a key role in responding to active shooter incidents. For
example, mobile device technology now gives security and law enforcement officers a
more robust real-time communications ability than existed in years past; officers can
track each other’s locations, receive blue prints of buildings, stream live surveillance
video, and communicate via text messaging using handheld devices. Other technology in
use in some locations are surveillance video systems that employ computer software to
examine the behavior of individuals and alert security personnel when a potentially
threatening behavior is observed (Harwood, 2007).
Rampage shooting incidents do not fall neatly into a small set of predefined
categories. Variances in offenders’ modus operandi make predicting all possible scenarios
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complicated at best. Protocols should, therefore, be considered as basic starting points
rather than comprehensive plans. School faculty and officials should be empowered to
make real-time decisions autonomously for the protection of people and assets under their
respective control because contingencies may cut decision-makers off from subordinate
personnel either through the inability to establish lines of communication, the absence of
the empowered personnel from campus, or the actions of the offender who may target
administrative personnel at the onset of an attack.20 “Response plans cannot be strict
chain-of-command protocols that gridlock in the absence of key hierarchical personnel,”
wrote Buerger and Buerger (2010). “Authority and responsibility must be fluid and
flexible” (p. 5). Critical decision-making must take place within the first 30 seconds of an
attack; therefore, all school employees must be trained and empowered to act in the event
that a rampage shooting unfolds (Maine Department of Education, 2014).
Theoretical Framework
Social control theory has been argued as an explanatory, if not causative,
theoretical framework for the phenomenon of rampage shootings (Levin & Fox, 1996;
Pittaro, 2007; see also VanGeem, 2009). According to Pittaro, little research into the
etiology of rampage shootings on school campuses had been done prior to the infamous
1999 Columbine High School massacre. Pittaro argued that school shooters are a small
subset of the much larger population of school offenders, but, unlike the dominant profile
for delinquents in schools, rampage shooters are far less likely to either fit a standard

20

During the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, principal Dawn Hochsprung was the

first person killed (Sedensky, 2013).
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profile and to have been influenced by such factors as poverty, urban plight, fractured
familial bonds, or social disorganization.
Hirschi (1969) outlined four social bond elements that he associated with
delinquency: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Hirschi controversially
argued that social class was not a factor in delinquency, an argument that has proven
applicable to the study of school rampage shootings. Though Hirschi later revised his
theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), the core understanding that social factors influence
the behavior of school rampage shooters has not been lost on modern day researchers
(Pittaro, 2007).
The extent to which researchers and policy makers better understand the on-scene
behaviors of school rampage shooters, the more that informed policy decisions can
influence the planning and behaviors of future shooters by imposing additional
influencing factors such as better security measures, a more complete profile of potential
offenders, an increased likelihood that planned massacres will fail to generate the level of
accomplishment intended by would-be perpetrators, and an improved framework for law
enforcement to intervene in such incidents and bring about an effective resolution. While
the primary goal of the research is to develop law enforcement planning, response, and
investigative strategies, such strategies are an important component to the social control
mechanisms that can be implemented by schools as a means of preventing or otherwise
mitigating the devastation of a school rampage shooting.
Conclusion
The literature review covered in this chapter points to the fact that little formal
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research has been carried out with respect to informing policy decisions based on
empirical data regarding the crime scene behaviors of school rampage shooters. Research
with respect to prevention has mostly focused on intervention through risk and threat
assessments. There exists no central repository into which data on incidents of school
rampage shootings have reliably been collected, particularly with respect to collecting
detailed information about the on-scene behaviors of the offenders.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Understanding the crime scene behaviors of school rampage shooters presents
unique methodological challenges. There are no models for this type of research. The
mostly closely related phenomenology that has been studied is the crime scene behaviors
of sexually-motivated murderers wherein specified crime scene behaviors have been
coded dichotomously to identify clustering of behaviors that can be associated with
particular typologies in an effort to validate investigative profiling models (Kocsis,
Cooksey, & Irwin, 2002). This research, however, focuses not on behavioral profiling, as
would be useful in studies aiming to validate models for identifying potential threats
prospectively, but, rather, on the correlation of the crime scene behaviors of rampage
school shooters to response strategies that could be used by officials with responsibility
for potential target locations, particularly law enforcement personnel charged with
responding to such incidents should they occur. In that context, this type of research has
no published precedent.
A mixed-methods research approach was employed. First, a plethora of crime
scene behaviors apparent in the sample were coded dichotomously to operationalize the
variables for quantitative analysis. The data were searched for patterns to detect and
measure the prevalence of certain identifiable patterns (if any existed), and specific
variables and clusters of variables have been presented using appropriate descriptive
statistics to determine the frequency with which specified crime scene behaviors occur
during school rampage shooting events. Second, cases were qualitatively to better
understand the overarching contextual issues that affected both the behaviors of the
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perpetrator and the response strategies by law enforcement. A case-study approach is
most suited to this type of research because of its ability (1) to answer “how” and “why”
questions, (2) to provide a methodology that does not require the researcher to manipulate
subject behavior, (3) to examine contextual parameters that do not allow for quantitative
analyses, and (4) the phenomenological and contextual boundaries are unclear (Baxter &
Jack, 2008).
Participants
The target population for this research consisted of offenders who have
perpetrated shooting rampages at primary, secondary, or post-secondary school campuses,
facilities, or events. The extremely small population of offenders meeting these criteria
precluded the effective use of random sampling, but did make possible the employment
of a sample size that approached the actual population size. Albeit non-random, the
sample is likely closely representative of the actual population because of the inclusion of
nearly all of the population of offenders meeting the research criteria.
To obtain the sample, multiple existing databases21 were queried and vetted for
inclusion criteria. To assure the completeness of the sample, the various databases were
cross-referenced under the assumption that multiple, independent databases are unlikely
to have ignored large numbers of relevant cases simultaneously. Omissions from the
databases stem from differing sampling methodologies, and, therefore, differ to some
21

The databases queried for this research include ones maintained by Stanford University, the

Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Dr. Peter Langman, Mother Jones, www.shootingtracker.com,
and Wikipedia. The databases were used to identify cases for inclusion in this research, and all data were
cross-referenced with other sources to confirm validity.
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extent, but do not differ systematically, thereby mitigating systematic sampling errors.
This research focused on data analysis rather than on collection of new data;
therefore, the researcher has been the only participant. Data from known, publiclyavailable sources was collected, assembled into a cogent, operationalized format, and
analyzed using spreadsheets and R Studio, a statistics and data analysis-oriented software
package.
Instruments
Once the sample of offenders was established, each offender’s case was
researched via publicly available sources to build a comprehensive database with over
100 fields (variables) per offender. Sources used included available government and
official reports relating to the incidents; journal articles in which the incidents have been
cited and discussed; reputable journalistic sources including national and local print and
online news sources; books written by known scholars on the topic of mass shootings;
and books written by reputable journalists on specific cases. The majority of the fields in
the database were coded dichotomously with boolean true/false values to indicate the
presence or absence of specified behaviors, actions, or conditions relevant to the
research.22 A code book (see Appendix A) defining criteria for each field was developed
to provide the researcher with appropriate guidelines for defining data.
Procedures
First, all offender cases were researched using publicly available sources (e.g.,

22

In computer science terms, boolean valued variables are dichotomous variables that possess a

true/false, on/off, yes/no value.
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official reports, case studies published in journals, journalistic accounts, etc.) in an effort
to answer each of the over 100 questions included in the data set. Second, the data set
was parsed by means of multiple condition spreadsheet and R computer language
functions to process the data, provide appropriate descriptive statistical analyses, and
visualize the data. Third, quantitative data analysis revealed the prevalence of both
individual variables (i.e., crime scene behaviors) and clusters of related behaviors, which
became apparent via data visualization such as histograms and bar charts. Fourth,
qualitative analyses of the data provided a deeper understanding of the phenomenology of
the crime scene behaviors of rampage school shooters by examining the apparent links
between the actions taken by bystanders, security personnel, and law enforcement
officers and the outcome of the offender, the number of casualties, and the duration of the
event.
Computer Use in Analysis
There are two software packages of utility to this research: Apple Numbers
spreadsheet application and R Studio, a statistical programming language. Both
applications offer a robust toolset for statistical and data analysis, as well as tools for data
visualization. Using these programming applications, the 101 variables and 78 shooters
used in this research can be efficiently analyzed by implementing simple, custom
functions to calculate descriptive statistics, check for specified patterns in the data, and
determine the extent to which multiple specified conditions occurred across samples.
Data visualization tools available in both applications allow for rapid development of
scatter plots, bar charts, and other visualizations of the data to aid in the analysis of the
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data with regard to the various parameters studied. The computer analysis in this research
is nothing sophisticated; instead, it is simple application of off-the-shelf tools that make
efficient work out of the analysis of a large data set.
Data Analysis
Research on rampage school shootings is plagued by potential sampling bias
issues. There exists no single, comprehensive database from which incidents can be
drawn, and sampling is often accomplished using a combination of journal articles;
monographs; official government crime and mortality data; reports by government
agencies, independent research organizations, and advocacy groups; and, news accounts
(Bjelopera, Bagalman, Caldwell, Finkela, & McCallion, 2013). As such, it is nearly
impossible to identify the complete universe of such episodes, in particular those that
involve small body counts, those that resulted in no deaths whatsoever, and those that
were averted outright.
One of the main concerns with regard to sampling bias in the study of rampage
school shootings is the fact that the most extreme cases receive the most attention and,
thus, provide the most residual documentation regarding the cases themselves, not only in
quantity of coverage, but in depth and breadth of coverage as well. Particularly where
qualitative analyses are concerned, differentials in the documentation associated with
individual cases can potentially bias data analysis, which is of particular concern when
evaluating the ability of specific security and response protocols to mitigate rampage
shooting incidents. The cases that receive the greatest coverage represent systemic
failures, not successes; therefore, cases that provide greater context for mitigation
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strategies are underrepresented in the data. Exclusion of those events from the data set
creates a researcher’s paradox: the cases most representative of the intended goal of the
research are the cases least likely to show up in the data.
Moreover, Huf-Corzine et al. (2014) found, in comparing news media coverage of
mass murders to official sources such as the Supplemental Homicide Reports and
National Incident Based Reporting System, that “certain types of incidents, especially
those involving Black offenders . . . are systematically overlooked by the national media”
(p. 118). However, the researchers did not investigate the extent to which such media bias
affects reports of mass murder on school campuses.
Harding, Fox, & Mehta (2002), discussing the merits of qualitative research
methods for studying rare events, pointed out the case definition problem associated with
school rampage shootings. “The definition used to identify a positive case can have a
significant impact not only on our assessment of how rare the event actually is,” they
wrote, “but also on the substance of the theory that is subsequently developed to explain
the phenomenon” (p. 177). The researchers further explained that “there is no consistent
definition of school shootings or population of events called school shootings in what
little empirical work exists” (p. 178). Harding et al. also argued the problem associated
with defining ‘non-event’ cases to serve as controls for studying school rampage
shootings in order to compare independent variables between cases that resulted in a
rampage shooting against those with a different outcome.
The small number of cases of school rampage shootings available for researchers
to study, furthermore, presents what Harding et al. have identified as the degrees of

!109
freedom problem: given the small sample size and the large number of independent
variables to be tested, isolating the effect of any one variable is difficult at best.
Clustering of variables, then, strengthens the validity of the research by isolating the
occurrence of variables both individually and in related groups to determine the causeand-effect relationships between crime scene behaviors and outcome of the event, if any
such correlation exists.
Harding, Fox, and Mehta (2002) explained that, with regard to rampage shooting
events, it is difficult to discern differences in the underlying cause, what is known as the
different causes problem. As the researchers explained, though the events may appear to
be similar in nature, the underlying causes may differ, particularly where contagion effect
exists. While in one case, the shooter likely planned the massacre uninfluenced by others,
in the other case, the shooter may have adapted some or all of the original shooter’s
philosophy and modus operandi. The effect on crime scene behaviors, then, is that some
offenders may behave more randomly than others. What may appear in the data as
indicative of a pattern of behavior may in fact be random behavior by one offender that
has been copied by others. Hence, the reliability and predictive value of the data may be
compromised by the fact that new random behaviors by one offender subsequently spawn
other offenders who copy those behaviors making it appear that those behaviors are less
random than they really are, a cycle that can continue to evolve and thus negate the
predictive validity of research models.
The data set for this research, which consists of 102 different variables and
descriptors for each of 78 school rampage shooters, likely encompasses a substantial
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portion of the population of rampage school shooters in the United States and Canada to
date. Hence, the sample-to-population ratio is quite high, though it is impossible to
calculate with any certainty because of the collective ignorance of researchers in this field
as to the total number cases of school rampage shooters, particularly those whose attacks
resulted in small casualty numbers.
Assembled in spreadsheet format, the data set provides boolean- or nominalvalued fields for several dozen characteristics of the shooter, the event, the outcome, and
the surrounding circumstances. A detailed codebook has been developed to supplement
the data set (see Appendix A).
In this case, the data set was decontextualized into coded values that represent
specified behaviors or conditions present during each rampage shooting attack (Ayres,
Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). Parameters were coded either dichotomously (boolean
values) or nominally to operationalize the data into components that can be quantitatively
analyzed. Individual parameters will be evaluated quantitatively to determine overall
prevalence of those parameters in the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters, but
further investigation will be carried out by searching across cases and parameters to
identify the prevalence of patterns within the data set through data visualization. Studying
crime scene behaviors of sexual homicide offenders for the purpose of determining the
utility of analyzing those behaviors to develop offender profiles, Kocsis, Cooksey, and
Irwin (2002) used a similar coding scheme in which they dichotomously coded various
crime scene and offender parameters and analyzed the data for the presence of clustering
that could be associated with specific offender types. Data visualization was likely used
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in their study through multidimensional analysis to plot and identify data clusters that
could be associated with particular offender typologies.
Trochim (1989) provided a model for using pattern matching as a means of
validating theories in program evaluation. Trochim’s model begins at the theoretical
realm and moves through conceptualization to the development of a theoretical pattern.
Contemporaneously, data are gathered and organized into an observed pattern. Pattern
matching is then used to compare the observed pattern to the theoretical one in order to
either validate or invalidate the latter.
Where patterns of behaviors exist, research findings provide greater clarity as to
the nature of the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters with regard to both the
predictability and consistency of particular behaviors. From those findings, conclusions
can be developed as to the utility of formulating preparation, response, and investigative
protocols based on the behaviors of past rampage school shooters.
Within-case analysis provides a means of validating data findings in small-sample
research. Pattern matching, process tracing, and causal narrative techniques, for example,
have been identified as useful research tools (Harding, Fox, & Mehta, 2002). For this
research, data analysis will be accomplished using custom-built algorithms in R, a
computer programming language designed for statistical data analysis. The data set will
be analyzed for the emergence of patterns that, in turn, will allow for a determination as
to the extent to which various factors affect incident outcome.
In addition to quantitative data analysis, qualitative review of specific cases will
also be used to gain a better understanding of the relevant parameters and their effect on
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event outcome. This research follows an explanatory-sequential mixed methods approach
(Cameron, 2009; Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006) in which the data set has been
operationalized for quantitative analysis, and then, based on those findings, individual
cases have been qualitatively assessed to determine how the crime scene behaviors of
school rampage shooters affect the potential outcome of a shooting incident vis-à-vis
established security and response protocols.
Further complicating matters is the potential that crime scene behaviors of school
rampage shooters have changed over time. However, the explanatory sequential mixed
methods approach allows for temporal sampling within the data set in conjunction with
qualitative analysis of cases from earlier time periods vis-à-vis those from later time
periods (Meyer, 2001).
The qualitative analysis in this research follows a grounded theory approach: data
analysis was carried out for the purpose of establishing theories regarding both the nature
and predictability of the crime scene behaviors of school rampage shooters and the
efficacy of associated and proposed preparation, response, and investigative protocols.
Johnson (1997) provides a model for assessing the validity structure of qualitative
research and specifically addresses the use of pattern matching as a tool for “[p]redicting
a series of results that form a ‘pattern’ and then determining the degree to which the
actual results fit the predicted pattern” (p. 283).
Research Questions
Data analysis methods used for each research question are as follows:
RQ (1): Is there a relationship between physical security and preparedness
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measures at potential target locations and target selection by rampage shooters? For
this question, the prevalence of security measures in place at the target locations were
calculated to determine if there is any statistical support for the use of the security
measures to prevent rampage shooting events. The prevalence of security measures
(controlled access, gun-free zone designation, presence of security personnel, etc.)
individually and in groups was calculated. Prevalence values at or near 50% give rise to
the conclusion that no correlation exists. Values below 50% provide evidence that such a
negative correlation, with the strength of the correlation increasing with lower prevalence
values (i.e., the more cases where security measures were not present, the more likely it is
that locations were targeted due to lax security). Assessment of this variable, however,
was hindered by the researcher’s ignorance of the prevalence of security measures at
other potential target locations in the offender’s immediate geographical area.
RQ (2): Is there a relationship between physical security and preparedness
measures at target locations and the number of casualties in a rampage shooting
event? For this question, the prevalence of security measures in place at the target
locations were calculated to determine if there is any statistical support for the use of the
security measures to mitigate casualties during rampage shooting events. The prevalence
of security measures (controlled access, gun-free zone designation, presence of security
personnel, etc.) individually and in groups was calculated against the number of
casualties for each event. Standard hypothesis testing using a Welch t-test based on the
number of casualties at venues with security measures compared to venues without
security measures allowed for appropriate assessment of the likelihood that security
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measures can mitigate casualties.
RQ (3): Is there a relationship between law enforcement response strategies
to rampage shooting events and the number of casualties? For this question, casualty
numbers were assessed on five parameters (police responded, police confronted the
offender, police apprehended the offender, police shot the offender, and police killed the
offender) using standard analysis of variances methods.
RQ (4): Are the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters sufficiently
definable such that specific response strategies are likely to be effective based on the
presence of patterns in the shooters’ behaviors? For this question, it was necessary to
evaluate the individual prevalence of various behavioral variables, as well as in clusters,
to identify patterns of behaviors that may be used for planning and response measures by
law enforcement (see Data Analysis, supra).
RQ (5): Can specific response strategies be used to secure potential target
locations and train personnel to intervene and mitigate casualties based on the
presence of patterns in the shooters’ behaviors? This question was evaluated using
qualitative research methods to identify components of the crime scene behaviors of
rampage shooting offenders that can be correlated to the identified strategies and current
law enforcement training and protocols. The evidence was evaluated to determine if there
is support for the current plans, if there is evidence that other, non-current plans might be
effective, or if there is no support for the idea that specific training or response strategies
are likely to be effective at mitigating casualties in rampage school shooting events.
RQ (6): Are the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters sufficiently
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definable to provide reliable investigative and reconstructive models within the
context of social control theory? This question was evaluated using qualitative research
methods to identify components of the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooting
offenders that can be used to develop investigative and reconstructive models that can be
used by law enforcement investigators in the aftermath of a rampage school shooting
event. The evidence was evaluated to determine if there are aspects of the crime scene
behaviors of school rampage shooters that allow for the development of such models.
Limitations
Perhaps the greatest limitations to this research are (1) the absence of any central
database of cases fitting the research criteria and (2) the significant reliance on sources
for which accuracy cannot be verified. The former have been mitigated by including a
sample that approaches the entire population of offenders under study. The latter has been
mitigated as much as possible by cross-referencing sources in hopes of detecting
inconsistencies, though it should be noted that case studies published in journal articles
often rely on news accounts, and news accounts published by different outlets often rely
on information obtained by a single source (such as Reuters or Associated Press), so
cross-referencing does not necessarily assure accuracy. However, absent the laborious, if
not impossible, task of vetting every detail through official sources, case studies and
news accounts may be the only practical way of accomplishing this research.
Conclusion
The research goals and methodology for this dissertation have been delineated in
this chapter. In the next chapter, the results of this research will be covered, to include an
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in-depth discussion of the data collection and analysis methodologies. The data fields
selected for analysis (see Appendix A) will be discussed, and the pattern-matching
methodology will be covered. Data results, both quantitative and qualitative, will be
presented with interpretive discussion.
The final chapter of this dissertation will focus on conclusions that can be drawn
from the data and recommendations that can be made from both policy and research
standpoints. Much of the focus of this chapter will be on applying what was learned
through the data collection and analyses processes to law enforcement planning and
training.
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Chapter 4: Results
Descriptive Statistics
The non-random sample selected for this research included 78 school rampage
shooters and 76 rampage shooting episodes that resulted in 257 victims killed and 387
wounded in the United States and Canada. Two of the events—the 1998 rampage at
Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas, and the 1999 massacre at Columbine
High School in Littleton, Colorado—were perpetrated by two offenders each. An average
of three people were killed and five wounded per shooter. Shooting episodes were most
likely to result in only one death and two injuries by gunfire. Some shootings resulted in
no deaths, and others resulted in no victims wounded. One shooting ended with 32
victims killed, another with 31 victims wounded (Figure 4.1). The 17 shooters that killed
no victims wounded between one and six (𝜇 = 2.7).

Figure 4.1. Overall casualties.
The sample was limited to a 30-year timespan to mitigate the likelihood that
including events more distant in time would create sampling bias issues based on the
apparent paucity of information related to older cases. Therefore, cases occurring
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between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 2017 were included in statistical calculations
involving temporal trends. However, two cases from 2018—the January 23, 2018
shooting rampage at Marshall County High School in Benton, Kentucky, and the
February 14, 2018 massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida—were included in the dataset due to their relevance as current shooting events,
but both were excluded from calculations involving temporal trends because of
sensitivity of those calculations to inclusion of a partial year.
In order to focus on school rampage shootings, certain criteria were implemented
for screening cases for inclusion in the dataset:
1. All shooting episodes in the sample occurred, at least in part, on a school
campus23 or at a school event that took place off campus.
2. Shooting incidents were included only if (1) they involved two or more
victims being shot (n = 72)24 , (2) the perpetrator(s) fired shots with apparent
intent to shoot multiple victims (n = 5), or (3) the perpetrator(s) fired random
shots with the apparent intent to shoot multiple victims (n = 1).
3. While other studies have set thresholds on number of victims killed or higher
thresholds on total number of victims, the threshold was set at two victims (if

23

School campus criteria included elementary, middle, and high schools, as well as colleges/

universities, and trade/technical schools. One episode occurred at a non-school venue where an ESOL class
was being taught because the shooter, a former student, specifically targeted that class.
24

Cases were eliminated when, though more than one person was shot, the circumstances of the

shooting made clear that the shooter’s intent was to target one individual but others were hit with errantly
fired bullets.
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based on victim count) in order to exclude more common acts of singlevictim homicides but not reject large victim count episodes that could be
representative of cases in which rampages were mitigated by intervention.25
4. Acts of politically-motivated terrorism and acts of targeted domestic violence
that did not involve additional randomly-selected victims were excluded from
the data set. Acts apparently related to gang violence, drug activity, or
criminal enterprise were also excluded.
The databases queried for this research included ones maintained by Stanford
University, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Dr. Peter Langman, Mother
Jones, www.shootingtracker.com, and Wikipedia. While it is unlikely that the sample
includes every shooting incident that meets the inclusion criteria, the sample likely
includes nearly all of the population of shootings, thus mitigating potential sampling bias
issues associated with the non-random sampling process.
Shooting incidents occurring in the United States and Canada were included as it
became apparent during the research process that obtaining reliable English-language
reports on cases outside of the two countries might pose a sampling bias issue. While
Canada’s firearms laws are generally more strict than those in the United States, cultural
and geographic similarities made inclusion of Canadian school rampage shooting cases
plausible and reasonable. In all, the sample included 72 shooting episodes in the United
States and four in Canada (Figure 4.2).

25

Limiting the cases to those involving four or more victims killed, for example, would have

reduced the number of shooters in the dataset from 78 to 20.
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Figure 4.2. Descriptive statistics of shooting episodes in the United States versus Canada
showing number and rate of shootings, victims killed, and victims wounded. The
population average was estimated by taking the mean of the estimated populations in
1988 and 2018 (i.e., linear interpolation).
During the sample period, the United States suffered 237 people killed and 352
wounded in school rampage shootings. Canada suffered 20 people killed and 35
wounded. While the United States had 18 times the number of school rampage shooting
episodes as Canada during the sample period, the per capita rate of shooting episodes for
the United States was just under twice the rate for Canada. In the United States, the per
capita rates of people killed and wounded were 1.2 and 1.1 times the rate for Canada,
respectively. In other words, while school rampage shootings were nearly twice as likely
to occur in the United States, the rates of casualties, both killed and wounded, were only
slightly higher in the United States than in Canada.
Canadian school rampage shooters closely mirrored U.S. shooters in terms of
casualties. In the United States (n = 74), there were a mean of 3.2 people killed per
shooter and 4.8 people wounded. In Canada (n = 4), there were a mean of 5.0 people
killed per shooter and 8.8 wounded, 1.6 and 1.8 times the U.S. averages, respectively.
However, the differences in the number killed (p = 0.605) and wounded (p = 0.450) were
not statistically significant.
The vast majority of school rampage shooting episodes in the sample were low-
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casualty incidents. Out of 78 shooters 26, 68 (87.2%) killed between zero and five victims,
five (6.41%) killed between six and ten victims, two (2.56%) killed between 11 and 15
victims, and three (3.85%) killed 16 or more victims (Figure 4.3). Similarly, 57 (73.1%)
shooters wounded between zero and five victims, nine (11.5%) wounded between six and
ten victims, six (7.69%) wounded between 11 and 15 victims, and five (6.41%) wounded
16 or more victims (Figure 4.4). None killed more than 32 victims nor wounded more
than 31.

Figure 4.3. Histogram of the number of victims killed by each shooter.

26

The numbers of victims killed and wounded during the two episodes in which shooters acted in

pairs were tabulated separately.
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Figure 4.4. Histogram of the number of victims wounded by each shooter.
Looking only at Canadian school rampage shooters, three (75%) killed five or
fewer victims while one (25%) killed 14 victims, and two (50%) wounded only one
victim each while the other two (50%) wounded 14 or more.
School rampage shootings were most likely to occur on high school campuses.
Out of the 76 rampage shooting episodes in the data, 35 (46.1%) occurred on high school
campuses, 22 (28.9%) occurred at colleges, 10 (13.2%) occurred at middle schools, seven
(9.2%) occurred at elementary schools, and three (3.9%) occurred at other schools.
Although more shooting episodes occurred at high schools, rampage shooters on
college campuses were somewhat deadlier. Shooters on college campuses killed a mean
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of 4.9 victims while shooters on high school campuses killed a mean of 2.3 victims.
However, the difference was not statistically significant on a 95% confidence interval (p
= 0.101).
In comparison to the overall sample, there was no difference in the number of
victims killed or wounded except with respect to middle school shooters, who killed and
wounded fewer victims on average than were killed and wounded by the shooters
overall.27

Figure 4.5. Shooting episodes and casualties based on type of school. Statistical p-values
represent probability that killed and wounded means are the same for the respective type
of school as they are for the overall sample.
Demographics
School rampage shooters have consistently been overwhelmingly male. Of the 78
shooters in the sample, 73 (93.6%) were male and only five (6.4%) were female. Males
killed more (𝜇 = 3.4 versus 𝜇 = 1.4, p = 0.0211) and wounded more (𝜇 = 5.2 versus 𝜇 =
2.2, p = 0.496) victims than females.
With respect to ethnicity, non-Hispanic Whites were not overrepresented in the
27

The catch-all “other” category included two schools: the West Nickel Mines Amish school

where Charles Roberts killed five students and wounded five others and the American Civic Association in
Binghampton, New York, where adult English-as-a-second-language students were attacked by former
student Jiverly Wong who killed 13 people and wounded four.
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sample with a representative factor of 1.02.28 Blacks and Hispanics were
underrepresented with representative factors of 0.67 and 0.36, respectively. Native
Americans, Asians, and other ethnicities were overrepresented with representative factors
of 4.93, 2.25, and 4.27, respectively.

Figure 4.6. Ethnic breakdown of shooters.
While the mean and median ages of the shooters were 23 and 18, respectively, the
shooters in the sample were most likely to be 14. The youngest was 11, and the oldest
was 62.

28

Representative factors were calculated by dividing the percent of shooters in the respective

ethnic category by the percent of the current U.S. population in that category.

!125

Figure 4.7. Histogram of shooter ages.
Of the 78 shooters in the sample, 62 (79.5%) shot at least one student and 46
(59.0%) shot at least one faculty or staff member. To further refine those numbers, 31
shooters shot students but not faculty or staff members, 15 shot faculty or staff members
but not students, and 31 shot both students and faculty or staff members. Shooters who
killed only students were no more deadly than shooters who killed only faculty or staff
members (n = 31, 𝜇 = 2.0 and n = 15, 𝜇 = 1.5, respectively; p = 0.403) but were more
likely to wound victims (𝜇 = 6.1 and 𝜇 = 1.3 respectively; p = 0.00187). Shooters who
shot both students and faculty or staff members were deadlier than shooters who shot
only students (n = 31, 𝜇 = 5.5 and n = 31, 𝜇 = 2.0, respectively; p = 0.0195) and shooters
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who only shot faculty or staff members (𝜇 = 5.5 and 𝜇 = 1.5, respectively; p = 0.00652).
Shooters who shot both students and faculty or staff members wounded more victims
than shooters who only shot faculty or staff members (n = 31, 𝜇 = 5.6 and n = 15, 𝜇 = 1.3,
respectively; p = 4.82 × 10-5) but not more than shooters who only shot students (𝜇 = 5.6
and 𝜇 = 6.1, respectively; p = 0.798).
Selection of students versus faculty members may, in some cases, have roots in
the factors that gave rise to the shooter’s rampage. When students perpetrate a rampage,
they may be focused on perceived slights by other students with no particular animosity
toward faculty members. Seth Trickey, for example, shot four other students, but dropped
the gun when confronted by a teacher who then subdued him.
The vast majority of the shooters (n = 55, 70.5%) shot both male and female
victims. Fourteen shooters (17.9%) shot only male victims, and nine (11.5%) shot only
female victims. It is important to note that, while several shooters targeted people of a
specific gender, the data may not reliably provide a picture of gender-based targeting.
Some shooters simply hit only people of a specific gender, such as Brendan O’Rourke,
whose rampage at Kelly Elementary School in Carlsbad, California resulted in two
female students wounded, though he apparently fired randomly at students on a
playground without specifically targeting only girls. Similarly, Marc Lépine, who killed
14 victims and wounded 14 others at École Polytechnique in Montreal, Canada, left a
manifesto indicating his intent to kill women, but he inadvertently shot four male students
in the process. Such cases were rare, however, as a qualitative assessment of the data
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makes clear that very few shooters intentionally targeted victims of a specific gender.
Eight shooters (10.3%) killed at least one person prior to perpetrating their
rampage. Most of the victims killed prior to the rampage were family members or
roommates. In some cases, the victims were killed a short time before the rampage began;
in other cases, the victims were killed the day before the rampage.
Forty-four (56.4%) of the shooters shot only randomly selected victims without
having targeted any specific individuals. Fifteen (19.2%) shot only specifically targeted
victims. Nineteen (24.4%) shot both specifically targeted and randomly selected victims.
Out of the 22 college shooters, eight (36.4%) were current students, five (22.7%)
were former students, three (13.6%) were current employees, one (4.5%) was a former
student and former employee, and five (22.7%) had no affiliation with the school. Of the
36 high school shooters, 30 (83.3%) were current students, four (11.1%) were former
students, one (2.8%) was a current employee, and one had no affiliation with the school.
Out of the 11 middle school shooters, eight (72.7%) were current students, two (18.2%)
were former students, and one (9.1%) had no affiliation with the school. Out of the seven
elementary school shooters, six (85.7%) had no affiliation with the school, and one
(14.3%) was a former student. Out of the two other school shooters, one was a former
student and the other had no affiliation with the school.
Temporal Trends
Time of day was coded has “Early Morning” (4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.),
“Morning” (8:00 a.m. to noon), “Afternoon” (noon to 4:00 p.m.), “Late Afternoon” (4:00
p.m. to 8:00 p.m.), “Evening” (8:00 p.m. to midnight), and “Night” (midnight to 4:00
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a.m.). Nearly half of all school rampage shooters in the sample (n = 38) attacked during
morning hours, and nearly one-third (n = 27) attacked during afternoon hours, a result
that was expected owing to the fact that school campuses are most heavily populated
during those times. No quantitative variables were operationalized to explain the
underlying cause of morning hours being more likely than afternoon hours for school
rampage shootings to occur. Shooters who attacked during morning hours killed a mean
of 3.5 victims and wounded a mean of 4.9, while shooters who attacked during afternoon
hours killed a mean of 2.3 victims and wounded a mean of 4.5. The differences between
the numbers of victims killed and wounded were not statistically significant (p = 0.223
and p = 0.791, respectively). Of the 10 shooters who killed more than five victims, one
attacked during early morning hours, six during morning hours, one during afternoon
hours, one during late afternoon hours, and one during evening hours. It should be noted
that the shooter who attacked during early morning hours—Seung-Hui Cho who killed 32
people at Virginia Tech in 2007—killed his first two victims during early morning hours
but did not resume his shooting spree until more than two hours later during morning
hours.
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Figure 4.8. Time of attacks by school rampage shooters.
School rampage shooting episodes were most likely to occur on weekdays, a
result that is not surprising considering that most K-12 schools are closed on weekends,
and colleges are much more densely populated during the week. Only two episodes
occurred during the weekend, both which occurred on a Saturday and both involved
either a prom or dance event outside of normal school hours. With respect to particular
days of the week, episodes were not more likely to occur on any given weekday. While
the highest number of shooting episodes occurred on Fridays (n = 18, 23.7%) and the
lowest number of shooting episodes occurred on Thursdays (n = 12, 15.8%), the
difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.308).
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Figure 4.9. Shootings episodes by day of the week.
To consider the temporal trends with respect to the rates of school rampage
shooting episodes, rates of victims killed, and rates of victims wounded in the United
States, the 70 shooting episodes that occurred between January 1, 1988 and December 31,
2017 were calculated on a per capita basis with the estimated U.S. population for each
respective year (shootings per one million population). Two of the 30 years (1990 and
2000) experienced no school rampage shootings. A number of years experienced only one
per year. The maximum number of school rampage shootings per year was six (2014).
The mean number of shootings per year was 2.3, and the median number was 2.0. The
per capita rate of school rampage shooting episodes trended slightly upward over the 30year period (R = 0.137). When broken down by decade, the per capita rate of school
rampage shootings climbed during the first decade (R = 0.408), declined over the second
decade (R = -0.050), and climbed again over the most recent decade (R = 0.240).

Figure 4.10. The rate of school rampage shootings in the United States from January 1,
1988 through December 31, 2017 (R = 0.137).
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There were a total of 218 people killed by school rampage shooters in the United
States during the 30-year period with three years (1990, 2000, and 2004) experiencing no
deaths due to school rampage shootings. The highest number of people killed in one year
was 36 (2012), the year in which Adam Lanza killed 20 children and six faculty members
at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The per capita rate of victims killed by school
rampage shooters annually has trended upward (R = 0.262) across the full 30-year sample
period, but when broken down by decade, the rate climbed over the first two decades but
declined slightly over the most recent decade (R = 0.295, R = 0.381, and R = -0.115,
respectively).29
There were a total of 323 people wounded by school rampage shooters in the
United States during the 30-year period with two years (1990 and 2000) experiencing no
shooting episodes and thus no wounded victims. The highest number of people wounded
in one year was 38 (1998), the year before the infamous massacre at Columbine High
School. The per capita rate of victims wounded by school rampage shooters annually has
trended somewhat downward (R = -0.179) over the 30-year sample period, having
declined over the first two decades but climbed slightly over the most recent decade (R =
-0.390, R = -0.473, and R = 0.077, respectively).

29

When assessing the deadliness of school rampage shootings over time, it is important to

consider Charles Whitman’s massacre at the University of Texas at Austin in 1966. Though, having
occurred over 50 years ago, the rampage was not included in the dataset for this research, it stood as the
deadliest school rampage shooting until the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, and today remains the third
deadliest school rampage shooting in U.S. history (Ahmed, 2018).
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Figure 4.11. Annual per capita rates of school rampage shooting episodes, victims killed,
and victims wounded in the United States during the 30-year period spanning from 1988
through 2017.
Firearms
At first blush, one may be tempted to correlate the increase in the fatality rate with
the perceived increase in the prevalence of what the media have termed “assault rifles,”
but the data simply do not bear such a conclusion out. Broadly defining the term “assault
rifle” for the purpose of this research to mean any centerfire, semiautomatic rifle30, only
15 shooters (19.2% of shooters of the 78 shooters in the U.S. and Canada) used an assault
rifle (13 in the United States and two in Canada). Across the 30 years of the sample, the
rate of assault rifle usage increased at best only slightly (R = 0.087). Nine shooters
(11.5%) used other types of rifles, 13 (16.7%) used shotguns, and 49 (62.8%) used

30

Centerfire rifles use larger caliber ammunition, including the .223 Remington cartridge used in

the now-infamous AR-15 rifle. The common usage for the term “assault rifle” is generally more narrowly
defined to certain types of semiautomatic rifles. For this research, small caliber, rimfire rifles were placed
in the generic “rifle” category because, in many cases, it was difficult to discern if a .22 caliber rifle used
by a particular shooter was semiautomatic, lever-action, or bolt-action.
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handguns. Some shooters used more than one type of firearm. While the rate of assault
rifle usage ticked only slightly upward, the rate of rifle usage declined significantly (R =
-0.240), and the rate of shotgun usage increased modestly (R = 0.076). In stark contrast,
however, the rate of handgun usage climbed significantly (R = 0.275). The use of
semiautomatic handguns increased most significantly (R = 0.337), indicating that
semiautomatic handguns played a much greater role in the increased lethality of school
rampage shootings than did semiautomatic rifles. None of the shooters in the sample used
a fully-automatic firearm.

Figure 4.12. Firearm types used by individual shooters annually.
Though the rate of semiautomatic rifle usage did not correlate to the rate of
fatalities, shooters who used such firearms killed and wounded more people than shooters
who did not. Shooters who used semiautomatic centerfire rifles (n = 15) killed a mean of
6.1 victims and wounded a mean of 8.3, while shooters who did not use such weapons (n
= 63) killed a mean of 2.6 people and wounded a mean of 4.2. While shooters with
semiautomatic centerfire rifles killed nearly two-and-a-half times and wounded nearly
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twice as many people on average as did shooters who did not use such firearms, on a 95%
confidence interval the differences were not statistically significant (p = 0.104 and p =
0.0993, respectively).
Still, the deadliest school rampage shooting in U.S. history—the massacre at
Virginia Tech that left 32 victims dead—was perpetrated with semiautomatic handguns,
not rifles. In all, 43 (55.1%) shooters used only handguns to perpetrate their rampages.
Shooters who used semiautomatic handguns but not semiautomatic centerfire rifles (n =
34) killed a mean of 3.9 victims and wounded a mean of 4.6 victims while shooters who
did not use semiautomatic firearms (n = 28) killed a mean of 1.1 victims and wounded a
mean of 2.6 victims. On a 95% confidence interval, the differences were statistically
significant (p = 0.0108 and p = 0.0453, respectively).
Shooters who used semiautomatic firearms (n = 50), including pistols, rifles or
both, killed a mean of 4.5 victims and wounded a mean of 6.3 while shooters who did not
use semiautomatic firearms (n = 28) killed a mean of 1.5 victims and wounded a mean of
2.6. The differences were highly significant (p = 0.000464 and p = 0.001506,
respectively). Shooters who used semiautomatic firearms killed 4.1 and wounded 2.4
times as many victims as did shooters who did not use semiautomatic firearms. Shooters
who used semiautomatic centerfire rifles killed 1.6 and wounded 1.7 times as many
victims as did shooters who used semiautomatic pistols (but not semiautomatic centerfire
rifles), and killed 5.5 and wounded 3.2 times as many victims as did shooters who did not
use semiautomatic firearms.
Most of the shooters (n = 43, 55.1%) brought only one firearm, 19 (24.4%)
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brought two, eight (10.3%) brought three, and eight brought four or more.31 Six (7.7%) of
the shooters brought firearms to the scene that they did not carry with them. No shooter
carried more than five. Twelve (15.4%) shooters discharged two firearms32, two (2.6%)
discharged three firearms, and only one shooter discharged four firearms. None
discharged more than four. Twenty-one (26.9%) shooters brought firearms that they did
not use during their attacks. No shooters acquired firearms or ammunition at the scene,
which means that the probability that armed security or school personnel would be
overpowered and disarmed by a rampage shooter is remote, which is not surprising in
light of the fact that rampage shooters almost always plan their rampages in advance and
rarely act spontaneously.
Thirty-two (41.0%) of the shooters reloaded their firearms during their rampages.
Shooters who reloaded killed more victims than shooters who did not (𝜇 = 5.8 and 𝜇 =
1.6, respectively; p = 0.00358) and wounded more victims (𝜇 = 8.7 and 2.4, respectively;
p = 6.76 × 10-5). Seventy-five percent of the shooters who reloaded used semiautomatic
firearms while 56.5% of the shooters who did not reload used semiautomatic firearms.
Shooters who reloaded were more likely to carry (53.1% versus 34.8%) and discharge
(31.3% versus 10.9%) multiple firearms than were shooters who did not reload. Shooters
who reloaded were less likely to be stopped by an unarmed citizen than were shooters
31 Andrew

Golden and Mitchell Johnson, who together perpetrated their massacre at Westside

Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas in 1998, brought 13 firearms between them.
32

Some of the shooters who discharged two firearms, such as Adam Lanza who massacred 20

children and six faculty members at Sandy Hook Elementary School, used the second firearm only to
commit suicide.
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who did not reload ( p̂ = 12.5% and p̂ = 41.3%, respectively; p = 0.0127).33 Shooters
who reloaded were no more likely to be stopped by police intervention than were
shooters who did not reload ( p̂ = 31.3% and p̂ = 23.9%, respectively; p = 0.646)
Likewise, shooters who reloaded were not more likely to end their rampages by
committing suicide than were shooters who did not reload ( p̂ = 40.6% and p̂ = 21.7%,
respectively; p = 0.122).
Of the 78 shooters, 23 (29.5%) fired between one and five shots, 21 (26.9%) fired
between six and 10 shots, 19 (24.4%) fired between 11 and 25 shots, three (3.8%) fired
between 26 and 50 shots, six (7.7%) fired between 51 and 100 shots, and six fired
between 101 and 200 shots. No shooter fired more than 200 shots. 34
Five shooters (6.4%) staged weapons, ammunition, or gear.
Physical Security
With respect to physical security measures, out of the 78 shooters in the sample,
only eight (10.3%) of them perpetrated rampages at venues to which their access was
restricted and only three (3.8%) forced entry into the school. Moreover, 35 (44.9%) of the
shooters were already at the scene in the normal course of business when they launched
their attacks.
Of the 76 schools in the sample, reports indicated that only 20 (26.3%) had armed

33

One of the arguments that has been made with respect to limiting the capacity of firearms

magazines has been the contention that forcing a shooter to reload more often would increase the likelihood
that someone could overpower the shooter. The data contradict such a premise.
34

Because reports were not always specific as to the number of shots fired, the ranges denoted

were used to operationalize the variable.
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security and 15 (19.7%) had only unarmed security, though it is important to note that
there is likely significant error in these numbers because news reports in most of the
cases made no mention of whether any security personnel were present when the
shooting rampages took place.
Crime Scene Behaviors
Some shooters made their approach apparent by wearing tactical attire or
displaying visible weapons, thus providing school personnel with some opportunity to
detect an impending rampage. Seventeen (21.8%) shooters approached with visible
weapons but did not wear tactical attire, four (5.1%) wore tactical attire but did not
approach with visible weapons, and 17 (21.8%) did both. In all, 21 (26.9%) shooters
wore tactical attire, and 34 (43.6%) shooters approached with visible weapons. It should
be noted, however, that even when shooters approached with visible weapons, there was
often little time for school personnel to respond before gunfire erupted. Seven shooters
who were at the scene during the normal course of business prior to the attack
approached with visible weapons. 35 Only 15 (19.2%) shooters made some type of verbal
announcement before firing. Thirteen shooters (16.7%) fired shots that were apparently
not aimed at any person.
Five (6.4%) of the shooters perpetrated at least part of their rampages as
barricaded snipers. Two of them—Andrew Golden and Mitchell Johnson—perpetrated
their episode together after activating the school’s fire alarm and then firing from nearby
35

Shooters were listed as having approached with visible weapons if they unveiled their weapons

and approached the location where the shooting began with some appreciable time delay before starting to
fire.
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woods at students who went outside. Two others also carried out their rampages from
sniper positions. One shooter, Biswanath Halder, began his rampage by killing a
professor and a student inside the school before barricading himself, engaging in a
shootout with police, and then committing suicide.36
Nineteen (25.0%) of the schools had armed security personnel on campus when
the shooting took place, 15 (19.7%) had unarmed security, and 42 (55.3%) had no
security personnel on campus. With respect to casualties, there was no statistically
significant difference between numbers of victims killed or wounded with either armed
security, unarmed security, or no security present. When armed security personnel were
present, shooters killed a mean of 4.6 victims and wounded a mean of 5.5. When
unarmed security personnel were present, shooters killed a mean of 3.7 victims and
wounded a mean of 5.1. When no security personnel were present, shooters killed a mean
of 2.5 victims and wounded a mean of 4.6. However, when the means were compared
using a Welch t-test, there was no statistically significant difference between the number
of victims killed with armed security versus no security (p = 0.257), unarmed security
versus no security (p = 0.329), or armed security versus unarmed security (p = 0.648).
Likewise, there was no statistically significant difference between the number of victims
wounded with armed security versus no security (p = 0.576), unarmed security versus no

36

The infamous rampage by former Marine Charles Whitman at the University of Texas at Austin

was also perpetrated from a sniper’s position atop the campus’s clock tower; however, the episode occurred
in 1966 and was, therefore, not included in the sample. Also, Douglas High School shooter Nikolas Cruz
attempted to gain access to an upper stairwell to snipe at students below but was stopped by hurricane-rated
glass.
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security (p = 0.766), or armed security versus unarmed security (p = 0.826). It should be
noted, however, that there was a great deal of uncertainty in determining whether or not
security personnel were present at a school when a rampage shooting occurred. Where no
evidence existed in sources from which to infer the presence of security, it was assumed
that no security personnel were present. Given the lack of statistical significance and the
fact that cases in which school security intervention ended the rampage were noted in the
data, it is unlikely that the uncertainty with respect to this variable affected the outcome.
The research data paint a clear picture that police intervention saves lives in
school rampage shootings. In cases in which the shooter was stopped by police
intervention (i.e., by gunfire, physical force, or confrontation), rampage shooters on
average killed one-third as many victims as they did when they terminated their
massacres by suicide, flight, or weapon issues (i.e., a malfunction or depletion of
ammunition), with average death tolls of six victims versus two, respectively. Out of the
78 shooters in the sample, 21 (26.9%) were stopped by police intervention, having killed
an average of two people, whereas 23 (29.5%) committed suicide having killed an
average of three people; six (7.7%) fled or simply stopped having killed an average of
five people; and three (3.8%) experienced a firearm malfunction or ran out of
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ammunition having killed an average of seven people.37
Shooters who were stopped by police intervention (n = 21) killed a mean of 2.4
victims while shooters who were not stopped by any form of intervention (n = 32) killed
a mean of 6.3 victims. On a 95% confidence interval, there was a statistically significant
difference in the numbers of victims killed (p = 0.030). However, when it came to the
number of victims wounded, the difference was less apparent. Shooters who were
stopped by police intervention wounded a mean of 4.8 victims, while shooters whose
rampages were not stopped by any form of intervention wounded a mean of 6.3 victims
(p = 0.357).
Police intervention, however, was not the winner with respect to saving lives:
intervention by unarmed citizens was. Unarmed citizens stopped 23 (39.5%) shooters, as
many as stopped their rampages by committing suicide. However, when unarmed citizens
intervened, the shooters killed an average of only one person. When school rampage
shooters ended their rampages voluntarily or by firearm malfunction or ammunition
depletion, they killed six times as many people on average as did shooters who were
stopped by the intervention of unarmed citizens.
Shooters who were stopped by unarmed citizens (n = 23) killed a mean of 1.0

37

In what has become one of the pivotal and most notorious school rampage shootings, Nikolas

Cruz, who killed 17 people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, fired 150
rounds from his AR-15 semiautomatic rifle before it malfunctioned, rendering the firearm inoperable. Cruz
discarded the weapon, along with 180 rounds of live ammunition, and fled the scene after blending in with
students (“Shooting suspect Nikolas Cruz had swastikas on ammunition magazines,” 2018; Nehamas &
Smiley, 2018).
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victims while shooters who were not stopped by any form of intervention (n = 32) killed
a mean of 6.3 victims. The difference was statistically significant (p = 0.00169). With
respect to victims wounded, the difference was less pronounced. Shooters who were
stopped by unarmed citizens wounded a mean of 3.3 victims while shooters who were not
stopped by intervention wounded a mean of 6.3 victims (p = 0.0779).
Intervention by unarmed citizens saved lives when compared to intervention by
police. Shooters who were stopped by police intervention killed twice as many people as
shooters who were stopped by unarmed citizens (𝜇 = 2.4 and 𝜇 = 1.0, respectively; p =
0.0410) but did not wound significantly more victims (𝜇 = 4.8 and 𝜇 = 3.3, respectively;
p = 0.335).
Two shooters (2.6%) were stopped by armed citizens, having killed an average of
two people. One of those shooters, Andrew Wurst, killed one person and wounded three
others at an eighth-grade dance at a private venue before being stopped by the venue’s
owner who was armed with a shotgun. Another shooter, Luke Woodham, killed three
people and wounded seven before he was stopped by an assistant principal who retrieved
a pistol from his vehicle and confronted the gunman. Neither citizen fired a single shot.
Shooters who were stopped by an armed citizen (n = 2) killed a mean of 2.0 victims while
shooters who were not stopped by any form of intervention (n = 32) killed a mean of 5.6
victims. The difference was not statistically significant on a 95% confidence interval (p =
0.0644).
Because it was difficult in many cases to discern the duration of the shooting
episodes, times were ranged using an integer coding:
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1: t <= 5 min
2: 5 min < t <= 10 min
3: 10 min < t <= 30 min
4: 30 min < t <= 60 min
5: t > 60 min

The integer values representing each range were operationalized to allow for average
time range computations to provide some meaningful way of evaluating the differences in
episode times. The time range data show that, while police intervention led to
significantly fewer fatalities than did suicide, flight, or firearms issues, shooters stopped
by police intervention had the highest time values of the sample (Figure 4.9), suggesting
that fatality rates are not as strongly linked to police intervention as average killed
numbers suggest but instead indicate that cases in which police were able to intervene
involved shooters who carried out their rampages at a slower pace than shooters who
committed suicide. However, looking at the numbers of wounded victims helps solidify
this conclusion. Shooters who were stopped by police intervention wounded a mean of
4.8 victims and shooters that committed suicide wounded a mean of 6.5. Shooters who
were stopped by unarmed citizens carried out their rampages for significantly less time
than did shooters who were stopped by police intervention and wounded a mean of 3.3
victims. Therefore, shooters who were stopped by police intervention were no more
likely to wound victims than were shooters who were stopped by suicide (p = 0.382) or
by unarmed citizen (p = 0.335).
In all, 46 (59.0%) shooters were taken into custody, 28 (35.9%) committed
suicide, and five (6.4%) were killed by police. Though 10 (12.8%) shooters fled the scene
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of the of their rampage, none escaped alive. Four (5.1%) shooters fled the scene but later
committed suicide at another location. 38

Figure 4.13. Statistics with respect to how each shooter’s rampage was terminated. Note
that the time and average number of shots fired variables were operationalized from
ranged values (see discussion above).
Of the 21 shooters who were stopped by police intervention, ten (47.6%) were
shot by officers, five of them fatally. Three of the shooters who were shot by police
subsequently committed suicide, and the other two were taken into custody. Additionally,
police fired shots at three of the shooters who were stopped by police intervention, one of
whom subsequently committed suicide. In all, police gunfire stopped 13 of the 21
shooters (61.9%). None of the shooters who were stopped by police intervention escaped.
In cases when police intervention stopped the shooter, whether the police fired
upon the shooter or not, there was no statistically significant difference in the number of

38

These numbers are independent of the numbers with respect to how each shooter’s rampage was

ended. One shooter fled and four committed suicide after intervention by police, and one shooter
committed suicide after intervention by an unarmed citizen.
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victims killed or wounded. Shooters who were fired upon by police (n = 13) killed a
mean of 2.5 victims while shooters who were not fired upon by police (n = 8) killed a
mean of 2.1 victims (p = 0.686). Similarly, shooters who were fired upon by police
wounded a mean of 5.1 victims, and shooters who were not fired upon by police
wounded a mean of 4.3 victims (p = 0.708).
For purposes of this research, two categories were operationalized as boolean
factors with respect to spree shootings. Shooters whose total rampage included a break in
time with no cooling-off period were coded as “Spree.BreakInTime == TRUE” while
shooters who perpetrated a rampage that took place partially on a school campus and
partially off a school campus were coded as “Spree.MultipleLocations == TRUE” in the
dataset. Shooters who killed family members prior to their rampage were not coded as
spree killers on the basis those killings, but were coded as spree killers if they met the
definition of apart from those killings.
Only five (6.4%) of the 78 shooters met the definition of either type of shooting
spree. Four (5.1%) perpetrated shooting sprees that occurred partially off campus, and
only one (1.3%) of the 78 shooters perpetrated a spree killing with a break in time
between killings. Seung-Hui Cho, who, in 2007, massacred 32 people at Virginia Tech in
what stands as the deadliest school rampage shooting in U.S. history, killed his first two
victims in a dormitory more than two hours before launching his full-scale attack.
Responding to the first two killings, police thought they were dealing with a lover’s
quarrel and, unaware of what Cho would do just a few hours later, had not taken steps to
prevent the massacre.
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Only one-third (n = 26) of the shooters carried out rampages while moving about
campus. The remaining two-thirds carried out their rampages in one basic location on
campus, e.g., a single classroom, lunchroom, or hallway.
Out of the 78 shooters in the sample, only 32 (41.0%) had some prior history of
mental illness, even if it had not been formally diagnosed. Only 16 (20.5%) had a history
of prior violence. Three (3.8%) had been the subject of a prior risk assessment, and four
(5.1%) had been the subject of a prior threat assessment.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Summary of Study
This research has examined 76 school rampage shooting episodes involving 76
shooters, 257 victims killed, and 387 victims wounded over a 30-year period in the
United States and Canada. For each of the 78 shooters, 102 variables were tracked based
on a coding system listed in Appendix A. The data were examined using a common
spreadsheet application and the R Studio application. R is a statistics and data analysis
programming language that allows from large datasets to be parsed rapidly to statistical
calculations. Means and proportions were compared using the t.test and prop.test
functions in R to calculate appropriate p-values. Various combinations of the variables
were evaluated with respect to answering the six research questions posed in this study.
Results and Discussion
While gun control is beyond the scope of this research, types of firearms were
studied because there are important implications for law enforcement when it comes to
weapon selection by rampage shooters. In particular, weapon selection is important to
officers who provide school security (such as school resource officers) because they are
generally mobile on foot throughout the school and may not have quick access to a patrol
vehicle that can house weapons such as patrol rifles and shotguns, forcing an officer to
take action against a rampage shooter with only the officer’s sidearm. Where there are
concerns about officers needing quick access to patrol rifles or shotguns, consideration
should be given to securing such firearms at location within the school that would be
readily accessible to the officer or security personnel, though nothing in this research
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should be used to support an argument that officers at schools need to have such firearms
accessible. Weapon selection decisions must be made on a case-specific basis. Given that
most uniformed law enforcement officers in the United States currently carry
semiautomatic sidearms, the data do not support a conclusion that pistol-armed officers
are likely to be outgunned by a rampage school shooter. Indeed, more than half of the
shooters used only handguns, and only about one-fifth used a semiautomatic centerfire
rifle.
It should be noted that, because firearms usage was not the focus of this research,
no effort was made to explore the phenomenology or endogeneity of these variables.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to formulate policy decisions or implement gun
control legislation on the basis of this research. What is not indicated in this research is
whether casualty rates are directly tied to firearm selection or whether there is some
intervening variable such as shooter motivation. It may well be the case that shooters who
were particularly motivated to inflict mass casualties selected semiautomatic firearms at a
higher rate. However, it remains unclear in the research data whether those motivated
shooters would have inflicted similar casualties had they used other types of firearms.
Given the fact that high casualty rates were quite rare among the shooters in the research
sample, conclusions drawn on the basis of casualty rate may be fraught with error and
should be viewed cautiously.
Based on news reports, it was difficult to ascertain whether or not firearms were
restricted at any given school, but as firearms are largely prohibited in K-12 schools
throughout the country, it was assumed that they were unless evidence to the contrary
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existed. In all, only 11 of the 76 venues likely did not restrict firearms. While gun rights
advocates might be tempted to argue these findings in favor of allowing firearms in
schools, such a conclusion is well beyond the scope of this research, and the accuracy of
the data with respect to firearms restrictions is questionable. However, this research does
support the conclusion that laws and school policies restricting the possession of firearms
on campus do little to dissuade the would-be rampage shooter. Lawmakers and school
administrators should objectively assess the permissibility of firearms on campus on a
case-by-case basis rather than assuming that restrictive policies are necessarily warranted.
Likewise, policymakers would be wise to understand that, particularly with respect to
rampage shooters, laws that prohibit firearms—as well as those that prohibit murder and
attempted murder—do not typically dissuade would-be perpetrators.
Research Question 1
With respect to whether or not there is a negative correlation between physical
security and preparedness measures at potential target locations and target selection by
rampage shooter, the data provide limited insight. From a quantitative perspective,
physical security measures—apart from airport-like screening of all people entering the
school—would seem tenuous at best. Because only eight shooters were restricted from
accessing the rampage venue and only three forced entry, measures designed to keep
intruders out would be largely ineffective in school rampage shooting cases. The vast
majority of shootings are perpetrated by students or staff members who have access to the
venues. Still, anecdotal examples provide some context for school security measures. For
example, when Adam Lanza killed 20 students and six faculty members at Sandy Hook
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Elementary School, he only had to breech a full-height glass panel adjacent to a glass
door to gain access to the school. Conversely, when Kevin Neal went on a shooting spree
in Corning, California, he used his vehicle to ram a gate at Rancho Tehama School in an
effort to gain access. Hearing approaching gunfire, staff members locked the school doors
and prevented Neal from getting in. Despite firing numerous shots at the school from
outside, Neal wounded only one student inside. When police killed Neal, he still had
numerous rounds of ammunition in his possession.
Despite a few anecdotal examples, there exists little evidence in the research data
from which to conclude that increasing school security measures with respect to keeping
outsiders from gaining access would do much to reduce the number of school rampage
shooting episodes. It is unlikely, given the fact that most school rampage shootings are
perpetrated by insiders, that school security measures designed to limit access would
affect target selection for more than a small handful of shooters. However, none of the
reports with respect to any of the in-house shootings indicated that the shooter had to
bypass security screening, so there remains the possibility that such screening could limit
a shooter’s ability to gain access to a school (see discussion in next section).
Research Question 2
With respect to whether there is a negative correlation between physical security
and preparedness measures at target locations and the number of casualties in a rampage
shooting event, the data again provide little insight. The data in this research lead to the
conclusion that physical security and preparedness at schools can save lives, but the
options to do so may be limited. Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of the
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shooters were not restricted from accessing the school, physical security measures such
as improved locks, layered doors, shatter-resistance glass, fences, and limited access
points would have done nothing to prevent the shooters from carrying out their rampages.
Still, two of the deadliest shooting episodes provide anecdotal evidence that such
measures could be effective. Adam Lanza massacred 20 children and six faculty members
at Sandy Hook Elementary School after forcing entry through a window. In the massacre
at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, Nikolas Cruz attempted to access a thirdfloor stairwell with apparent intent to fire at students from a high perch, but hurricanerated glass stopped his bullets and perhaps kept him from killing many more victims.
When Kevin Neal rammed his vehicle through a gate and tried to get into Rancho
Tehama School, he was stopped by the locked doors that had been secured by staff
members seconds before he tried to enter the building. But given the fact that the vast
majority of school rampage shootings are perpetrated by people who belong inside the
school, the only realistic physical security measures that would stop or significantly
reduce such events are those that would prevent firearms, especially handguns, from
being brought into schools. School administrators, security personnel, and law
enforcement officials must decide, on a case-be-case basis, whether such measures are
warranted and to what extent they should be implemented. The utility of such measures,
too, would be limited by the extent to which they could be implemented on a given
campus. Sprawling university campuses, for example, would be much more difficult to
secure than would single-building schools where access could be limited to a small
number of entrances.

!151
As presented in Chapter 4, handguns were used by nearly two-thirds of school
rampage shooters and were used exclusively by more than half. Handguns are easier for a
shooter to conceal, and, in a number of cases, students prepared to perpetrate rampage
shootings arrived at school in a normal fashion, carrying their firearms into the school
concealed inside a backpack or other innocuous package. Some shooters similarly
brought rifles to school concealed. 39 School faculty and security personnel should be
especially alert for suspicious packages carried by students entering school buildings.
While full-blown security screening may be unjustified, searching unusual packages may
be prudent. Schools can also reduce the need for large backpacks by replacing paper
textbooks with electronic versions, stored on tablets. As such technology continues to
improve, schools could move entirely to tablet-based resources, which would make
backpack bans considerably more feasible, thus cutting down on the necessity for
security screening. Randomized security screening may provide some deterrence, but to
what extent remains unclear from the data in this research. Whatever screening measures
a school implements, however, it must be understood that such measures can only be
effective if overall physical security measures prevent a shooter from smuggling firearms
in another way, such as stashing them outside a door to be retrieved after the shooter
passes through a security checkpoint undetected. Even door alarms may not be effective
as the shooter would likely be able to retrieve the firearms and start shooting before any
staff or faculty could respond to the alarm.

39

Michael Carneal, for example, brought a .22 caliber pistol and a duffle bag containing two

shotguns to school.
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Research Question 3
The data indicate that there is a negative correlation between law enforcement
response strategies to rampage shooting events and the number of casualties. When
shooters were not stopped by any form of intervention, they killed nearly two-and-a-half
times as many people as when they were stopped by police. Still, police intervention
could be improved and has the potential to save even more lives. While police
intervention saved lives, intervention by unarmed civilians saved even more. Shooters
were not stopped by intervention killed five-and-a-half times as many victims as shooters
who were stopped by unarmed citizens, and shooters who were stopped by police killed
nearly two-and-a-half times as many. Shooters who were stopped by unarmed citizens
had their rampages terminated more rapidly than shooters who were stopped by police, a
finding that suggests that if police response times to school rampage shootings could be
reduced, more lives would be saved.
To be effective, though, law enforcement officers must be guided to take action as
rapidly as possible, often counter to standard policing practices. When a gunman entered
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, killing 17 students and
faculty and wounding 15 others, a Broward County sheriff’s deputy assigned as a school
resource officer failed to intervene and waited outside for several minutes while gunfire
was ongoing. Further reports indicate that as many as three more deputies arrived and
failed to enter the school after gunfire had ceased. Officers from nearby Coral Springs
Police Department, who were not even within their city’s jurisdictional limits, arrived and
bypassed the county deputies, entering the school to begin rescuing the wounded. The
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shooter, Nikolas Cruz, as it turned out, had fled the school. He was captured near the
school by Coconut Creek police officer Michael Leonard. In the shooting’s aftermath,
critics blasted the Broward County Sheriff’s Office for what many perceived as a colossal
failure, not only because deputies failed to engage the shooter but also because deputies
had received nearly two dozen calls regarding Cruz and his brother over the previous
decade but had done nothing to prevent the massacre from being perpetrated in the first
place. There were additional reports that the same school resource officer who failed to
enter when the shooting was ongoing had refused to provide information to child welfare
investigators about Cruz during a previous investigation. In fact, prior to the shooting
rampage, the Broward County Sheriff’s Office, the Florida Department of Children and
Families, the Broward County School District, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
had all been made aware of Cruz’s potential threat as a rampage shooter, yet little had
been done to stop him. The FBI admitted that they had a received a tip warning them that
Cruz might perpetrate a rampage shooting, yet that tip was never funneled to field agents,
and no action was taken to validate the tip or warn local law enforcement or school
officials. Reports also have indicated that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office had
received a similar tip. The aftermath of the incident led to heated criticism of the Broward
County Sheriff, not only by media pundits and politicians, but by police officers and
administrators around the country. Some social media commentators have referred to
“Coward County,” and Florida’s governor, among many other voices, called for the
sheriff to step down (Berman, 2018; Elsesser, DiPentima, & Winston, 2018; Karimi &
Lynch, 2018; “Officer who caught Parkland shooter honored,” 2018; Merelli, 2018;
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Wamsley, 2018).
The Douglas High School shooting stands as at least an anecdotal testament to the
fact that preventative measures are far from failsafe. Despite tips directly indicating that
Cruz was likely to become a school rampage shooter weeks before the massacre took
place, systemic failures overshadowed what retrospectively seems obvious: that Nikolas
Cruz was an armed powder keg waiting to go off. But this episode brought with it another
systemic failure, one which will likely place the episode in the historic annals of pivotal
school rampage shootings from a law enforcement perspective. Given the overwhelming
likelihood of false positive responses based on tips to law enforcement, the failure on the
part of law enforcement to intervene and perhaps prevent the Parkland massacre can be
viewed through a contextual lens that perhaps makes some sense, even if it is difficult to
comprehend. However, the fact that an armed deputy, more than two decades postColumbine, could stand outside the school while students and faculty were being
slaughtered, raised a certain level of disgust among the law enforcement community.
Reports that three other deputies followed suit gave rise to the perception of institutional
failures with respect to policy and training. Beyond the reputational damage not only to
the Broward County Sheriff’s Office, but to law enforcement across the nation, the
political backlash and potential for civil liability cannot be ignored. Multiple law
enforcement agencies have been sued by survivors or by deceased victims’ families for
failure to act, and one of the most colossal of such cases—the massacre at Columbine
High School—led to sweeping reform with respect to law enforcement training on active
shooter incidents throughout the country.
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Some of the police intervention cases involved off-duty police officers who
happened to be at the school when the shooting took place, and several others occurred
when on-duty police officers were present at the school when the shooting began. A
rampage shooting at Appalachian School of Law, for example, was ended when two offduty police officers, both of whom were students at the school, went to their respective
vehicles, retrieved their firearms, and confronted the shooter. Whether casualties in that
shooting would have been lower had the two officers been carrying their firearms on their
persons remains unclear. Likewise, shooter Jakob Wagner brought a semiautomatic rifle
to a high school prom, apparently intent on killing numerous victims. Instead, he was
quickly killed by a police officer assigned to patrol the parking lot having only wounded
two students. He was armed with enough ammunition to have killed numerous victims.
Most of the police interventions, however, occurred after police responded to 911
calls, which means that some time lapsed between the onset of the rampage and police
intervention. One notable example of police intervention was the case of Myron May,
whose rampage at Florida State University left three people wounded. Police received the
first call at 12:25 a.m. and reported May killed (by police) at 12:28 a.m. (Papy, 2015).
However, it is important to note that, although multiple officers arrived quickly, May left
the building and was encountered by officers outside. The extent of May’s rampage and
the rapidity of police intervention may have been quite different had May been mobile
inside the building. May’s rampage also took place late at night when only a small
number of students were studying in the library where May launched his attack. Given
the fact that nearly one third of the shooters were stopped by unarmed citizens, it is
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reasonable to conclude that if police officers had at least been on campus near the shooter
when the rampage began, police intervention would likely have been more effective.
While the data made clear the conclusion that police intervention saves lives,
what remains unclear is why the rate of victims killed was lower in cases in which
unarmed citizens intervened versus cases in which police intervened while the rate of
victims wounded remained at similar levels. Cases involving police intervention lasted
much longer than cases involving unarmed civilian intervention, so one would intuitively
expect that casualties would be greater in terms of both the rate of victims killed and
wounded when police intervention stopped the shooter. One possible explanation for this
disparity is that shooters who were stopped by police operated at a slower pace than did
shooters who were stopped by unarmed citizens—and certainly slower than shooters who
committed suicide. Given the fact the police intervention was nearly as successful as
intervention by unarmed citizens at mitigating casualties but did so over a significantly
longer time period, it stands to reason that if police intervention occurred more rapidly,
even more casualties could be prevented.
The data paint one clear picture: rapid intervention saves lives and reduces
casualties. Therefore, policies and training that tend to restrict officers from making solo
entries to go after a shooter are tantamount to trading the lives of victims in order to
potentially save the lives of officers. Police administrators and trainers—and indeed linelevel police officers who may respond to a school rampage shooting—must make
decisions with regard to solo entry versus awaiting backup centered on this
understanding. Officers, administrators, and trainers must also be cognizant of the fact
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that school rampage shooters overwhelmingly act alone; therefore, a solo-officer entry to
confront a shooter means that any confrontation between the police and shooter is likely
to be mano a mano, or at least gun to gun.
A solo officer entering a building at the sound of gunfire inside is one issue;
officers entering a building after gunfire has ceased is another. There were no
operationalized variables in this research from which one could scientifically evaluate the
efficacy of officer entry once the shooting has ceased with respect to saving lives.
Qualitatively, no episodes in the sample involved a shooter ambushing a police officer,
but it is unclear whether ambush cases may have occurred if police had arrived and
entered the venues more quickly than they did. Officer injuries were not widely reported,
so it is unclear how many officers, were wounded in the 13 cases in which police gunfire
took place, though at least one case involving an officer who was present when the
shooting erupted led to the officer being wounded. The officer, who survived the
shooting, then killed the perpetrator.
Research Question 4
While psychological profiling was not a component of this research, certain
factors were included in the data with respect to the potential for averting shootings
before the perpetrator arrives at campus armed and ready. However, as with findings by
other researchers, the data in this case—at least qualitatively—did not support a
conclusion that prospective psychological profiling of potential school rampage shooters
would be likely to stop more than a fraction of these episodes. Indeed, the psychology of
school rampage shootings has proven to be quite complex. Some shooters, at least
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retrospectively, met the criteria for some Axis I mental disorder; others simply did not.
Some shooters came from abusive homes; others did not. Some shooters had been
traumatized; others had not. Some shooters had been bullied; others were bullies
themselves. Some shooters were popular kids; others were marginalized. Some shooters
exhibited obvious signs of psychopathy; others were simply scared kids who sought to
use their rampage shooting episode as a means of gaining power. In short, many of the
shooters would have been difficult to distinguish from any other student prospectively
without expending significant resources delving into the backgrounds of virtually every
student and faculty or staff member at a school. Still, there are indicators that, when
observed by properly trained school personnel—including law enforcement officers
assigned to schools—can provide insight into the possibility of a particular student being
a candidate for carrying out a rampage shooting, but relying on such indicators as a
primary means of averting school rampage shootings is prone to high levels of Type I
error and risks sweeping numerous students and faculty or staff members into suspicion
for what was, in fact, innocuous, though perhaps ill-conceived, behavior.
The crime scene behaviors of the shooters were equally complex. Some shooters
were obviously quite motivated and left high body counts to prove it. Some shooters were
simply scared kids who sought to use a firearm as a means of gaining power and attention
—a way out of their perceived plight. Still, the picture with respect to how shooter
motivation correlates to body count is unclear. When 14-year-old Jess Osborne opened
fire on students and teachers at Townville Elementary School, he had boasted of his
intention to kill more victims than Adam Lanza did at Sandy Hook Elementary School

!159
and hoped to “kill around 50 of 60 [people]. If I get lucky maybe 150” (quoted in Cox,
2018). Indeed, Osborne paints a picture of the complexity of school rampage shooter
psychology: despite showing an apparent lack of empathy for other people, Osborne,
unlike many other shooters who, like some serial killers, engage in acts of animal abuse,
hugged all of his animals after killing his father and before heading the school to try to
kill as many people as possible (Tron, 2018).
Research Question 5
This research indicates that it is unlikely that predictive response strategies can be
used to secure potential target locations and train personnel to intervene and mitigate
casualties. At the onset of this research, is was hoped that the data would reveal patterns
of behavior that would allow for response strategies have some underpinning in the likely
behaviors of a shooter such that a limited punch list of possible responses could be laid
out. However, the rampage shooters in the sample simply did not follow any kind of
predictive playbook. Some shooters mobilized, killing victims throughout the venue;
others remained in one location. Some shooters simply gave up upon being confronted by
a faculty or staff member; others killed anyone who confronted them. Some shooters
targeted specific individuals; others killed whoever happened to be nearby. Some
shooters spared the lives of certain victims; others did not. Some shooters announced
their presence before opening fire; others said nothing at all. Some shooters dressed in
tactical attire, donning vests or fatigues or trenchcoats; others wore regular clothes and
looked like regular people. Some committed suicide, some fled the scene, some simply
gave up when confronted, and some shot it out with police. In short, no trends appeared

!160
that would allow for any meaningful predictive response strategy to be developed.
Research Question 6
While the crime scene behaviors of rampage shooters were not grossly
predictable, they do provide some reliable underpinnings for developing investigative and
reconstructive models. School type can provide an indication as to the the shooter’s
affiliation with the school. When the shooting occurred at a college or university, the
shooter was more likely to be a current or former student than a current or former
employee ( p̂ = 63.6% and p̂ = 18.2%, respectively; p = 0.00579). When the shooting
occurred at a high school, the shooter was almost guaranteed to be a current student ( p̂ =
83.3% and p̂ = 16.7% respectively; p = 5.92 × 10-8). When the shooting occurred at a
middle school, the shooter was in all cases a current or former student with current
students being most probable ( p̂ = 72.7% and p̂ = 18.2% respectively; p = 0.0323). When
the shooting occurred at an elementary school, the shooter was most likely to have no
affiliation with the school ( p̂ = 85.7% and p̂ = 14.3%, respectively; p = 0.0325). Hence,
investigators have a place to begin searching with respect to identifying a shooter.
In almost all cases, the shooter fired no more than 25 rounds, thus limiting the
number of potential fired cartridge cases and bullet impacts at the scene. Only 19.2% of
the shooters fired more than 25 rounds, and none fired more than 200. More than half of
the shooters used only handguns. The shooters were most likely to have brought only one
firearm, but some brought two, and, rarely, three or more. Only six shooters brought
firearms that they did not carry with them during their rampage episode. Nearly half
(41%) reloaded, and of those, 75% used semiautomatic firearms. In light of these
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numbers, investigators should consider that additional firearms may be present at the
scene, on the shooter’s body, or in the shooter’s vehicle. No shooter obtained firearms or
ammunition at the scene (i.e., by taking it from another person), but five shooters staged
firearms or gear.
The possibility of a weapon other than a firearm being involved was minimal.
While a number of shooters brought other types of weapons, few deployed them. One
shooter set fire to another school prior to her rampage. Two students in one shooting
episode (Columbine High School) deployed improvised explosive devices, none of which
detonated. One shooter used his motor vehicle as a weapon. One shooter stabbed a
student who tackled her.
Two-thirds of the shooters perpetrated their on-campus rampages in one general
location within the school; only one-third moved about the school firing shots in different
locations. Therefore, crime scenes are likely to be contained to a limited portion of the
school rather than being spread throughout the school. Even when shooters were mobile,
they often moved only through a small portion of the school. When Adam Lanza killed
26 people at Sandy Hook Elementary school, he did so only the main office, front
hallway, and first two classrooms.
Limitations
Perhaps the most significant limitation to this research was reliance on news
reports and other non-official sources for most of the data. Because no centralized,
comprehensive database on school rampage shootings exists, data did not always come as
cleanly or clearly as scientific researchers typically desire. Inferences had to be made
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with respect to a number of variables: school security measures were often not mentioned
in news reports; shooter motivations were often not known; and very little detail was
available in many cases from which to discern the specifics of shooters’ crime scene
behaviors beyond the general statistical tallies with respect to numbers of victims and the
basic timeline of events. Times were rarely listed, so the duration of each event had to be
ranged based contextual information about the event. The number of shots each shooter
fired was rarely listed and, likewise, had to be ranged based contextual inferences. Where
no news reports specifically mentioned a shooter’s mental health history, it was assumed
that no diagnosed history existed. Where no prior threats were noted, it was assumed that
none had been made. In short, the depth and breadth of the data, while still abundantly
useful, left the lingering desire to have gone much further with this research.
Further Research
Further research is warranted, particularly with respect to the cases in which
police intervention stopped the shooter. A comprehensive, qualitative study of all 21
episodes of police intervention would likely provide much greater depth and breadth to
understanding police responses to school rampage shooting incidents. Likewise, a similar
study of the episodes stopped by the intervention of unarmed citizens could provide
valuable insight with respect to preparing faculty, staff, and students for the possibility of
a school rampage shooting and to determine the probable efficacy of the various active
shooter response programs currently being disseminated at schools around the country.
Implications
With approximately 130,600 schools in the United States (Dorn & Dorn, 2013),
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any given school can expect to suffer a rampage shooting episode once every 56,000
years. Viewed through that lens, the level of policy discussion and public debate related
to such episodes is hardly warranted. But fear is a strong driving force, and the potential
for failure in the face of that fear should compel law enforcement managers and trainers
to spend at least some measurable amount of time and resources on this issue.
It is incumbent upon law enforcement trainers and managers to understand the
depth of breadth of the problem of school rampage shooters and to maintain an objective,
evidence-based context for preparing for such events. Examples have been shown across
the gamut of police responses: officers failing to act while gunfire was ongoing, officers
rapidly intervening and stopping rampage shooters before casualties escalated, and
officers over-reacting to school gunfire by implementing school-wide searches and
deploying armored vehicles for a dramatic but quite isolated suicide attempt. It is
precisely the goal of this research to narrow that gamut to appropriate, evidence-based
responses in order not only to allow law enforcement officials to properly respond to
school rampage shooting incidents, but also to help quell the unfounded public hysteria
that often follows such episodes. To be sure, law enforcement preparation for, and
response to, a school rampage shooting is a gamble, one that requires police managers
and trainers to devote significant resources toward preparing for an event that is unlikely
to happen but can end with catastrophic results if the first responders have are not trained
and ready. Being in the position of making such decisions in realtime is unenviable as,
with many aspects of law enforcement, it can place police managers in a damned-if-youdo-damned-if-you-don’t situation that may draw considerable public outcry and harsh
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political backlash. Still, police simply cannot chose to do nothing. To that end, it has been
the goal of this research to help law enforcement trainers and managers better take the
gamble. To quote the lyrics from a famous song (Schlitz, 1978):
You got to know when to hold them,
Know when to fold them,
Know when to walk away,
And know when to run.
You never count your money
When you’re sitting at the table.
There’ll be time enough for counting
When the dealing’s done.
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2017
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NM

USA
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2017; Associated Press, 2017b; Ellis,
Levenson, & Diaz, 2017; Kellogg,
2017; Levenson & Diaz-Zuniga,
2017; McKee, 2017; Petersen &
Grover, 2017

Bartley

Kenneth

2005

Campbell County High
School

TN

USA

“Bartley released,” 2014; "Boy in
school shooting,” 2005; “One dead in
Tennessee school shooting,” 2005

Bishop

Amy

2010

University of Alabama

AL

USA

Johnson, 2015; Keefe, 2013;
Lawson, 2014

Brown

Nathaniel

2010

Ohio State University

OH

USA

Decker & Gray, 2010; Dodge, 2010;
Leingang, 2010; Urbina, 2010;
“Suspect kills self in Ohio State
shooting,” 2010;

Bush

Elizabeth

2001

Bishop-Neumann
Junior-Senior High
School

PA

USA

Associated Press, 2001; Connie
Chung interviews school shooter,
2017; School prayer follows school
shooting, 2001

Butler

Robert

2011

Millard South High
School

NE

USA

Abourezk, 2011; Langman, 2016;
Liebowitz, 2007; Welch, 2011

Campbell

Mason

2014

Berrendo Middle
School

NM

USA

Golgowski, 2015; Nathanson, 2014;
Thoren, 2015; Younger, 2015

Carneal

Michael

1997

Heath High School

KY

USA

Harding, 2002; Harding, Mehta, &
Newman, 2003; Langman, 2009a,
2009b, 2015b

Castillo

Alvaro

2006

Orange High School

NC

USA

Ferrell, 2006; Karas, 2009; Langman,
2012a

Cho

Seung

2007

Virginia Tech

VA

USA

Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007

Coon

Asa

2007

SuccessTech
Academy

OH

USA

Langman, 2010b; Maag, 2007;
“Police,” 2007; “Police chief,” 2007

Cruz

Nikolas

2018

Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School

FL

USA

Dwyer & Kennedy, 2018; Dwyer &
Neuman, 2018; Gonzales & Dwyer,
2018; Nehamas, 2018; Nehamas &
Smiley, 2018; Rabin, Vassolo, &
Chang, 2018; Rodriguez, Madan,
Harris, & Vassolo, 2018; Rozsa,
Balingit, Wan, & Berman, 2018;
"Shooting suspect Nikolas Cruz had
swastikas on ammunition
magazines,” 2018; Weaver, Flechas,
& Ovalle, 2018

Sources
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Dann

Laurie

1988

Hubbard Woods
Elementary School

IL

USA

Kaplan, Papajohn, & Zorn, 2017;
Papajohn & Kaplan, 1988; “School
shooting remembered,” 2008

Davidson

Frederick

1996

San Diego State
University

CA

USA

Associated Press, 1996a; Fiorina,
2016; Perry, 1997; Perry & Malnic,
1996

Duong

Mark

1993

Weber State University

UT

USA

Associated Press, 1993a, 1993b;
Costanzo, 1993; Parkinson & Brown,
1993; Shenefelt, 2016; “Student
shoots three at hearing in Utah,”
1993

Eastwood Bruco

2010

Deer Creek Middle
School

CO

USA

Associated Press, 2010a; Fender,
2011; Martinez, 2010; People v.
Eastwood, 2015; “Teacher describes
how he stopped shooting,” 2015;
Vigil, 2015

Elliott

Nicholas

1988

Atlantic Shores
Christian School

VA

USA

Fox, 2017; Somerville, 1989

Fabrikant

Valery

1992

Concordia University

QC

CAN

Bovsun, 2013; “Former Concordia
professor,” 2015; Lejtenyi, 2017

Flores

Robert

2002

University of Arizona

AZ

USA

Broder, 2002; DeFalco, 2002;
Gabrielson, 2002; Holgun, 2002;
Rotstein, 2002

Fryberg

Jaylen

2014

Marysville-Pilchuck
High School

WA

USA

Johnson & Dewan, 2014; Kutner,
2015; Rhue & Honnen, 2015; “Two
dead in Washington high school
shooting,” 2014

Gill

Kimveer

2006

Dawson College

QC

CAN

“College shooter Gill obsessed with
guns,” 2006; Langman, 2010a; The
Canadian Press, 2016

Goh

One

2012

Oikos University

CA

USA

“Families, friends mourn victims of
Oakland college shooting,” 2012;
Lee, 2014; Onishi & Wollan, 2012

Golden

Andrew

1998

Westside Middle
School

AR

USA

Bragg, 1998; Bragg, Johnson, Kifner,
& Verhovek, 1998; Deardorf 1998a,
1998b; Fox, Roth, & Newman, 2003;
“Judge orders boys held,” 1998;
Keneally, 2016; Koon, 2008;
Langman, 2009a

Hainstock Eric

2006

Weston High School

WI

USA

Alfano, 2006a; “Details emerge about
teen held in Wisconsin shooting,”
2006; Hall & Ericson, 2006;
Langman, 2012a; Lueders, 2008;
Maniaci, 2010; “Wisconsin principal
dies after shooting,” 2006

Halder

2003

Case Western
Reserve University

OH

USA

Bernbaum 2003a, 2003b; Hakim,
2003; Ohio v. Halder, 2007

Biswanat
h
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Hancock

James

2016

Madison Jr./Sr. High
School

OH

USA

BieryGolick, 2016a, 2016b; “James
Austin Hancock: Five fast facts you
need to know,” 2016; Hagrman, 2016;
“Madison Township school shooter
sentenced to six years at juvenile
facility,” 2016; Pack, 2016;
“Suspected Madison Jr./Sr. High
School shooter in court,” 2016

HarperMercer

Chris

2015

Umpqua Community
College

OR

USA

Frosch & Kesling, 2015; Healy &
Lovett, 2015; Loew & Stanglin, 2015;
Mai-Duc, 2015; Miller & Wang, 2015;
Saslow, Kaplan, & Hoyt, 2015;
Turkewitz, 2015; Vanderhart,
Johnson, & Turkewitz, 2015;
Woolington, 2016

Harris

Eric

1999

Columbine High
School

CO

USA

Cullen, 2010; Hong, Cho, AllenMeares, & Espelage, 2010; Jefferson
County Sheriff’s Office, 2000;
Langman, 2008

Hoffman

Jason

2001

Granite Hills High
School

CA

USA

“Another school shooting in San
Diego area,” 2001; Krueger, 2010;
Langman, 2012a; Perry, 2001;
Texeira, Krikorian, & Maretlle, 2001

Houston

Eric

1992

Lindhurst High School

CA

USA

Langman, 2012a; People v. Houston,
2008, 2012

Johnson

Mitchell

1998

Westside High School

AR

USA

Bragg, 1998; Bragg, Johnson, Kifner,
& Verhovek, 1998; Deardorf 1998a,
1998b; Fox, Roth, & Newman, 2003;
“Judge orders boys held,” 1998;
Keneally, 2016; Koon, 2008;
Langman, 2009a

Kazmierc
zak

Steven

2008

Northern Illinois
University

IL

USA

Boudreau & Zamost, n.d.; Cuomo,
Pinto, & Sterns, 2008; Gray, 2008;
Langman, 2010a; McCarthy, 2013;
Vann, 2008

Kinkel

Kipland

1998

Thurston High School

OR

USA

“Accused Oregon school shooter
shows no emotion in court,” 1998;
Bernstein, 2013; Cooper, 2003; “Eight
years later: Thurston and Kinkel
revisited,” 2006; Langman, 2009a;
Sullivan, 1998; “Teen jailed after
Oregon high school shooting spree,”
1998

Kliebold

Dylan

1999

Columbine High
School

CO

USA

Cullen, 2010; Hong, Cho, AllenMeares, & Espelage, 2010; Jefferson
County Sheriff’s Office, 2000;
Langman, 2008
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Lane

Thomas

2012

Chardon High School

OH

USA

Connors, 2017; Glassier, 2012a,
2012b; Payne, 2014; “Third student
dies in shooting rampage, 2012”;
"T.J. Lane, Chardon High School
shooting suspect, was described as
outcast,” 2012

Lanza

Adam

2012

Sandy Hook
Elementary School

CT

USA

Montminy, Crowley, Maniago, &
Reed, 2013; Sandy Hook Advisory
Commission, 2015; Sedensky, 2013

Ledeger

Keith

1994

Wickliffe Middle School

OH

USA

Kuehner & O’Donnell, 1996; “Man
fires shotgun in school,” 1994;
O’Donnell, 2014; Read, 2012

Leith

Stephen

1993

Chelsea High School

MI

USA

“Chelsea school trying to deal with
shootings,” 1993; “Chelsea teacher
ordered to stand trial,” 1994; “Four
dead in shooting sprees in Michigan,
Idaho,” 1993; Shellenbarger, 2013

Lépine

Marc

1989

École Polytechnique

QC

CAN

Bindel, 2012; Chauvin, 2015; “Hope
lives for Polytechnique survivors,”
2009; Krajicek, 2014; Langman,
2010a; Pitt, 1989; Sourour, 1991

Lo

Wayne

1992

Simon's Rock College

MA

USA

DePalma, 1992; Henig, 2007;
Langman, 2010b

Loukaitai
s

Barry

1996

Frontier Junior High
School

WA

USA

Geranios, 2017a, 2017b

Lu

Gang

1991

University of Iowa

IA

USA

Blau & Becker, 1991; Eckhardt, 2001;
Marriott, 1991a, 1991b

May

Myron

2014

Florida State
University

FL

USA

Atwood, Dobson, Rossman, Skeritt, &
Waters, 2015; Goldstein, 2015; Papy,
2015; Rossman, 2014; Waters &
Dobson, n.d.

Neal

Kevin

2017

Rancho Tehama
School

CA

USA

Arthur, 2017; Chapman, 2017;
Longoria & Schultz, 2017; Sabalow,
Chabria, & Kasler, 2017; St. John,
Shyong, Serna, Vives, & Cosgrove,
2017

Newman

James

2006

Pine Middle School

NV

USA

Associated Press, 2006a, 2006b,
2006c; Bidwell, 2013; Kerlin & Myers,
2006; McAndrew, 2014

Newman

Kevin

1993

Central Middle School

WY

USA

Associated Press, 1993c, 1993d,
1993e; “Four students shot,” 1993

Odighizu
wa

Peter

2002

Appalachian School of
Law

VA

USA

Associated Press, 2003; Clines,
2002; Kahn, 2004; “Law students
tackled gunman,” 2002; Sidener,
2002; “Suspect in school slayings
arraigned,” 2002; Wallace, 2002
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Oliver

Bryan

2013

Taft High School

CA

USA

Associated Press, 2013a; Cone,
2013; Martinez, 2013; Simmons,
Santa Cruz, & Mather, 2013; “Sheriff,”
2013; Stanglin & Winter, 2013

O'Rourke

Brendan

2010

Kelly Elementary
School

CA

USA

Associated Press, 2010b; Davis,
2010; Knott, 2012; Kruger, Hood,
Page, & Wayland, 2010; Ojeda,
2012; Spagat, 2010

Osborne

Jesse

2016

Townville Elementary
School

SC

USA

Associated Press, 2018; “Court
releases 46-page confession by
Townville shooting suspect,” 2018;
“Deputies describe ‘chaos’ at
Townville Elementary shooting scene,
new details about suspect,” 2018;
Mayo, 2018; McLeod, 2018; Shaw,
2018; Tron, 2018

Padgett

Jared

2014

Reynolds High School

OR

USA

Bernstein, 2014a, 2014b, 2015;
Collman & Nye, 2014; Farrell, 2015;
Gunderson, 2014; “Oregon school
shooting,” 2014

Parker

Gabriel

2018

Marshall County High
School

KY

USA

Gostanian, Johnson, & Siemazko,
2018; Lopez, 2018; “Request made
to assign new judge to deadly
Marshall County, Kentucky high
school shooting case,” 2018;
Segarra, 2018; Shugerman, 2018;
Wolfson & Sayers, 2018; Yan,
Stapleton, & Murphy, 2018

Penningt
on

Scott

1993

East Carter High
School

KY

USA

Buckley, 1993; Reed, 1993; “Two
killed in school shooting in Kentucky,”
1993

Pierson

Karl

2013

Arapahoe High School

CO

USA

Associated Press, 2014b; Joseph,
2016; Martinez & Wilson, 2013;
Nuseibeh, 2014; “Police: Arapahoe
High School shooter,” 2014; Rael,
2013; Steffan, Torres, & Brown, 2014;
Torres, 2014; Woodward & Goodrum,
2016

Purdy

Patrick

1989

Cleveland Elementary
School

CA

USA

Associated Press, 1989; Kempsky,
1989; Logan, 2016; Richman &
Emmons, 2014; Vanairsdale, n.d.

Ramsey

Evan

1997

Bethel Regional High
School

AK

USA

Avila, Holding, Whitcraft, & Tribolet,
2008; Bell & Shinohara, 1997;
Dremer, 2017; McBride, 2017;
“Rage,” 1999

Reyes

Jose

2013

Sparks Middle School

NV

USA

Associated Press, 2014a; Elam,
Hanna, & Vercammen, 2013;
Glionna, 2014; McAndrew, 2013;
Sparks Police Department, 2013
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Robbins

Jillian

1996

Penn State University

PA

USA

Associated Press, 1996b, 2004;
Falce, 2016; Gibb, 2003; Panny,
2016; “Sniper kills student at
Pennsylvania State,” 1996; Wittich,
1996

Roberts

Charles

2006

West Nickel Mines
School (Amish)

PA

USA

Associated Press, 2013b; Bovsun,
2014; “Fatal shooting at US Amish
school,” 2006; Itkowitz, 2016; Kelly,
2007; Kocieniewski & Gately, 2006;
Logan, 2017; "Police: Amish school
shooter,” 2006; Walters, 2016

Rodger

Elliot

2014

University of California
at Santa Barbara

CA

USA

Brown, 2015; Nagourney, Cieply,
Feuer, & Lovett, 2014

Romano

Jon

2004

Columbia High School

NY

USA

Liquori, 2004; Redick, 2014

Rouse

James

1995

Richland High School

TN

USA

Associated Press, 1995b; Goodstein
& Glaberson, 2000; Langman, 2012a;
Leung, 2014

Sharpe

Caleb

2017

Freeman High School

WA

USA

Associated Press, 2017a; Blackwood,
2017; Blankstein & Siemaszko, 2017;
Chia & Cerullo, 2017; Clouse, 2017;
Cruz, 2017; “Freeman High School
shooting: Suspect said he was
bullied, police documents say,” 2017;
“Freeman High School: Suspected
gunman posted troubling YouTube
videos,” 2017; Geranios, 2017;
Kamrowski, 2017; Lapin, 2017

Sincino

Anthony

1995

Blackville-Hilda High
School

SC

USA

Associated Press, 1995a; Smith,
1995; United Press International,
1995a, 1995b, 1995c

Smith

Todd

1999

W. R. Myers High
School

Alber
ta

CAN

“Alberta town tries to understand,”
2000; “Boy charged in Taber shooting
gets three years,” 2000; “One dead,
one wounded in Alberta school
shooting, 1999; Shaw & Harding,
2005

Solomon

Thomas

1999

Heritage High School

GA

USA

Cloud, 1999; Dejevsky, 1999;
“Georgia school shooter gets 40
years,” n.d.; Sullivan & Guerette,
2003; Winne & Gehlbach, 2016

Todd

Joseph

1997

Stamps High School

AR

USA

“Boy, 14, charged in shooting at
school,” 1997; Haymes, 1998;
McLemore, 2013; “Teen arrested for
shooting Arkansas classmates,”
1997; “Two students wounded in
Arkansas shooting,” 1997

Trickey

Seth

1999

Fort Gibson Middle
School

OK

USA

"Four wounded in Fort Gibson
shooting,” 1999; Jackson, 1999; Li,
1999; Ruble, 1999; Walton, 2005
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Wagner

Jakob

2016

Antigo High School

WI

USA

"Jakob Wagner: Five fast facts you
need to know,” 2016; Welter, 2016;
Wisconsin Division of Criminal
Investigation, 2016

Weise

Jeffrey

2005

Red Lake High School

MN

USA

Davey & Harris, 2005; Enger, 2015;
O’Toole, 2013; Roberts, 2005;
“School gunman stole police pistol,
vest,” 2005; Younge & Goldenberg,
2005

Williams

Charles

2001

Santana High School

CA

USA

Dickey, 2013; “Exclusive: Santana
School Shooter,” n.d.; McCarthy,
2001; Perry, 2002; Purdum, 2001;
Smolowe, 2001

Williams

Latina

2008

Louisiana Technical
College

LA

USA

Associated Press, 2008a, 2008b;
King, 2008; Persac, 2008; “Shooting
suspect displayed signs of paranoia,”
n.d.; “Three dead in LTC shooting,”
n.d.

Wilson

James

1988

Oakland Elementary
School

SC

USA

Associated Press, 1988a, 1988b;
Brooks, 1988; Gormley, 2006; Knapp,
2012; Moredock, 2012

Wong

Jiverly

2009

American Civic
Association

NY

USA

“Binghamton struggles to understand
why gunman killed 13,” 2009;
Esposito, Thomas, Goldman, Potter,
& Michels, 2009; Fernandez &
Schweber, 2009; Huynh, 2009; Kemp
& Siemaszko, 2009; Langman,
2010a; McFadden, 2009; Wright,
2009

Woodham Luke

1997

Pearl High School

MS

USA

Associated Press, 1998; Chua-Eoan,
2001; Hewitt, 1997; Langman, 2010b;
Lasseter, n.d.; O’Connor, 2018;
Mitchell, 2016; Sack, 1997b; “Teen
guilty in Mississippi school-shooting
rampage,” 1998

Wurst

Andrew

1998

Parker Middle School

PA

USA

Associated Press, 2000; DeJong,
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Appendix B: Code Book
1. ID: Unique identification number for each incident (may be duplicated if
multiple offfenders). This number provides a means of allowing the computer to
distinguish between events in cases where more than one offender was involved.
2. LastName: Offender’s last name, included only for identification purposes.
3. FirstName: Offender’s first name, included only for identification purposes.
4. MiddleName: Offender’s middle name, included only for identification
purposes.
5. Gender: Offender’s gender, included only for statistical purposes. The
proportion of female rampage shooting offenders to male offenders is too low to
allow for any meaningful differentiation between female offender behaviors versus
male offender behaviors. This field was coded either as “Male” or “Female.”
6. Ethnicity: Offender’s race/ethnicity, , included only for statistical purposes.
Ethnicity was coded as “White,” “Black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” “Native American,”
“Other” (including mixed race), or “Unknown.”
7. Age: Offender’s age (in whole years), included only for statistical purposes.
8. Criterion: This field identifies the criterion for inclusion and was coded as
“MultVics” (two or more people shot), “RandomShots” (shots were fired randomly
with probable intent to wound), or “AttemptMultVics” (attempted to shoot multiple
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victims, regardless of number shot).40
9. TimeOfDay: Period of the day when the incident took place. This variable
was coded as “Early Morning 0400-0800,” “Morning 0800-1200,” “Afternoon
1200-1600,” “Late Afternoon 1600-2000,” “Evening 2000-2400,” or “Night
2400-0400.” This variable was used to determine if there time-of-day factors could
be used to influence the deployment of security resources at schools.
10. Month: Month during which incident occurred (two numerical digits). This
variable is used for statistical purposes and to aid in understanding when law
enforcement and security resources are most needed to respond to a rampage school
shooting.
11. Day: Day of month on which incident began (two numerical digits). This
variable is used for statistical purposes and to aid in understanding when law
enforcement and security resources are most needed to respond to a rampage school
shooting.
12. Year: Year during which incident occurred (four numerical digits). This
variable is used for statistical purposes.
13. DayOfWeek: Day of the week on which incident began (automatically
calculated by spreadsheet based on month, day, and year). The variable is coded as 1
= Saturday, 2 = Sunday, 3 = Monday, 4 = Tuesday, 5 = Wednesday, 6 = Thursday, and
40 Acts

of politically-motivated terrorism and acts of targeted domestic violence that did not

involve additional randomly-selected victims were excluded from the data set. Acts apparently related to
gang violence, drug activity, or criminal enterprise were excluded. Shootings that occurred entirely within
campus dormitories or residential facilities were also excluded.
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7 = Friday.
14. VenueType: Type of school at which incident primarily took place, coded as
“College/University,” “High School,” “Middle School,” “Elementary School,”
“Trade School,” or “Other School.”
15. VenueName: The name of the school where the incident primarily took place.
16. City: The city in which the school is located.
17. State: The state in which the school is located (two-character postal
abbreviation).
18. Country: The country in which the school is located, coded as either “USA”
or “CAN.”
19. Description: Text field with brief description of the shooting incident.
20. RampageEnded: What was the primary event that ended the shooting
rampage? This variable was coded as “Suicide” when the offender committed or
attempted suicide; “UnarmedCitizen” when the offender was subdued by or
surrendered to an unarmed citizen, including faculty or staff; “ArmedCitizen” when
the offender surrendered to an armed citizen; “Firearm” when the offender either
experienced a firearm malfunction or ran out of ammunition, ending the shooting;
“Fled” if the offender fled the scene or voluntarily stopped shooting; or “Police” if
the rampage was stopped by police intervention.
21. RestrictedAccess: Was access to the venue restricted by means of some type
of physical security? (Boolean)
22. ArmedSecurity: Was the venue protected by armed security personnel who
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were present when the incident began? (Boolean)
23. UnarmedSecurity: Was the venue protected by unarmed security personnel
who were present when the incident began? (Boolean)
24. FirearmsRestricted: Were firearms prohibited or restricted at the venue in
the location where the incident primarily took place? (Boolean)
25. Killed: Number of victims killed (not included the offender).
26. Wounded: Number of victims wounded (not included the offender).
27. AdultVictims: Were adult victims shot by the offender? (Boolean)
28. ChildVicitms: Were child victims shot by the offender? (Boolean)
29. MaleVictims: Were male victims shot by the offender? (Boolean)
30. FemaleVictims: Were female victims shot by the offender? (Boolean)
31. ShotFamilyMembers: Did the offender shoot family members prior to or in
association with the shooting rampage? (Boolean)
32. ShotCoworkers: Did the offender shoot coworkers during the rampage?
(Boolean)
33. ShotStudents: Did the offender shoot students? (Boolean)
34. ShotFaculty: Did the offender shoot faculty or staff members? (Boolean)
35. ShotOtherKnown: Did the offender shoot others known to him/her (not
employees or students)? (Boolean)
36. SparedVictims: Did the offender intentionally spare any victims’ lives?
(Boolean)
37. Spree.MultipleLocations: Did the offender engage in a spree killing defined
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by multiple locations? (Boolean)
38. Spree.BreakInTime: Did the offender engage in a spree killing defined by a
break in time between killings? (Boolean)
39. KilledPriorToRampage: Did the offender kill anyone prior to carrying out
the rampage? (Boolean)
40. CommittedSuicide: Did the offender commit or attempt to commit suicide
during or immediately following the rampage? (Boolean)
41. KilledByPolice: Was the offender killed by police during or immediately
following the rampage? (Boolean)
42. KilledBySecurity: Was the offender killed by security personnel (non-LEO)
during or immediately following the rampage? (Boolean)
43. KilledByCivilian: Was the offender killed by a civilian during or
immediately following the rampage? (Boolean)
44. ShotByPolice: - Was the offender shot by police during or immediately
following the rampage but not killed? (Boolean)
45. ShotBySecurity: - Was the offender shot by security personnel (non-LEO)
during or immediately following the rampage but not killed? (Boolean)
46. ShotByCivilian: - Was the offender shot by a civilian during or immediately
following the rampage but not killed? (Boolean)
47. PoliceGunfire: Did police fire at the offender? (Boolean)
48. ConfrontedByPolice: Was the offender confronted by police during or
immediately following the rampage but not shot? (Boolean)
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49. ConfrontedByArmedSecurity: Was the offender confronted by armed
security personnel (non-LEO) during or immediately following the rampage but not
shot? (Boolean)
50. ConfrontedByUnarmedSecurity: Was the offender confronted by unarmed
security personnel (non-LEO) during or immediately following the rampage?
(Boolean)
51. ConfrontedByArmedCivilian: Was the offender confronted by an armed
civilian during or immediately following the rampage but not shot? (Boolean)
52. ConfrontedByUnarmedCivilian: Was the offender confronted by an
unarmed civilian during or immediately following the rampage? (Boolean)
53. PoliceArrived.NoConfrontation: Did police arrive at the scene prior to
termination of the rampage but not confront the offender? (Boolean)
54. TakenIntoCustody: Was the offender taken into police custody at the scene?
(Boolean)
55. Fled: Did the offender flee and escape the scene? (Boolean)
56. CommittedSuicide.OtherLocation: Did the offender escape the scene and
then commit suicide at another location? (Boolean)
57. TacticalAttire: Did the offender dress in tactical attire such as BDU pants,
tactical vest, gun belt, etc.? (Boolean)
58. VisibleWeapons: Did the offender display or have visible weapons prior to
shooting? (Boolean)
59. VerbalAnnouncement: Did the offender make a verbal announcement of his
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presence and/or intent prior to shooting? (Boolean)
60. ShotsFired.NotAtPerson: Did the offender fire shots that were not aimed at a
person (ceiling, wall, door, etc.)? (Boolean)
61. AtScenePriorToAttack: Was the offender at the venue in the normal course
of business prior to beginning the rampage (e.g., went to class, attended meeting,
studying in library, etc.)? (Boolean)
62. StagedWeaponsOrGear: Did the offender stage weapons, ammunition, or
gear at the venue prior to carrying out the rampage? (Boolean)
63. ForcedEntry: Did the offender force entry into any area within the venue?
(Boolean)
64. BarricadedSniper: Did the offender barricade himself/herself or otherwise
conceal his/her location to snipe at victims from a distance? (Boolean)
65. MobileShooter: Was the offender mobile at any point during the rampage?
(Boolean)
66. TargetedVictims: Did the offender select any of his/her victims based on
targeted characteristics? (Boolean)
67. RandonVictims: Did the offender select any of his/her victims at random?
(Boolean)
68. FirearmsDescription: Text description of the firearms used by the offender.
69. FirearmsBroughtToScene: Number of firearms the offender brought to the
venue (including staged firearms).
70. FirearmsCarried: Number of firearms the offender carried on his/her person
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(or kept within arms reach) during the rampage.
71. FirearmsDischarged: Number of firearms the offender actually fired during
the rampage.
72. HandgunUsed: Did the offender fire any handguns? (Boolean)
73. RifleUsed: Did the offender fire any rifles? (Boolean)
74. AssaultRifleUsed: Did the offender fire any centerfire semiautomatic rifles?
(Boolean)
75. ShotgunUsed: Did the offender fire any shotguns? (Boolean)
76. FirearmsBroughtNotUsed: Did the offender bring any firearms to the scene
that were not fired? (Boolean)
77. SemiautomaticFirearmsUsed: Did the offender fire any semiautomatic
firearms? (Boolean)
78. AutomaticFirearmsUsed: Did the offender fire any automatic or select-fire
firearms? (Boolean)
79. Reloaded: Did the offender reload any firearms during the rampage?
(Boolean)
80. AcquiredFirearmsAtScene: Did the offender acquire any firearms not
belonging to him/her during the rampage? (Boolean)
81. AcquiredAmmunitionAtScene: Did the offender acquire any ammunition
not belonging to him/her during the rampage? (Boolean)
82. TotalRoundsFired: Total number of rounds fired by the offender at the scene
of the rampage.
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83. DepletedAmmunition: Did the offender run out of ammunition during the
rampage? (Boolean)
84. FirearmMalfunctioned: Did the offender experience a firearms malfunction
(failure to fire, failure to feed, failure to eject. etc.) during the rampage? (Boolean)
85. Weapon.Explosives: Did the offender deploy or attempt to deploy any
explosives at the scene of the rampage? (Boolean)
86. Weapon.Edged: Did the offender use any edged weapon during the rampage?
(Boolean)
87. Weapon.Impact: Did the offender use any impact weapon during the
rampage? (Boolean)
88. Weapon.ECD: Did the offender use any electronic control device (Taser, stun
gun, etc.) during the rampage? (Boolean)
89. CoeffenderStatus: Was the offender the only shooter, or did he/she have
cooffenders? This variable was coded as “Alone,” “One Co-offender,” or “Multiple
Cooffenders.”
90. TotalMinutes: The total time (in minutes) from beginning to end of the
rampage.
91. StudentStatus: Offender’s student status, coded as “Current”, “Former,”, or
“Not Applicable.”
92. StudentType: Offender’s student type, coded as “Undergraduate,”
“Graduate,” “Professional,” “Doctoral,” “Other,” or “Not Applicable.”
93. EmployeeStatus: Offender’s employee status at venue, coded as “Current,”
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“Former,” or “Not Applicable.”
94. EducationLevel: Offender’s highest education level, coded as “Less Than
High School,” “High School,” “Some College,” “Undergraduate Degree,” “Graduate
Degree,” “Professional/Doctoral Degree,” “Trade Certificate,” or “Other.” Use
“other” if unknown.
95. MilitaryService: Offender’s military service status, coded as “Current,”
“Former,” or “No Service.”
96. HistoryMentalIllness: Did the offender have a diagnosed history of mental
illness? (Boolean)
97. HistoryViolence: Did the offender have a prior history of violence?
(Boolean)
98. PriorRiskAssessment: Was the offender the subject of a prior risk
assessment? (Boolean)
99. PriorThreatAssessment: Was the offender the subject of a prior threat
assessment? (Boolean)
100.PriorDirectThreats: Did the offender make direct threats of the rampage
prior to carrying it out? (Boolean)
101.IntimatedPlanToOthers: Did the offender communicate his/her plan to
anyone else prior to carrying out the rampage? (Boolean)
102.BehaviorChange: Did others notice a change in behavior in the days prior to
the shooting episode? (Boolean)
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Appendix C: Additional Statistical Tables

